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From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly
be inferred that in saying "There can be no liberty where the
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or
body of magistrates," or, "if the power of judging be not separated
from the legislative and executive powers," he did not mean that these
departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over,
the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import, and
still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can
amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole
power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free
constitution are subverted.
-The Federalist No. 47 (Madison)'
I. INTRODUCTION
Alexander Hamilton wrote that the judiciary was "the least dangerous"
branch.2 But which was the most dangerous? James Madison, another alter
ego of Publius,3 had no doubt. "The legislative department" he wrote, "is
everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its
impetuous vortex."4 Publius therefore urged that "it is against the enterprising
ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy
and exhaust all their precautions."5 Two centuries later, things look very
different. Never has the executive branch been more powerful, nor more
dominant over its two counterparts, than since the New Deal. Yet against this
new vortex the Supreme Court has exhausted scarcely any constitutional
precautions. To the contrary, the Court has done more to safeguard presidential
power in the past two decades than at any time in our history. This inversion
of the Founders' concern about the most dangerous branch-whichever branch
that may be-hardly registers in modem separation of powers thinking. It
should.
The dominance of executive power ought by now, to lift a phrase from
Charles Black, to be a matter of common notoriety not so much for judicial
notice as for background knowledge of educated people who live in this
republic.6 The point holds, moreover, notwithstanding Congress's recent
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302-03 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
3. Though he could claim to be still another alter ego of "Publius," John Jay contributed merely five
of the 85 essays that make up The Federalist Papers.
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
5. Id.
6. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1960).
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resurgence, especially when the larger historical context is kept in mind. Over
one hundred years ago, Woodrow Wilson could still write that "[t]he balances
of the Constitution are for the most part only ideal. For all practical
purposes ... Congress [is] predominant over its so-called co-brdinate
branches."7 Nor, ordinarily, did this state of affairs produce constitutional
conflict or appreciable case law. But the government Wilson knew,
"congressional government," is long gone, and with it the interbranch harmony
that once prevailed. 8 Today the President can treat even the most meager
electoral victory as a national mandate to a degree unthinkable in Wilson's
day.9 Even after the Cold War, the President commands the largest military
establishment on earth and the massive security apparatus that goes with it.
Finally, the President maintains either direct or primary control over the
"administrative state," the colossal array of agencies that legislate and
adjudicate under any but the broadest definition of "executing" the laws. The
Supreme Court has little legitimately to say about claims to electoral
mandates.1t It has chosen to say little about executive deployment of the
military." Thanks to repeated congressional challenges, however, it has said
a great deal about the President's authority to carry out laws at home. The
more it has said, however, the less it has made clear.
The result has been not just confusion but stalemate. In part, case law and
commentary greet the historic growth of presidential power with alarm and
therefore approve various devices meant to keep it in check, including
restrictions upon the President's removal authority, interbranch appointment of
"executive" officials, and, least successfully, the legislative veto. But in larger
part, the weight of precedent and scholarship rests with those who reject such
7. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 52 (The
Legal Classics Library 1993) (1885).
8. As President, Wilson of course would later play a significant part in shifting the balance to the
President. See generally ARTHUR S. LINK, THE HIGHER REALISM OF WOODROW WILSON 133 (1971); JOHN
MORTON BLUM, WOODROW WILSON AND THE POLITICS OF MORALITY (1956).
9. As far as the victors are concerned, moreover, the fact of victory matters more than its size.
President Clinton, who won by a 43% plurality, still claimed that the election represented a national
consensus for a "new beginning." Robin Toner, Bush Pledges Help: Governor Given an Edge of 43% to
38%, With Perot Getting 18%, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at Al, B6.
10. The Constitution, in other words, affords courts no basis to evaluate the political impact of
elections. It does of course enable the judiciary to consider the fairness of election procedures. See Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (challenging North Carolina's congressional redistricting plan); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (challenging Alabama's state legislative apportionment); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962) (challenging Tennessee's apportionment of seats in General Assembly).
11. The Court has managed to avoid saying much about executive deployment of the military in
circumstances of questionable constitutionality. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973)
(Douglas, J.) (upholding stay of district court's injunction prohibiting Defense Department's military
participation in Cambodia); Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1321 (1973) (Marshall, J.); id. at 1322
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (denying certiorari in challenge to
drafting and deployment of troops to Vietnam); id. (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 935 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). For a powerful argument that the Court should consider such issues, see JOHN HART ELY, WAR
AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993).
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controls.'2 In an effort to break the impasse, each side has increasingly turned
to history-in particular, to Founding conceptions regarding separation of
powers.' 3 So far, however, this move has had nearly the opposite effect and
made the stalemate even more intractable. 4
However long doctrine divided against itself can stand, both sides cannot
be right. It is evident from the current impasse that both sides suffer from two
basic problems in their treatment of the history of separation of powers. The
more basic one is simply that they get their history wrong to begin with. This
problem occurs most commonly when scholars and judges project onto early
understandings of the doctrine a rigid set of formal categories or when they
misconstrue the functions for which separation of powers was established. The
other problem arises through incorrectly applying what insights the Founding
does yield to the vastly different circumstances of today.
This Article seeks to dispense with the first problem and clear a path
toward resolving the second. Accomplishing these goals requires new
approaches, and this study offers two. First, this Article cuts the current
historicist knot by rejecting the "forensic history"' 5 commonly practiced by
lawyers and legal academics in favor of historical methods as undertaken by
historians. In contrast to much of the writing on either side of the present
divide, it seeks to construct a narrative of constitutional development based not
solely or even principally on primary materials, but rather on the wealth of
historical scholarship that has recently been devoted to the Founding. In this
fashion, this study aims to avoid the usual result from the encounter between
law and history that I have elsewhere dubbed "History 'Lite." ' 6 This method
exposes the presidentialist account-advanced in its most powerful form by
Justice Scalia and Professors Stephen Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash-as
incomplete and flawed. Put another way, it corroborates the core assertion
advanced (but not demonstrated) by Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein, that
the unitarian executive attributed to the Founding is "just myth."' 7
Reconstruction faithful to the past in turn clears the way for breaking the
juridical stalemate. The Founders embraced separation of powers to further
several widely agreed-upon goals. Among these were certain ends or values
12. See infra Subsections II.A.I-2.
13. See infra Subsection II.A.3.
14. As the latest edition of a leading administrative law casebook puts it:
Can the rich tapestry of government we have, the product of Congress's varying choices over
the years, be squared with the Constitution we have? It may be surprising to see how deeply
that question still divides the legal community. The early history is recounted in detail, and its
implications hotly debated ....
PETER STRAuss ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE's ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 51-52 (9th ed. 1995).
15. John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 193, 203-20 (1993).
16. Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 523
(1995).
17. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
1, 4 (1994).
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that today are commonly at the center of separation of powers debates,
including balance among the branches, responsibility or accountability to the
electorate, and energetic, efficient government. Currently, these goals are seen
to be almost necessarily in tension, with balance cutting against a unitary
presidency but accountability and energy cutting in its favor. The light shed by
the Founding suggests that this need not be the case. On the one hand, an
examination of the period only confirms the foundational importance of
balance. In this light, the emergence of the administrative state renders
congressional regulation of the executive branch more crucial than ever before,
especially since Congress enjoyed extensive regulatory authority even when it
was still the most dangerous branch. On the other hand, a better understanding
of the Founding undermines current thinking about accountability and energy.
Contrary to the usual scholarly assumptions-including those of Lessig and
Sunstein-the Founders sought to tame, not further empower, those divisions
of government that claim a special responsiveness to the electorate. On this
basis, the need for congressional regulation becomes imperative precisely
because of the modem presidency's claim to electoral accountability.
Conversely, many of the Founders did extol separation of powers as a way to
accord government greater energy, much as modem constitutional thinkers do
today. Viewed in context, however, that commitment was modest, especially
given the sheer scope of modem governmental activity.
These basic strategies-first, a faithful reconstruction of the doctrine's
origins, and second, the attendant reconciliation of the purposes underlying
separation of powers-confirm the initial intuition that there is something
anomalous about the judiciary shielding what is now the most powerful office
in the nation. These approaches refute the idea that the Founders had
developed a thoroughgoing, tripartite baseline capable of resolving modem
controversies. They demonstrate that balance favors a flexible approach, that
accountability bolsters this view, and that energy in the modem context is
largely irrelevant. They point, finally, toward doctrinal bases for congressional
regulation that are more thoroughgoing than anything currently mooted in
separation of powers scholarship.
To appreciate how thoroughgoing these bases are, Part II examines the
current separation of powers deadlock, then suggests how looking at the past,
which to this point has only exacerbated matters, can provide a way of cutting
the judicial and scholarly knot. Accordingly, Part II first considers the
persistence of certain themes in the Supreme Court's recent separation of
powers case law and examines parallel themes in related scholarship, both
analytical and historical. Given the prominent invocations of history in this
process, this part next argues that the historical record may show a way
forward, but not without some conception of how to look at such a record
properly. To do that requires, at a minimum, a strong sense of the current
professional narrative of early constitutional history, from the Revolution
1730 [Vol. 105: 1725
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through Ratification-a sense conspicuously absent from most recent legal
writing in the area.
Part III practices what Part II preaches. It traces the evolution of early
American approaches to separation of powers from independence to the
framing of the Constitution to the ratification debates (which have been largely
ignored in this area). Out of this treatment, the foundational imperatives of
balance, a different type of accountability, and comparative concern for energy
plainly emerge. A rigid tripartite division of all government plainly does not.
Previous attempts to resolve these matters, even those that have reached similar
conclusions, have failed largely because they have been more concerned with
justifying an appeal to history in the first place rather than with the difficult
task of reconstructing Founding values themselves.
Those values reconstructed, Part IV suggests how they apply to the very
different governmental structures that exist today. It first considers how two-
hundred-year-old values are applicable to modern circumstances at all, arguing
that in this case the familiar brand of originalism offered by Justice Scalia and
Judge Bork actually undermines fidelity to the Founding while the models of
"synthesis" advanced by Bruce Ackerman and "translation" set out by
Lawrence Lessig present ways forward that do remain faithful to the past. Part
IV then examines several principal changes since the Founding that affect any
application of past imperatives to present conditions. These changes, each one
dramatically accelerated by the New Deal, include: the shift in power from the
legislature to the executive, especially in light of the administrative state; the
presidency's rise as not just the most dangerous branch, but the most
accountable branch as well; and the expansion of federal governmental activity.
Part IV ends with the doctrinal solutions that result from applying the
imperatives derived from the Founding to the modem circumstances just
examined. As an initial matter, there is no reason to abandon the apparent
Founding strategy of leaving separation of powers controversies to be
hammered out by the branches themselves, given that each is armed with
explicit means of self-defense and negotiation. The part concludes by looking
at whether the Court has been--or would be-justified in abandoning this
strategy with regard to the legislative veto, removal, and the line item veto.
The Article itself concludes by emphasizing that, whatever the precise doctrinal
cash out, it should remain clear from now on that the history of separation of
powers does not support the formalist assumptions too often taken for granted
in present case law and scholarship.
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II. "MARCHING BACKWARD INTO THE FUTURE '1 8
A. Past Imperfect: The Modem Separation of Powers Stalemate
Separation of powers has an ancient pedigree. The debate it currently
generates, however, has crystallized only recently. Since lawyers can fell great
forests in little time, sketching even a recent debate runs the risk of
oversimplification. The overall picture is nonetheless clear. The dominant
unitarian position conceives of the executive branch as a separate entity
ordinarily accountable to the President alone. This view receives its most
powerful support, though not necessarily its most convincing justification, from
jurists whose approach to separation of powers is best described as formalist.
This brand of formalism in turn rests on an analytic foundation built by
commentators who set out the larger values the formalist model
advances-above all, the goal of greater accountability of an energetic and
efficient government to the people it represents. The less successful
trinitarian 19 position contends that the lawful activities of the executive branch
may be regulated not only by the President, but by Congress and the judiciary
as well. This approach enjoys its most significant support from Justices, often
in dissent, best described as functionalist. Functionalist opinions are likewise
elaborated in law review commentary, only here the larger values cited center
on the goal of maintaining the three branches of government in balance.
1. Separation of Powers in the Supreme Court
The idea that government consists of distinct functions goes back at least
to ancient Greece.20 The argument that discrete institutions should discharge
government's distinct functions goes back at least to seventeenth-century
England.21 During the eighteenth century, Americans hotly debated and
refined these ideas in contesting the assertions of Parliament, in shaping the
first state constitutions, and in designing the Federal Constitution.22 For most
of the nation's history, however, separation of powers prompted little
controversy. Until recently the Supreme Court considered few separation of
18. The image comes from MARVIN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF
229-33 (2d ed. 1960). Here I use it in two senses: first, to refer to those turning backward to the past when
analyzing modem separation of powers disputes; and second, to indicate those who, having done so poorly,
have come up with backward answers.
19. The term comes from A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 NW.
U. L. REV. 1346, 1348 (1994).
20. M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 21-23 (1967).
21. Id. at 23-75, 98-118; see also W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 66-99
(1965).
22. See infra Part III.
[Vol. 105: 17251732
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powers cases of any sort-still less those involving Congress and the
President.' This is not to say that the lines between President and Congress
went unaddressed." What stands out, however, is the lack of contention. In
marked contrast to the federal government and the states, the President and
Congress had apparently worked out ways to proceed with the business of
government, or at least had done so enough so as not to wind up in court.
From the republic's earliest days, many of these arrangements involved some
type of congressional meddling in the President's direction of the executive
branch.'
The harmony diminished as government grew until, by the end of this
century, it is all but inaudible. The contrasting dissonance at first emerged
slowly, starting with Myers v. United States,26 which promoted the unitary
presidency, and Humphrey's Executor v. United States,27 which did not.
Conflict accelerated, albeit in similar inconsistent fashion, when a campaign
mounted by President Reagan's constitutional brain trust attacked an array of
accommodations that the legislature and the executive had previously worked
out. This campaign led to a quick succession of landmark decisions, including
INS v. Chadha,28 Bowsher v. Synar,29 and Morrison v. Olson.3° Yet the
conflicts have outlasted the campaign that made what had been rare judicial
interventions in this field almost commonplace, as witness Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Airport
Noise3 and this past Term's Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. 32
In nearly all of these cases, the Court has employed one of two basic
approaches in justifying its holdings. One, supporting the model of a unitary
executive branch, has aptly been called formalistic. Initially championed by
23. This list is not extensive. See, e.g., Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897) (finding that
Congress conceded to President power to remove district attorney of United States); United States v.
Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886) (holding that when Congress, by law, vests appointment of inferior officers
in heads of departments, it may limit and restrict power of removal as it deems best for public interest);
Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50 (1884) (holding that executive supervision that head
of department may exercise over subordinates in administrative and executive matters does not extend to
matters in which subordinate is directed by statute to act judicially); United States ex rel. Goodrich v.
Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284 (1854) (holding that no court has power to command withdrawal of money
from treasury of United States to pay any claim against United States); In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230
(1839) (holding that appointment of clerks of courts properly belongs to courts of law); Kendall v. United
States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838) (holding that it is President's duty to see how and when
laws are executed, and that such a power cannot be given to courts); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803).
24. See Kendall, 37 U.S. at 524; Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137.
25. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 11-38.
26. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
27. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
28. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
29. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
30. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
31. 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
32. 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
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Chief Justice Taft,33 this approach has found its best-known exponents in
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Scalia. Easily the Court's dominant approach,
formalism has recently betrayed certain serious limitations that have become
evident in light of its very success. The Court's other principal approach,
invoked on behalf of congressional regulation, is functional. Echoing early
defenses by Justices Holmes and Brandeis has been Justice White. Lacking the
clarity of formalism, the functional approach has-despite some critical
triumphs-lacked its rival's success.34
The Court's formalist cases teach what "every schoolchild learns," 35 at
least those schoolchildren who are headed to the Office of Legal Counsel.
Formalist catechism posits three discrete branches, each exercising one of three
distinct powers. The legislative, executive, and judicial branches, with certain
carefully crafted exceptions, each controls its own domain, unconstrained by
its counterparts. For the executive, ultimate control rests with the President. No
less importantly, formalist precepts consider legislative, executive, and judicial
powers, which mark the proper domains of their respective branches, to be
readily identifiable. The domain of executive power is especially broad under
this approach, amounting almost by default to any governmental action distinct
from passing a statute or adjudicating a case.
Given this canon, any action Congress takes to limit the President's control
over the executive branch is presumptively invalid. This is true when those
limitations take the form of congressional action that cuts too many corners to
count as a statute. Chadha set forth the formalist defense to the first type of
assault, otherwise known as the "legislative veto. '36 Likewise, congressional
33. Myers, 272 U.S. at 52.
34. Here I draw upon the formalist/functionalist dichotomy employed by Peter Strauss. See Peter L.
Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?,
72 CORNELL L. REv. 488 (1987). This Article, however, uses the term "functionalist" in a slightly different
manner. Strauss employs "functionalist" to refer to functions of government-legislative, executive, and
judicial-to argue, rightly in my view, that many administrative agencies engage in all three functions and
therefore cannot fit into a rigid, tripartite structure, see id. at 492-94; I use the term "functionalist" to refer
to the functions-for example, balance among the branches of government-for which the doctrine of
separation of powers was developed, see infra text accompanying notes 44-46.
35. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
36. Congress had established a scheme, the Immigration and Nationality Act, in which it could oversee
determinations on certain matters, such as the status of individual aliens, otherwise delegated to the
executive branch through the resolution of either house of Congress. Chief Justice Burger's formalist
opinion rejected this setup without difficulty. Citing text and original intent, the opinion addressed the
proposition that "as nearly as possible ... each branch of government would confine itself to its assigned
responsibility." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. The legislative branch would therefore legislate subject to several
intrabranch requirements, most notably bicameralism, and to the single interbranch requirement of
presentment to the President. Id. at 944-51. The discreteness of the branches established, the Court next
considered the formalist contention that "[tihe Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the
new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, Judicial ..... [powers that
are] functionally identifiable." Id. at 951. For various reasons, the Court had little trouble labeling an
attempt to alter the legal status of an alien as "Legislative." The distinct power identified, the Court's
conclusion inexorably followed. A single house had tried to control the executive through a legislative act
without either forwarding that act to the other house or presenting it to the President. By definition,
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limitations are also presumptively invalid when they take the form of executive
action through congressional agents. Bowsher refined the formalist defense to
this second type of assault, the oversight of officials who execute the laws.37
Formalists have good reason to feel satisfied. Between them, Chadha and
Bowsher have provided the Court with a framework for separation of powers
analysis that endures. Judicial formalists, moreover, have even greater reason
to cheer. When applied, the formalist framework has proven to be one of the
more successful forms of judicial activism, almost invariably resulting in the
invalidation of often carefully conceived arrangements forged by the so-called
"political branches."3 s Even so, in legal analysis as in business, "[t]here is
nothing more vulnerable than entrenched success. 39 In its success may lie
formalism's eventual downfall, as the Court's extensions of the approach
reveal its contradictions.
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority illustrates both formalism's
current strength and its internal weakness. The case considered the
constitutionality of a review board composed of nine members of Congress
"sitting in their individual capacities" that would have "veto" power over major
capital decisions made by a joint authority established by Virginia and the
District of Columbia to administer National and Dulles Airports, which were
previously run by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).40 In a formalist
tour de force, the Court found--or at least suggested-separation of powers
infringements twice over. If, the Court held, the joint airports authority
exercised legislative power, then the review board violated Chadha. Not only
could the nine members of Congress make law without comporting with the
requirements of either bicameralism or presentment, they could do so without
something less than Congress was attempting to encroach upon the President by doing something that only
Congress with the President could do. Id. at 954-55.
37. This case arose when Congress assigned certain budgetary functions to the Comptroller General
of the United States, a post Congress had earlier established to keep its own financial house in order as
head of the General Accounting Office. Once more, a formalist opinion by Chief Justice Burger made short
work of what might have been a thorny matter. Taking the discreteness of the branches as a given, the
Court first determined that the Comptroller General was a creature of the legislative branch, mainly on the
basis that Congress exercised the authority to remove him. The Court next considered the nature of the
powers the office exercised. So long as the Comptroller General's office merely served the informational
needs of Congress, it did not wield the distinct powers of the other branches and in fact had not done so
for over 50 years. Problems arose when Congress gave the Comptroller General the new power of using
independent judgment to make an estimate that would bind the President in reducing the federal deficit.
This new power, declared the Court, "plainly entail[ed] execution of the law in constitutional terms."
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-33. Congress, in short, had created a post answerable only to it yet had later
accorded it the type of authority that could be given only to officers answerable to the President.
38. See, e.g., Plaut, 115 S. Ct. 1447 (invalidating congressional attempt to "reopen" securities cases
that had been finally adjudicated); Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 501 U.S. 252 (invalidating
participation of Congresspersons on Metropolitan Airports Authority Board of Review); Bowsher, 478 U.S.
714 (invalidating Comptroller General's participation in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings process); Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (invalidating legislative veto).
39. George Romney quoted in DAVID HALBERSTAM, OCrOBER 1964, at ix (1994).
40. 501 U.S. at 259-60 n.5.
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gaining the assent of even one house of Congress.4 ' Conversely, if the
authority wielded executive power, then the review board violated Bowsher.42
On this view, the law was being executed not only by congressional "agents"
but also by agents who were themselves members of Congress. Either way,
Congress lost.
As Justice White noted in dissent, "The majority never makes up its mind
whether its claim is that the Board exercises legislative or executive
authority.' 43 Yet making up one's mind whether a given power is legislative
or executive is precisely the determination that formalism presumes will often
be easy and must always be clear. The core formalist idea, after all, is that
three disparate branches respectively exercise three different powers. If this is
true, the same power cannot at once be the subject of a violation because the
President alone can (ultimately) exercise it and because Congress alone
(subject to presentment) can exercise it. The Court's readiness to treat the
administrative tasks of the review board as either legislative or executive may
simply show indecision. But it may also signal that, at least for the purposes
of separation of powers, the tasks undertaken by agencies like the FAA or the
joint airports authority do not really fall into any of the three rigid formalist
categories.
That proposition is at the heart of the Court's other main analytic
approach. The functionalist model views separation of powers doctrine as
underdeveloped and pragmatic. Functionalists consequently reject any global
framework that attempts to specify the nature and place of all powers in
advance. This is not to say that the functional view repudiates notions of
structure. To the contrary, the functional approach acknowledges that the
Constitution sets forth certain fundamental boundaries among the three
branches, mostly in clear text, and mostly at the highest level. Only Congress
can (subject to presentment) enact laws. 4 Only the President can appoint
(subject to the advice and consent of the Senate) ambassadors or "judges" of
the Supreme Court.45 Only the Supreme Court (subject to congressional
regulation) shall enjoy final appellate jurisdiction in federal cases.46 Nor does
the functionalist position hold that no separation of powers constraints exist
other than specific, textual ones. The functional approach voices particular
concern for maintaining a basic equilibrium among the branches. The very
term "functionalist"---at least as I employ the term-stems from the inquiry
into how a given device like the legislative veto functions to hinder this type
of more broadly defined goal. The formalist views devices that do not comport
41. Id. at 276.
42. Id. at 275-76.
43. Id. at 290 (White, J., dissenting).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cf. 2.
45. Id. art. II, § 2, ci. 2.
46. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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with a rigid tripartite division as hindering the purposes of separation of
powers by definition. The functionalist is not so sure. To her, the Constitution
does not inhibit, and even invites, the legislature, the executive, and the
judiciary to share power in creative ways. So long as the arrangements that
emerge do not upset the specified design at the top of the structure, and so
long as they do not infringe the basic and strongly implied goals of separation
of powers, what emerges is fair game.
Given this approach, congressional regulation of the executive is
presumptively valid. This is true regardless of whether the limitation appears
to take the form of a legislative act short of a formal statute, as in Chadha, or
whether the regulation seems more like an executive measure undertaken by
agents answerable to Congress, as in Bowsher. For functionalists, these
appearances are beside the point. What matters instead is whether a challenged
arrangement directly undercuts that more fundamental value that a particular
division of powers was meant to advance in the first place.
In comparison to their doctrinal rivals, functionalists have enjoyed only
modest success. The presumption of validity was scarcely apparent with regard
to the legislative veto, for example, Justice White's dissent notwithstanding.47
It fared better, however, when directed at congressional limitations on
executive officials, most notably in Morrison.as Even then, functionalist
47. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967-1013 (White, J., dissenting). As an initial matter, the dissent makes
clear that "[t]he Constitution does not directly authorize or prohibit the legislative veto," id. at 977, a point
that Justice White would later argue applies to nearly all of the devices at issue in separation of powers
cases. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 501 U.S. at 282 (White, J., dissenting); Bowsher, 478 U.S.
at 760-64 (White, J., dissenting). The real question therefore becomes whether the legislative veto violates
the principles of separation of powers functionally. About this Justice White had no doubt. For him, a
device not specifically prohibited violates the Constitution only if it operates as a sword in the hands of
one branch "to aggrandize itself at the expense of the other branches." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 974 (White,
J., dissenting). Far from a congressional sword, he declared, the legislative veto functions as a shield.
"[,V]ithin the last half century," the dissent noted, "the complexity and size of the Federal Government's
responsibilities [have] grown so greatly," id. at 978 (White, J., dissenting), that Congress has delegated vast
areas of what is in effect lawmaking authority to administrative agencies formally within the executive
branch, delegations the Court has approved, id. at 984-85 (White, J., dissenting). These developments mean
that the executive branch in functional reality now makes laws where in formalist theory it could only
execute them, a development that has increased the power of the executive branch exponentially. In this
light, the legislative veto represents Congress's attempt to prevent the wholesale abdication of "its
lawmaking function to the Executive Branch and independent agencies." Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
Whatever its analytic power, however, Justice White's approach did not convince any of his colleagues.
48. In Morrison, the Court considered whether Congress could establish an "independent counsel"
within the executive branch by significantly curtailing the appointment and removal powers that the
President would otherwise exercise over ordinary prosecutors. 487 U.S. at 660-69. Chief Justice Rehnquist
answered yes-a significant result in and of itself. But at least as significant was the Court's functionalist
approach, which was most significant in the Court's discussion of removal authority. While Congress, with
one hand, had given the authority to discharge an independent counsel to the Attorney General, with the
other it had specified that this authority could be exercised only "for good cause." Id. at 663. In considering
these limitations, the Court found that the rigid discreteness of the branches did not matter. To the contrary,
the majority opined that "[t]he analysis contained in our removal cases is designed not to define rigid
categories of those officials who may or may not be removed at will by the President .... [The real
question is whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability
to perform his constitutional duty." Id. at 689-91. The "for good cause" requirement did not. Nor did the
limits on presidential authority takeh together. In what amounted to a functionalist manifesto, the Court
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victories are usually passive and self-denying from the point of view of the
judges who win them for the simple reason that the application of functionalist
analysis almost always upholds the results that the political branches
produce. 49 This, too, is hardly surprising since the flexibility of functionalism
by definition accords with the flexibility of the political arrangements that the
President and Congress reach so long as those arrangements do not violate an
underlying functional goal.
Like formalism, functionalism also has its problems; unlike formalism,
those problems are mainly external rather than internal. As noted, the Court's
brand of formalism threatens to collapse of its own weight.50 Positing three
distinct governmental powers, at least one majority has already found itself
treating an agency's authority as both legislative and executive. By contrast,
the Court's attempts at functionalism have not so much run into difficulties on
their own terms as run up against the Court's dominant formalist mindset.
Functionalists may plausibly claim Humphrey's Executor and Morrison, as
well as Mistretta. But formalists can even more surely point to Myers, Buckley
v. Valeo,51 Chadha, Bowsher, and-most recently-Metropolitan Washington
Airports Authority and Plaut.
2. Separation of Powers in the Law Schools
Professors got into the separation of powers act even later than did judges.
The great nineteenth-century treatises barely mentioned the topic, and gave it
scant coverage when they did.52 This picture began to change with the advent
of Progressivism, the New Deal, and, something truly momentous, law
reviews. But it did not change dramatically. By the 1920s, both casebooks and
treatises treated the relationship among the three branches under a separate
rubric. 3 With the early exception of Edward S. Corwin,54 however, scholars
generalized its rough and ready formulation to cover all restrictions on presidential authority, whether
legislative or judicial. See id. at 693-96. No longer should the test be whether any of the branches formally
strayed onto the turf of any of the others. Rather, the relevant inquiry should be whether a given power-
sharing arrangement functionally '"disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches [by]
prevent[ing] the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."' Id. at 695
(quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
49. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding Sentencing Guidelines);
Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (upholding independent counsel statute).
50. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
51. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
52. See, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 141-63 (1880); JOHN R. TUCKER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 749-52 (1899).
53. See, e.g., HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1927);
CHARLES W. GERSTENBERG, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1937); HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE
LIVING CONSTITUTION (1927).
54. Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the Constitution, 27 COLUM.
L. REV. 353 (1927) [hereinafter Corwin, Tenure of Office]; see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT:
OFFICE AND POWERS (1940) [hereinafter CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT].
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avoided systematic discussions of that relationship, especially as between
Congress and the President. The discussions that did find their way into print
tended to deal with the particulars of the few separation of powers cases the
Court had begun deciding.5 In the academy as in the courts, the
arrangements that the legislature and the executive had worked out simply did
not cause great scholarly concern.
All this changed, significantly if not utterly, thanks to the crises of
President Nixon and the initiatives of President Reagan. The Nixon era brought
a succession of confrontations among the White House, Congress, and the
courts. For its part, the Reagan administration mounted a careful, self-
conscious legal campaign to establish the "vision" of a unitary presidency.
56
From both the crises and the initiatives came a torrent of case law where
previously there had been a trickle. Watergate alone led directly and indirectly
to a number of major precedents, including United States v. Nixon,57 Nixon
v. Administrator of General Services,58 Nixon v. Fitzgerald,59 and Harlow
v. Fitzgerald,60 not to mention Buckley. Somewhat more successfully, at least
from an executive viewpoint, the Reaganite campaign led to Chadha, Bowsher,
Morrison, and Mistretta, cases that in turn cleared the path for Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority.
The case law in turn produced a deluge of commentary, which shows no
signs of receding. At various points the participants have included such
eminent scholars as Stephen Carter, Lawrence Lessig, Suzanna Sherry, Peter
Strauss, and Cass Sunstein, among many others. Much of this critical response
is exactly that-criticism, often pointed, of the Court's hopelessly inconsistent
analysis.6' More importantly, much of this same commentary offers
55. See, e.g., William J. Donovan & Ralstone R. Irvine, The President's Power to Remove Members
of Administrative Agencies, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1936); Note, Constitutional Law: President's Power
of Removal, 12 CORNELL L.Q. 67 (1926-27); Note, Constitutional Law-Removal of Executive Officers by
the President Without the Consent of the Senate, I1 MINN. L. REv. 166 (1927); Note, Removal of Federal
Administrative Officers, 30 ILL. L. REV. 1037 (1936).
56. As Charles Fried has written:
The Reagan administration had a vision about the arrangement of government power: the
authority and responsibility of the President should be clear and unitary. The Reagan years were
distinguished by the fact that that vision was made the subject of legal, rather than simply
political, dispute. The battle to rearrange government power was fought in the Supreme Court.
As Solicitor General, I was in the front line of this struggle ....
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND AccouNT 133
(1991) (footnote omitted).
57. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
58. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
59. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
60. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
61. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-
Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 719-22 (1987); E. Donald Elliot, INS
v. Chadha.: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SUP. CT. REV.
125, 126; Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV.
1253, 1254-55 (1988); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 5-12; Suzanna Sherry, Separation of Powers:
Asking a Different Question, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 287, 289 (1989); Strauss, supra note 34, at 489;
Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Court's Legislative Veto
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underlying rationales that jurists have failed to supply.62 The resulting
discussion may not be "as fully developed" as the debate over other topics,
even other structural ones such as the power of Congress to restrict the
jurisdiction of the judiciary.63 It is nonetheless abundant, enough so to signal
a debate every bit as lively, if lopsided, as the one that persists in the Supreme
Court.
The basic academic positions track the judicial ones. Scholars extolling
formalist doctrine, not to mention its unitarian results, tend to view separation
of powers in terms of such ultimate goals as governmental efficiency,
deliberation, and self-government. Most often these goals collapse into what
is easily the dominant constitutional value that commentators on this side of
the aisle identify-the requirement that government remain accountable to the
people. The minority of scholars who defend the functionalist case law, and
its trinitarian consequences, see separation of powers in different, more
negative terms. For them what matters most is preventing the tyrannical
accretion of power in any one part of government. Most often this concern is
pitched as a requirement to maintain balance among the branches. Nothing
about the root values of accountability or balance places these goals in logical
opposition. Up to now, however, this has been exactly their relation in the
scholarly literature.
Accountability and energy, then, provide the ultimate justifications for the
opposing side. Ostensibly, unitarians advocate plenary presidential control of
the executive branch because separation of powers presupposes a clear
formalist model of three discrete branches wielding three distinct powers. Yet
neither is this model an end in itself. Rather, the formalist framework is simply
the best means of making government more responsive to the people and for
making that government efficient and energetic. By placing the execution of
the laws in one department, by making those who execute the laws answerable
to a single Chief Magistrate, and by making that Chief Magistrate responsible
to the people, the formalist version of separation of powers promotes the
Constitution's fundamental goals of accountability and energy. Unitarians, to
be sure, point to complementary values as well, such as the mitigation of
Decision, 1983 DUKE LJ. 789, 804; Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea
of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 311-12 (1989).
62. See, e.g., Corwin, Tenure of Office, supra note 54; David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers
After Bowsher, 1986 Sup. Cr. REv. 19; Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and
Its Alternatives, 68 TaX. L. REv. 1, 50-65 (1989); Brian S. Koukoutchos, Constitutional Kinetics: The
Independent Counsel Case and the Separation of Powers, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 635, 635-53 (1988);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L.
REv. 469 (1985); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in
Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal
Effect of the Sweeping Clause, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 102; Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes
and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE LJ. 257.
63. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive,
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1164 (1992).
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faction. Even so, reliance on these "root values" cuts across the spectrum of
techniques for interpreting the Constitution. Some-like Kevin Rhodes and
Steven Calabresi6---see these values embodied in the text of a handful of
controlling clauses. Others-like Saikrishna Prakash 65 -see them in Founders'
statements and writings about the Constitution's text. Some-again Rhodes and
Calabresi66-- infer them from the structures and relationships in the document
taken as a whole. Still others-like Geoffrey Miller,67 Cass Sunstein, and
Lawrence Lessig 68 -contend that whatever their basis in 1787, these values
have become imperative in light of the growth and development of the
administrative state. These and other scholars point to other constitutional
imperatives as well.69 Many even acknowledge important values that cut in
the opposite direction.70 Still, for most unitarian scholarship, accountability
remains a trump.
Most often opposing accountability and energy is balance among the
branches, especially balance designed to prevent tyrannical accretions of
power. As noted, trinitarians generally arrive at this goal first by arguing-with
markedly less success-that congressional control of the executive branch
logically results from a functional separation of powers model. As with
formalism, it has fallen to scholars to emphasize that the functional tack is
itself merely the means to a greater constitutional end. What functionalism
promotes, they argue, is balance almost by definition. Functionalism serves
balance as a general matter by permitting, even encouraging, any number of
power-sharing arrangements subject to the one ultimate constraint that those
arrangements do not render either the President, Congress, or the judiciary
significantly more powerful than its counterparts. As applied, the functional
inquiry promotes balance by enabling Congress to exercise some control over
the vast policymaking authority that the executive branch would otherwise
wield solely at the whim of the President.
Scholars positing balance as the ultimate goal likewise run the interpretive
gamut. William Eskridge, Jr., and John Ferejohn, for example, rely on the text
of Article I, Section 7 to argue that the Constitution privileges the status quo
over intemperate policymaking assertions by any single branch or subset of a
64. Id. at 1175-85.
65. See Saikrishna B. Prakash, Note, Hail to the ChiefAdministrator The Framers and the President's
Administrative Powers, 102 YALE LJ. 991, 994-99 (1993).
66. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 63, at 1215-16.
67. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. Cr. REV. 41, 52-58.
68. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 85-106.
69. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L.
REv. 23, 37-41 (1995) (discussing separation of powers and governmental energy); Lessig & Sunstein,
supra note 17, at 106-10 (discussing separation of powers and need to promote deliberation and discourage
faction).
70. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 62, at 596-640.
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branch.7' William Van Alstyne likewise contends that the Necessary and
Proper Clause furnishes Congress with a powerful source for controlling the
executive.72 Edward Corwin73 and Peter Shane74 have both at least
sketched originalist arguments for functional diffusion. Peter Strauss,75
Shane,76 and Abner Greene,77 among others, have suggested that the growth
of the modem administrative state, far from triggering concern about
accountability, should instead elicit fear of an imperial presidency and point
to Congress as the only logical Brutus. Here, too, trinitarian scholars recognize
other, complementary and competing values, including accountability. Yet the
goal that drives this school of thought remains balance.
3. The Historicist Debate
In the last few years, both the judicial and scholarly debates have more
and more become historical ones. The reasons for this recent turn are not hard
to fathom. Many, if not most, of those originally responsible for the current
unitarian renaissance have also been vocal proponents of original intent. Not
surprisingly, trinitarian scholars soon realized that unitarian accounts should
not go unchallenged, or at least unchecked. The resulting back and forth has
been inconclusive on its own terms and has therefore failed to resolve the
larger debate, even on the assumption that history should matter. Here,
however, perhaps significantly, historicist work has yet to replicate the
unitarian bent evident in decisions and articles.
This is not for want of trying, particularly by Justice Scalia. As an
executive branch lawyer, he helped formulate unitarian strategy in Chadha;78
as a Justice, he has been the Court's foremost defender of formalist
doctrine;79  as a scholar, he has sung the praises of presidential
accountability 8 -- all in the name of the "Framers' views. Typical of the
Justice's approach is his lone dissent in Morrison.8' With full faith that the
Constitution assigns three clearly defined powers to three distinct branches,
71. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523,
528-33, 564 (1992).
72. See Van Alstyne, supra note 62, at 107-20.
73. See Corwin, Tenure of Office, supra note 54, at 387-99.
74. See Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
596, 602-06 (1989).
75. See Strauss, supra note 62, at 581.
76. See Shane, supra note 74, at 621-22.
77. See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 123, 124-28, 153-54 (1994).
78. BARBARA H. CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 181-83,
184-87 (1988).
79. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413-27 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. See Antonin Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload, REGULATION,
Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 19.
81. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia castigates the majority for avoiding "the inevitable conclusion
that since the statute vests some purely executive power in a person who is not
the President of the United States it is void." 2 In stark contrast to his
individual rights jurisprudence, Justice Scalia bases his conclusion not on the
plain meaning of a precise text. Rather, he infers a formalist approach mainly
based upon the Constitution's tripartite structure as set forth in the Vesting
Clauses of Articles I, II, and ][n. 83 He augments this inference with history,
mainly snippets from The Federalist. To this he adds Article XXX of the 1780
Massachusetts Constitution,84 an express separation of powers provision that
ostensibly supports the Justice's formalism in no uncertain terms but is
conspicuous by its absence from the Federal Constitution.85
Justice Scalia's academic counterparts have been Steven Calabresi and
Saikrishna Prakash, who have done more to advance a historicist, unitarian
view than perhaps any other separation of powers scholars. Recently, the two
joined forces to argue that the Founders clearly intended that the President
alone would be accountable for the execution of federal law notwithstanding
congressional attempts to insulate executive officials.8 6 They base this case
first on the drafting history of the key clauses commonly invoked to support
the unitarian position, notably the Vesting Clause 7 and the Take Care
Clause,88 as well as those cited (erroneously, they say) on behalf of
congressional regulation, including the Opinions Clause89 and the Necessary
and Proper Clause.9" Relying next on The Federalist, Calabresi and Prakash
contend that the Founding generation likewise practiced the coherent theory of
presidential authority that the constitutional text preached.9' Their joint work
not surprisingly confirms separate earlier efforts: on the one hand, previous
historical work by Prakash; on the other, the textual exegesis of Calabresi and
Steven Rhodes, who earlier argued that a comparison of Article II and Article
III shows that the Framers established a "plural" judiciary but a unitary
82. Id. at 705.
83. See James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1, 50 & n.291 (1995);
Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CH. L. REV. 317, 318-19 (1992).
84. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. See infra text accompanying notes 227-54
86. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the Laws, 104
YALE LJ. 541 (1994); see also Prakash, supra note 65, at 991-94, 1012-17.
87. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America."); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 570-78, 604-15.
88. U.S. CONsT. art. U1, § 3 ("[Hie shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed ......
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 582-84, 616-22.
89. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I ("[He may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer
in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices .... ); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 582-85, 626-34.
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."); Calabresi & Prakash, supra
note 86, at 586-93, 622-26.
91. See Prakash, supra note 65, at 1012.
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executive. For that matter, it accords with the history set forth in United States
Reports.
92
The other historicist school of separation of powers scholarship undermines
the unitarian position. Here, the argument runs that the Founders themselves
mainly possessed a functional approach, specifying the relation among the
branches only at their respective peaks and therefore leaving to Congress
ample room to structure the implementation of law below. Corwin apart, much
of the initial work articulating this position comes in the form of hints,
suggestions, and sketches.93 Yet recently a number of scholars have begun to
do more. One, Abner Greene, going beyond the materials Calabresi and
Prakash use, comes to nearly opposite conclusions. 94 "The bottom line," he
concludes, "was not strength in the executive, but rather balance between the
branches.95 Importantly, Greene frames his use of primary sources, whether
The Federalist or the Constitution itself, with extensive references to the work
of Gordon Wood, perhaps this generation's leading historian of Founding
ideology.96 More recently, Cass Sunstein and Lawrence Lessig have carried
Greene's work forward by presenting extensive useful research on the
Founding generation's early practices. 97 Their well-documented results show
frequent and robust congressional involvement in the implementation of the
laws, including criminal prosecution, the structure of executive departments,
and opinions and administration.98 Puzzlingly, the two authors ultimately
reject the trinitarian approach that their work implies on the ground that the
Founding goal of accountability (which, unlike their descriptions of early
practice, appears virtually without support) when applied to the modem
administrative state, requires a strong, unitary executive. The bulk of their
efforts, however, establishes the strong case that the Founders stood committed
to the trinitarian model. That said, more work needs to be done.99
92. See, e.g., Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Airport Noise, 501
U.S. 252, 272-77 (1991); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-99 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-51 (1983).
93. See Shane, supra note 74, at 602-06, 613-17; Strauss, supra note 62, at 599-605.
94. See Greene, supra note 77, at 125, 138-53, 196.
95. Id. at 138.
96. Id. at 139-53.
97. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 12-32.
98. Id. at 12-78.
99. For earlier work also asserting that the Founders had not worked out a rigid and thoroughgoing
separation of powers model, see generally Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early
Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211, 212-24 (1989) (asserting that no single separation
of powers model prevailed); Arthur S. Miller, An Inquiry into the Relevance of the Intentions of the
Founding Fathers, With Special Emphasis Upon the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 27 ARK. L. REV.
583, 587-92 (1973) (discussing different conceptions of separation of powers theory).
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B. Toward a Backward-Looking Solution: Pragmatic Fidelity
A lot more. This section argues that history should matter in separation of
powers analysis, but only if credibly pursued. The first part of this section
therefore justifies using history to begin with. Theorists have advanced many
such justifications, each with different implications concerning the extent to
which the past should count. Nearly every theory of constitutional
interpretation, however, agrees that history merits some consideration. Given
this agreement, this section then considers proper-or at least convincing-use
of history. Pursuing history credibly in general requires following the canons
of historians rather than the instincts of lawyers. These canons dictate, at a
minimum, examining the larger context of the Founding first and only then
examining particular puzzles, rather than leaping immediately to a handful of
specific, shop-worn sources in a relative vacuum. This goal, in turn, means
approaching the topic with a sufficient degree of breadth, which in this case
means going back not just to the summer of 1787 but at least to the years
leading to the Revolution. It also means looking at the major primary and
secondary materials in at least a modicum of depth, which, compared to more
than a few previous treatments, means looking at them at all.
1. History and Theory
Then again, should any of this matter? The short answer is: not
necessarily. History itself cannot justify guidance by history. As Ronald
Dworkin has pointed out, it is circular to argue that the views of the Founders
bind later generations simply because the Founders themselves thought their
views should be binding.'t° The longer answer must therefore come from
theory. The question of how far history should bind, of course, has felled
mighty forests. Few theorists, however, contend that history is irrelevant.''
Many more consider it significant, even essential.
The most obvious devotion to the past issues from thinkers who stress the
Constitution's commitment to democracy"' 2 An array of thinkers believes
that the keys to the great constitutional mysteries can be discovered in the
views of the Founders. Sometimes explicitly, more often implicitly, such
theorists justify their reliance on this particular history with some variant of
Hamilton's famous passage in The Federalist No. 78. The "people" articulate
100. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 52-55 (1985).
101. For an argument, made by a professional historian, that "original intent is not a viable foundation
for a jurisprudence of constitutional law," see LEONARD LEvy, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS'
CONSTrUTION 298, 284-321 (1988).
102. For insightful discussions of major scholarship that develops themes of democracy, process, and
self-government, see James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEx. L. REv. 211,
220-79 (1993); Fleming, supra note 83, at 6-29.
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constitutional law; subsequent generations govern themselves within the
framework of that law; those generations must therefore consult the "people's"
views when determining what the original framework leaves open-unless, of
course, one of those subsequent generations itself successfully claims to act for
"the people" and changes the framework. 3 Originalists both Right"° and
Left'05 take this idea to its most extreme conclusion, holding that the
historical understandings initially underlying constitutional norms are
dispositive. A somewhat larger group, whom I call historicists, do not go this
far, but still see early understandings as either authoritative or highly
probative. 10 6 Others, who are more embarrassed by the specter of "dead
hand" control, nonetheless argue that original understanding, while not
dispositive, should at least be privileged.0 7
Reliance on the past also figures heavily in those theories that err on the
side of rights and justice.'08 The past that rights-oriented approaches invoke,
however, is not only, or even primarily, the history underlying particular
constitutional texts but also the evolving traditions that shape our constitutional
culture.'0 9 As with intentionalist reliance on history, justifications for
invoking tradition are also often either left unstated or, when articulated, rest
on some democratic foundation." More often, however, tradition appears
to matter out of a concern for feasibility, that is, for determining which rights
the society officially honors (even in the breach) to be candidates for judicial
protection and which it does not. Accordingly, some theorists contend that the
ideas of the Founders should matter because they were unusually able thinkers
103. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467-68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). This is
not to say that all of these ideas necessarily result from Hamilton's treatment.
104. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143-85,251-59 (1990); Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 862 (1989) (essay).
105. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 165-67 (1991); see also Suzanna
Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REv. 918 (1992) (reviewing ACKERMAN, supra).
106. Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1017 (1981).
107. See, e.g., Simeon C.R. McIntosh, Reading Dred Scott, Plessy and Brown: Toward a
Constitutional Hermeneutics, 38 How. L.J. 53, 57-58 (1994).
108. For similarly useful discussions of theories that emphasize rights, justice, and autonomy, see
Fleming, supra note 102, at 280-304; Fleming, supra note 83, at 6-43; James E. Fleming, We the
Exceptional American People, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 355, 357-73 (1994).
109. Tradition in this sense can predate the drafting of constitutional text by centuries and continue
well beyond it. Nowhere is reliance on tradition more evident than in the Supreme Court's substantive due
process jurisprudence, where tradition continues to play a dominant role in the definition of fundamental
rights. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-51 (1992) (discussing role of tradition);
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing need to balance individual
liberty and demands of society with regard to traditions "from which [the constitutional concept of due
process] developed and the traditions from which it broke").
110. Perhaps the best known instance of democratic justification for a rights-based approach is Justice
Brennan's reliance on evolving tradition as a means to maintain the people's ongoing consent to our
constitutional order, including the work of the Supreme Court. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution
of the United States, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 23 (Jack
N. Rakove ed., 1990).
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with a wealth of practical experience, facing problems that endure."' Others
simply believe that history matters because we cannot intelligently develop
new norms without comprehending old ones.'12 Even Dworkin, not one to
make frequent appeals to the past, articulates a commitment to history and
tradition by positing "fit" to our constitutional culture and past as a basic
criterion of legitimacy."
3
This Article need not venture into this normative thicket further, at least
not to justify the examination that follows. Given that almost every leading
theory of constitutional interpretation accords at least some weight to history,
two conclusions follow. First, it makes sense to undertake a historical inquiry.
Next, it is worth pursuing that inquiry in a credible fashion on the theory that
something worth doing at all is worth doing well. This last requirement should
obtain, moreover, regardless of the weight a theory attaches to history, so long
as it attaches any. Otherwise, the argument becomes that a theorist such as
Dworkin is just as well off relying on a dated, error-ridden textbook as he
would be devoting his time to finding a respected monograph, much less
engaging in his own survey of the literature and sources, because his
conception of fit is thin. Yet to the extent that Dworkin invokes the past to
claim fit, however little, the claim would necessarily suffer.
Of course in practical terms, going the textbook route may make more
sense to someone whose theory has only a limited place for history, because
limited resources would be better served exploring language, economics,
philosophy, or whatever else the theory places at a premium. But even these
practical considerations do not obtain here. For one thing, the inquiry that
follows aims to conserve the resources of precisely those constitutional
scholars who do not have the time or inclination to undertake an extended
historical treatment. After that treatment is presented, moreover, I will at least
assume that norms from the Founding should be binding to some degree." 4
That assumption may not be a necessary condition for pursuing a project such
as this, but it does not hurt, either.
2. History and Historians
This examination cannot proceed, however, without a word on method.
Too often the resulting attempts to identify either history or tradition are
deeply problematic. For all that various theories esteem the past, the actual
estimation remains in the strictest sense theoretical, at least as far as historians
111. William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLuM. L. REV. 782, 856-59 (1995).
112. See DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 33 (1989).
113. DWORKIN, supra note 100, at 143-45.
114. See infra Sections InI.A-B.
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would be concerned."t5 In part, the law's substandard use of the past simply
reflects the difficulties of interdisciplinary exchange. Historians seek
explanations while lawyers make arguments, and from this basic distinction
other methodological differences flow."6 But perhaps more troubling, the
problem also results from imperatives inherent in constitutional discourse in
particular. Those committed to democratic, intentionalist approaches make the
stakes of defining the record so high."7 Conversely, those who are more
directly rights-oriented at times sidestep any real inquiry into the past
altogether perhaps because, one suspects, the messiness that such an inquiry
yields inevitably does violence to neat, theoretical constructs."
8
Should constitutional theorists, then, forget the whole thing? The record
has led a number to say as much, or at the very least to conclude that lawyers
should simply employ historical arguments just as one more polemical
technique. Then again, some of the same scholars who have come to this
conclusion themselves had to display a command of historical scholarship to
expose the chronic failings of their colleagues." 9 Put more directly, they
demonstrate how the past can be credibly pursued in asserting that it cannot.
Many chronic failings, moreover, seem readily correctible with just a modicum
of additional homework. At least on the practical level, perhaps we should not
give up too hastily.
On a more fundamental level, however, perhaps we should. The law's
attempt to invoke the past may flounder not simply because lawyers appear ill-
equipped to do it. Rather, the entire enterprise may be doomed to failure since
no one, not even the most careful historian, is in a position to do it. The most
influential challenges along these lines issue from postmodernism. Two
particular objections seem worth raising for present purposes. The more radical
critique holds that the past is almost entirely a construct of the present. On this
view, neither history nor tradition can provide meaningful constraints because
interpreting the past, like all interpretation, turns on the conditioning, desires,
and whims of the interpreter. A more modest, yet still sweeping, challenge
contends that while the past can yield certain constraints, it does not provide
115. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 23-45 (1988); Flaherty, supra note 16, at 524-26, 555.
116. Flaherty, supra note 16, at 526 & n.16, 553-55; see also William E. Nelson, History and
Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237 (1986) (discussing challenge of
interdisciplinary exchange between history and constitutional analysis).
117. A controversial case in point is Raoul Berger, specifically RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). For critical assessments of
Berger's historical methodology, see Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE
L.J. 453, 523 n.139 (1989); John J. Gibbons, Review of Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 839 (1978). For a work refuting Berger's account, see
Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986).
118. Ronald Dworkin, for example, seldom makes historical assertions in his work. For a rare
exception, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 360 (1986).
119. See TUSHNET, supra note 115, at 36.
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enough to matter. In particular, even those interpretations based on the most
rigorous study only rarely provide genuine guidance, and then usually fall to
the revisionist accounts of later generations anyhow. Either way, the best we
can do in the end is make a virtue of necessity and admit that the only real
criterion for a constitutional lawyer's use of the past should not be whether a
given event ever happened but whether it convinces anybody to go the
lawyer's way.'
In their provocative study addressing separation of powers, Lessig and
Sunstein note that "there is no algorithm for deciding how to maintain fidelity
with past instructions."'' Still less is there an algorithm for the prior
question of figuring out what those past instructions, or traditions, are. Though
rarely considered in the pages of law reviews, certain ways of making
historical assertions are clearly better than others. These logically come from
the discipline of history itself. This conclusion follows not so much because
historians determine what is historically true, 2 2 but because they commonly
resolve what is historically convincing. Legal arguments relying on economics,
philosophy, or sociology are more convincing when they comport with the
standards set by those disciplines. Nothing prevents the same point from
applying to arguments based upon history. 2
3
To the contrary, the logic of using the past compels it. Certain eminent
scholars assert that the standards of historians need not apply to theorists
because historians are historians and theorists are theorists. 24 Elaborated, the
claim is that what counts as credible in one interpretative community need not
count as credible in a different interpretative community with different goals
and concerns. However clothed, this argument seems hopelessly formalistic.
Constitutional theorists do not ordinarily cite Madison, Hamilton, or Wilson
simply because these thinkers had compelling ideas. Instead, they invoke
authority that derives from something external to the substance of their
thought, namely the fact that their ideas arose in a certain time and place that
directly connects them to our constitutional history and tradition."2 Seeking
such external authority entails playing by external rules. Or at least it entails
120. For a concise description of postmodem challenges to history, see JOYCE APPLEBY ET AL.,
TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY 198-237 (1994).
121. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 104.
122. Whether a matter can be deemed historically "true" in an objective sense need not be resolved
to assert the utility of historical standards. For a discussion of historical objectivity, see PETER NOVICK,
THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE"OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988)
and Thomas L. Haskell, Objectivity Is Not Neutrality: Rhetoric vs. Practice in Peter Novick's That Noble
Dream, 29 HIST. & THEORY 129 (1990).
123. See generally Flaherty, supra note 16 (arguing that constitutional scholars often employ shoddy
historical method).
124. For a recent defense along these lines, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 601 (1995); cf. STANLEY FISH, PROFESSIONAL CORRECTNESS: LITERARY STUDIES AND
POLITICAL CHANGE (1995) (arguing that literary criticism should remain removed from political efforts to
work changes in society).
125. Flaherty, supra note 16, at 574.
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playing by external rules until it can be shown, as postmodernists claim they
can, that the external rules themselves do not provide the authority that they
promise.
The history that lawyers do has such a notoriously poor reputation,
especially among historians, 126  that it would represent a considerable
improvement were the legal community to adhere to even just the most basic
standards that historians practice. Of the precepts that might be mentioned,
several stand out for present purposes, in large part because legal scholars are
often indifferent to them, particularly with regard to separation of powers.
Each standard not only calls for more rigor, but also for greater reliance on the
work of historians themselves. One is evidentiary depth. Too often the legal
community falls into the habit of looking only at a narrow range of sources
around the constitutional provisions that ostensibly control.127 Absent a
"separation of powers clause"--itself a significant omission-an enormous
amount of the work focuses on a handful of scattered and cryptic texts and the
barely more illuminating debates that led to them.128 Another precept is
temporal breadth. Here, for example, virtually none of the even self-
consciously historicist work on separation of powers begins the story much
before the summer of 1787.129 One further canon prescribes an adequate
historiographical grounding. Much ostensibly historical separation of powers
126. That reputation is abominable when it comes to the historical accounts judges provide. Id. at 524
n.5. It is not much better when it comes to the accounts made by legal academics. Id. at 524-26.
127. Robert Bork's The Tempting of America furnishes a rich deposit ofjust this type of noncontextual
historical assertion. One in particular arises in his argument that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
did not understand the "privileges and [sic] immunities clause" to provide judicial protection for a range
of fundamental liberties. BORK, supra note 104, at 180-81. This would have been unthinkable, he contends,
because "[t]he only significant exercise of judicial review in the past century had been Dred Scott," which
gave the notion of judicial review for the protection of rights a bad name. Id. at 181. But making an
inference from the undisputed fact that Dred Scott occurred slights several larger points that, in context,
render this ostensibly important fact, at best, irrelevant, and, at worst, cut the other way. The assertion
overlooks the fact that, by 1867, the Union had won the Civil War and, in controlling Congress and the
judiciary, commanded the mechanisms for enforcing national conceptions of fundamental rights dramatically
different from a property right over human beings. It ignores the expansive role lower federal courts played
in Reconstruction. And it omits an even glancing awareness that these and other matters uncongenial to
his conclusions have been central to the past generation of scholarship. For sources addressing the larger
context, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1988); WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988);
Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986).
128. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 559-99 (concentrating on textual understanding
of Constitution through close analysis of individual clauses); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 63, at
1175-85 (focusing on structural analysis of various constitutional provisions); Froomkin, supra note 19,
at 1351-66 (offering structural analysis of specific constitutional clauses dealing with three branches).
129. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 599-607 (giving "quick synopsis" of earlier
history before focusing on Constitutional Convention and ratification debates there); Greene, supra note
77, at 138-53 (discussing original understanding from 1787-89 onward after cursory two pages on "pre-
1787"); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 12-84 (concentrating on Constitutional Convention and
ratification debates after preliminary discussion of Montesquieu).
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scholarship violates this precept by neglecting---or ignoring altogether-
important historical monographs, to say nothing of essential general works. 3°
Many in the legal community would defend each of these practices.
Constitutional text, after all, is the only thing that the Founding generation
actually ratified, and it is best not to stray too far from it. Ratification itself
only commenced in 1787. 13 Lawyers, moreover, commonly make assertions
about the past without reading relevant historians. But these are theoretical
justifications. If the task is recapturing some notion of how the Founders
thought the thing was going to work, perhaps the worst thing to do is to jump
right to individual clauses. Doing so is not unlike trying to glean the meaning
of the 1992 election by looking first-and last-at the Democratic Party's
platform and convention, with no mention of the Reagan/Bush years that came
before. Jack Rakove, an eminent historian of both Madison and the Founding,
aptly identifies the true outcome of such an approach. Whenever the law's
appeals to the past "are allowed to rest on crude and fragmentary caricatures
of complex historical reality," he observes, "we should recognize that it is our
own political culture, more than that of 'The Founders,' which is being
exposed."' t3
2
Historians themselves take almost exactly the opposite tack. They
view-or at least attempt to view-events, ideas, and controversies in
sufficient depth precisely to capture "complex historical reality." This point
applies with special force to complex texts and governmental frameworks.
Consider the experience of Gordon S. Wood, whose Creation of the American
Republic remains perhaps the leading work on the ideological origins of
the Constitution.34 Of that work, Wood writes:
I began simply with the intention of writing a monographic analysis
of constitution-making in the Revolutionary era; yet I soon found that
I could make little or no sense of the various institutional or other
devices written into the constitutions until I understood the
assumptions from which the constitution-makers acted.
t35
130. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 599-635 (failing to use work of such scholars
as W.B. Gwynn, Willi Paul Adams, Gordon Wood, and Edmund Morgan); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note
17, at 139-43 (neglecting works of Gwynn, Adams, and Morgan). But see Greene, supra note 77, at
139-42 (relying on work of Wood and Bailyn).
131. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204,
208-09 (1980) (arguing that textualist interpreter must first understand ordinary usage at time of adoption).
132. Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Moment, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 473, 476 (1988).
133. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
134. See Richard B. Bernstein, Charting the Bicentennial, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1565, 1594-97 (1987);
Flaherty, supra note 16, at 539-49.
135. WOOD, supra note 133, at vii-viii; see also FORREST MCDONALD, NovUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 67 n.25 (1985).
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Wood found one solution in plumbing the sources deeply. As he explains, "I
needed ... to steep myself in the political literature of the period."'36
Wood found another solution in casting the net widely. Creation-like any
good treatment of the Founding-defines the relevant period in broad terms.
The account does not simply begin in the months leading up to the Federal
Convention. Rather, it commences in the years leading up to the American
Revolution.13
7
Beyond these two types of rigor, neither Wood nor any other respected
historian goes forward without also according the same type of scrutiny to the
work of fellow scholars, as the citations and bibliographic essays of leading
historians typically demonstrate. 38 In doing this, historians are especially on
the lookout either for accounts that their colleagues more or less generally
agree upon or, failing that, at least a framework for further debate and
research. Scholars commonly seek a dominant account or framework to follow
it, to build upon the information and interpretation of those who have spent
lifetimes in a particular field the better to focus upon the outstanding questions
and locate the answers in a meaningful context. A select few also master the
current paradigms to expose their weakness and debunk them.
139
There is, however, a rub. Recapturing the greater context of events in each
of the ways discussed, like many other standards historians live by, is
immensely labor intensive. As Wood suggests, a historian would take years
steeping herself in both primary and secondary works before venturing forth
with any type of authoritative overview of even the most modest event, much
less one as momentous as the Founding. 40 Wood's noted contemporary,
Forrest McDonald, did not attempt to generalize about the Founding until he
had "read virtually every line of virtually every extant American newspaper for
the period and a large body of personal correspondence.''. Legal scholars,
and still less practitioners, do not have the luxury of steeping themselves in a
given period. Cases and controversies rage here and now; tentative answers
must be advanced.
But they can rely on those who do. In this way, the challenges that these
standards of professionalism present to the legal community also generate their
own solution. Much as historians themselves do, constitutional professionals
can at least look to prevailing historical accounts or debates when trying to
resolve specific issues. While this is also time consuming, reading what are
136. WOOD, supra note 133, at viii.
137. Id. at vii-ix.
138. See, e.g., McDONALD, supra note 135, at 313-41; WOOD, supra note 133, at 619-33.
139. See APPLEBY Er AL., supra note 120, at 129-51.
140. In my own experience at graduate school, I recall Conrad Russell, a leading historian of the
English Civil War, telling a fellow student working in that field that the student would have to memorize
the principal events that occurred during each day of the 1650s before he could attempt either his oral
examinations or dissertation.
141. MCDONALD, supra note 135, at 67 n.25.
1752 [Vol. 105: 1725
Most Dangerous Branch
acknowledged to be the leading books on a topic beats reading the thousands
of sources that the authors of those books had to consult. Fortunately, the work
of Wood, McDonald, Edmund Morgan, Bernard Bailyn, Jack Rakove, and
many others has done much to reconstruct the Founding as never before and
so made the task possible. 42 Perhaps nothing furthers historical credibility
more effectively, at least in a legal context, than turning to such works first,
rather than proceeding directly to a few select primary texts in a relative
vacuum. Doing so indirectly addresses the problems of depth and breadth since
such scholarship itself rests on extensive research and wide-ranging inquiry.
It also deals directly with the need to master a subject's historiographical
context. More generally, this prescription by definition comports with the
external standards through which the legal community seeks external guidance
and authority. As such, the practice in fact seems to be the only practical
hope.143
But if so, it is a hope that also seems easy prey for a more fundamental,
postmodern set of objections. Consider the following dilemma. Under the
proposed approach, anyone hoping to interpret the Constitution by examining
its origins has no credible choice but to rely in the first instance on historical
scholarship, doubly so when a recognized body of scholarship offers a
provisional account or framework. Fifty years ago that would have meant
turning to the economic interpretations of Charles Beard, whose model
dominated historiographical discourse for decades.' 44 Today the initial choice
would be the very different narrative offered by Wood, McDonald, Bailyn, and
Morgan. Fifty years from now it will probably be another account--crafted by
scholars whose names are yet unknown. Surely such turnover exposes the
fallacy of looking to the past for guidance. The constant shifts in the accounts
that even professional historians create confirms that neither history nor
tradition offers any real outside constraints for those who occupy the present.
And at the very least it demonstrates that whatever does limit historiographical
creativity does not limit it much, that those meager limits permit successive
generations to reinvent the past even when there has been temporary agreement
on a dominant framework, and that they leave anyone who would rely on any
momentary paradigm with little more than a rope of sand. Trying to salvage
the past, it appears, merely exposes the project's futility.
But a claim is not over 'til it's over. Further reflection suggests that the
past can come out of the encounter not only unscathed, but stronger. The more
142. For an overview of this work, see Bemstein, supra note 134; Flaherty, supra note 16, at 535-49.
143. One example of someone who does this economically is Greene, supra note 77, at 138-42.
Another scholar who has embarked on a more full-fledged excursion into the past in order to explore
federalism is Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1515-59 (1994).
144. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (1913). For a discussion of Beard's place in the constitutional historiography, see FORREST
MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-18 (1958).
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radical challenge simply proves far too much. The more modest objection,
moreover, actually supports the use of historical scholarship precisely because
such scholarship changes.
Take the more radical objection. The shift from Beard to Wood (to a
future scholar) demonstrates the strength of the constraints that operate upon
historians rather than their malleability. The "Beardian view" went out of
fashion for many reasons, but one of the most important was the discovery that
Beard's thesis simply did not comport with newly accessible sources and more
rigorous research. In particular, McDonald led the way-in fact made his
reputation-by showing that wealthy creditors did not support the Constitution,
nor embattled debtors oppose it, with anything like the consistency Beard
posited.'45 Now a postmodern critique might retort that the sources
McDonald used to refute Beard are themselves malleable. And on a deeper
level that may well be true. But that is not the level upon which people
operate. Even the most cynical originalist stands willing to concede a point
when a relevant source cuts directly against her. 46 No less important,
accepting such a radical indeterminacy for historical sources necessarily
compels accepting the same type of indeterminacy for other materials that have
been more easily manipulated, such as cryptic constitutional texts.
By contrast, the turnover of historical models does support the more
moderate postmodern challenge, but this turns out actually to support following
such models, or at least the most current version. Only a dinosaur of the most
Whiggish sort would argue that history is a dispassionate search for truth
immune from the social forces amid which historians live. Beard's Progressive
views flourished while he was speaking to a society influenced by the
Progressive movement. 47 Wood's ideological interpretations arguably first
came to dominate because his work first addressed an era steeped in the
ideological competition of the '60s and the Cold War. Future historians will
perhaps develop a multicultural framework to connect with the nation's
growing pluralist and multicultural concerns.
Yet far from undermining the integrity of these models, this element of
contingency furnishes all the more reason to employ them. As three pragmatic
historians recently put it, "Successive generations of scholars do not so much
revise historical knowledge as, they reinvest it with contemporary
interest.... New versions of old narratives are not arbitrary exercises of
historical imagination, but the consequence of the changing interest from
145. McDONALD, supra note 144, at 358, passim.
146. Or, to employ the pronoun descriptively, him. This phenomenon may explain why Justice Scalia,
for example, is curiously silent in those areas where he has reason to believe that the weight of historical
scholarship is against him. Compare Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961-85 (1991) (relying
extensively on idiosyncratic version of English and American history in Eighth Amendment analysis) with
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (not relying on history in
First Amendment analysis).
147. Flaherty, supra note 16, at 533.
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cumulative social experience."' 48  Contemporary historians formulate
questions and approaches that at some level reflect the concerns of the society
in which they live. So, too, do contemporary constitutional interpreters.
Following a current historiographical framework, therefore, speaks to present-
day constitutionalists in a way that no previous or future account could. For
now, it is better historical practice to rely on Wood rather than Beard, not just
because Wood's account brings us closer to an objective reality, though
something like that is for most intents and purposes true. It is also better
because the issues Beard pursued-class warfare, economic determinism, elitist
misrule-at best engage our own concerns tangentially and sometimes not at
all.
With all of this in mind, the overview that follows does not claim to be
more than a sketch by the standards of the historical academy. By the
standards of the legal academy, however, it at least begins a full-length portrait
in an area in which even sketches so far have been few.
III. THE FOUNDING: INVENTING SEPARATION OF POWERS
Once this is done, an interesting, even counterintuitive story starts to
emerge. What this narrative reveals, at the most general level, is people
groping as best they could toward a workable conception of government from
which only broad purposes can safely be inferred. No less important is what
the narrative does not reveal. To take one of the most formalist accounts,
Calabresi and Prakash argue that the Founding generation advanced something
like the modem formalist conception of separation of powers, including a truly
unitary executive. 49 In the first instance, they advance this claim to refute
Lessig and Sunstein's contention that the Founders articulated a separate
category of "administrative" power. °50 More broadly, they make the
argument to support the formalist view that the Founders rejected legislative
involvement in the manner in which the executive executes the laws. But a
genuine reconstruction of the Founding belies the contention that the Founders
either always or primarily viewed the doctrine of separation of powers in
modem formalist terms. Instead, the complex, messy, and at times
contradictory ferment in constitutional thinking renders it unlikely at best that,
by 1787, Americans had reached a consensus on the doctrine in anything like
the precise, thoroughgoing manner that modem formalists prescribe. Beyond
the pace of constitutional change, a reconstruction of the Founding refutes the
formalist case even more dramatically in showing that contemporaries did not
exclusively, or even usually, use the phrase "separation of powers" and related
148. APPLEBY Er AL., supra note 120, at 265.
149. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 545-46.
150. Id. at 547-49.
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terms in the literal fashion that formalists assume. To the contrary, even the
most cursory examination reveals that when American constitutionalists said
"separation of powers," "execute the laws," or "legislate," time and time and
time again they meant something far different from the modem formalist
conception.
A. Toward 1787
1. From Mixed Government to Separation of Powers
a. Whig Mixed Government
The American commitment to constitutional government did not begin
with the Constitution. Nor did it begin with the constitutions of the several
states. Colonists in America thought, debated, and wrote about how
government ought to be framed almost from the founding of their first
settlements.' 5' By the middle of the eighteenth century, Americans could and
did draw upon a staggering array of sources to help them in their reflections:
works of antiquity; Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke, Montesquieu,
Beccaria, and Hutcheson; English common law; and the "Radical Whig" or
"Commonwealth" tradition embodied by Harrington, Sidney, Trenchard,
Gordon, and Bolingbroke.'52 What these sources all tended to confirm was
that, of all governmental arrangements on the globe, easily the best was the
English Constitution-what a young John Adams called "the most perfect
combination of human powers in society which finite wisdom has yet contrived
and reduced to practice for the preservation of liberty and the production of
happiness."1 53 One of the many things that made it so was its devotion, not
151. See CHARLES H. MCILWAIN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
(1923); JOHN P. REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF
RIGHTS (1986) [hereinafter REID, I CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY]; JOHN P. REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO TAX (1987) [hereinafter REID, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY]; JOHN P. REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY
TO LEGISLATE (1991) [hereinafter REID, 3 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY]; JOHN P. REID, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1993) [hereinafter REID, 4
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY]; ROBERT L. SCHUYLER, PARLIAMENT AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE: SOME
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING IMPERIAL LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION (Archon Books 1963)
(1929). See generally Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U.
PA. L. REV. 1157 (1976) (exploring history and scholarship on colonial theories of government); Liam S.
O'Melinn, Note, The American Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Seventeenth-Century Vest Indies,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 104 (1995) (examining plausibility of American theories by examining analogous West
Indian experience).
152. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22-54
(1967); MCDONALD, supra note 135, at 57-96; WOOD, supra note 133, at 3-45.
153. JOHN ADAMS, The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym, in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 477,
477 (Charles F. Adams ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1851). It would be hard to overstate the extent
to which English-speaking political speakers viewed the English Constitution as an isolated success amidst
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to separation of powers, but to a more old-fashioned idea called "mixed
government."
The English Constitution, on the Whig view, reconciled power and liberty
as successfully as it did by embracing a theory of mixed government. Mixed
government reflected the idea that the balance between power and liberty could
be struck through governmental structure. This idea, an ancient one, gained
renewed vigor during the Renaissance. The mixed government approach,
however, did not attempt to structure government around governmental
functions. It instead attempted to structure government in order to balance the
basic forces within society. Those forces consisted of three social orders, "each
embodying within it the principles of a certain form of government: royalty,
whose natural form of government was monarchy; the nobility, whose natural
form was aristocracy; and the commons, whose form was democracy."' 54
Experience unhappily showed that each of these "pure" forms would almost
inevitably degenerate into either an excess of power-monarch to tyranny;
aristocracy to oligarchy-or an excess of liberty, or at least licentiousness-
democracy to anarchy. The English Constitution escaped these traps in two
ways. First, it developed institutions-the Crown, the House of Lords, and the
House of Commons-that embodied each social estate. Next, it structured
these institutions to insure that they would direct power not just to provide
essential services, nor simply to preserve order, but to check each other.
American Whigs saw their own colonial frameworks, each with a governor as
well as an upper and lower house of the legislature, striking this same balance
as mixed governments in miniature. Through this balance, both the English
state and its colonial offspring could rule efficiently enough to satisfy the
dictates of power, but protect rights sufficiently to satisfy the requirements of
liberty.155
an ocean of tyranny, oligarchy, and anarchy. One Rhode Island newspaper, reprinting an item from a
London journal, put it this way:
There are 775,300,000 people in the World. Of these, arbitrary governments command
741,800,000, and the free ones (including 10 million Indians) only 33 1/2 million. Of these few,
12 1/2 million are subjects or descendants of the British Empire-1/3 of the freemen of the
world. On the whole, slaves are three and twenty times more numerous than men enjoying, in
any tolerable degree, the rights of human nature.
MCDONALD, supra note 135, at 9 (quoting PROVIDENCE GAZETE & COUNTRY J., Nov. 11, 1786).
154. BAILYN, supra note 152, at 70.
155. Bailyn characterizes the Whig analysis of mixed government this way:
The result of this balanced counterpoise of social and governmental forces in the British
Constitution was the confinement of social and political powers to specified, limited spheres.
So long as the crown, the nobility, and the democracy remained in their designated places in
government and performed their designated political tasks, liberty would continue to be safe in
England and its dominions. But if any of them reached beyond the set boundaries of their
rightful jurisdictions; if, particularly, the agencies of power-the prerogative, administration-
managed, by corrupt practices, to insinuate their will into the assembly of the commons and to
manipulate it at pleasure, liberty would be endangered.
Id. at 76.
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Whigs on both sides of the Atlantic were virtually unanimous in extolling
England's brand of mixed government as "a system of consummate wisdom
and policy."'56 So powerful was support for this system that when American
Whigs became American patriots-when, that is, Americans in the 1760s
began to resist parliamentary encroachment on their rights as Englishmen-the
furthest thing from their minds was repudiating the English Constitution as
they understood it. To the contrary, the patriots opposed Parliament not
because the English Constitution oppressed them but because Parliament
violated the English Constitution. Adams, for example, said as much on the
eve of Lexington and Concord. 157 Nor did the shooting change things, at
least not at first. Even after independence appeared on the horizon as a genuine
possibility, few Americans realized the profound implications that the break
with Great Britain would have on their understandings of government.
They could not evade these implications for long. Thomas Paine, with
typical gusto, was among the first to explore what independence would mean
for mixed government. In Common Sense, the best-selling tract of the era,
Paine lampooned what had been seen as the consummately wise and politic
system, proclaiming as "farcical" the notion of the English government as a
"union of three powers, reciprocally checking each other."' 158 Thanks in part
to this "onslaught," Forrest McDonald points out, Americans tended to
abandon the notion of mixed government. 159 But Paine's onslaught was not
the only reason. More fundamentally, it was independence itself that led to the
abandonment of mixed government. Breaking the link with Britain in the first
instance presented Americans with the problem of framing their own
governments on the state level. Yet independence also deprived them of
exactly those societal foundations on which the most successful framework that
had ever been seen was built. Gone was the royalty. Gone was the nobility.
Gone, therefore, was the chance of replicating the mixed government that the
Whigs so prized. 1
60
b. Republican Experiments
With mixed government no longer an obvious option, Americans turned
to the one possibility left-the democracy. For any but the smallest polity this
choice meant experimenting not with democracy in its pure form, on the model
156. Id. at 71.
157. JOHN ADAMS, Novanglus and Massachusettensis, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS
26, 59-70, 74-79 (George Peek Jr. ed., 1954).
158. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS 7 (Nelson F. Adkins ed.,
1953) (emphasis omitted).
159. MCDONALD, supra note 135, at 84.
160. See BAILYN, supra note 152, at 274-82.
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of Athens, but with democracy in the form of republics. 16' Unfortunately, the
same Whig political theory that taught Americans that republics were all they
could realistically establish also taught that republics had little realistic chance
for success. Without the checks of monarchy and aristocracy, republics had
almost invariably fallen prey to that excess of liberty known as anarchy. But
just as American society presented the problem, it also afforded a solution.
America's lack of a royal family or titled nobility-in fact its comparative lack
of very rich or very poor in general-helped insure an abundance of civic
virtue, the critical quality that made republican experiments feasible at all.
Viewed roughly as a selfless, participatory commitment to the public good,
civic virtue kept liberty in check from within the hearts of citizens themselves,
preventing them from seeking self-interested goals based on their religious,
class, or local commitments at the expense of the whole. 162 Europe suffered
from too many of these factional divisions for republics to succeed for very
long. But Americans-or at least white Americans-prided themselves on their
relative homogeneity; what Franklin called, "a general happy Mediocrity."''
63
Especially in the even more homogeneous context of each state, American
republicans believed they could cheat the received political wisdom and
successfully establish each state as what Samuel Adams famously described
as a virtuous and republican "Christian Sparta."' 6
It followed that republics in America would have to emphasize certain
political principles and downplay others. With respect to liberty, American
republicans to a significant extent felt free to sacrifice balance, so critical to
the English mixed constitution, in favor of accountability. 65 Thanks to
American virtue, balance no longer seemed crucial. 166 One reason the
English Constitution required balance as a means of turning power against
161. Most Americans never seriously considered literal democracy because it was impractical for any
but the smallest polity, because it was the most unstable form of popular rule, and because of its leveling
implications. For a discussion of Revolution-era American attitudes toward equality, see GORDON S. ,VOOD,
THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 229-43 (1992).
162. For the classic discussion of the role of American virtue in republican ideology, see WOOD, supra
note 133, at 65-70.
163. Franklin's famous passage reads, "The Truth is, that tho' there are in that Country [the United
States] few People so miserable as the Poor of Europe, there are also very few that in Europe would be
called rich: it is rather a general happy Mediocrity that prevails." Benjamin Franklin, Information to Those
Who lbuld Remove to America, in BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, WRITINGS 975, 975 (J.A. Leo Lemay ed., 1987).
Later in the same essay Franklin concludes, "The almost general Mediocrity of Fortune that prevails in
America, obliging its People to follow some Business for Subsistance [sic], those Vices that arise usually
from Idleness are in a great Measure prevented. Industry and constant Employment are great Preservatives
of the Morals and Virtue of a Nation." Id. at 982. For a brilliant discussion of the relative equality and
liberty enjoyed by whites (and especially white males) and the slavery endured by African-Americans, as
well as the effect of that relationship on the American commitment to republicanism, see EDMUND S.
MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 376-87
(1975).
164. WOOD, supra note 133, at 118 (quoting letter from Samuel Adams to John Scollay (Dec. 30,
1780), in 4 WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 238 (Harry Cushing ed., 1904-1908)).
165. See id. at 150-58.
166. See id. at 65-70, 118-24.
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itself was because it needed power to prevent anarchy. Sufficient virtue,
however, could do much of the work traditionally set aside for power and itself
prevent anarchy. Better still, it could do so without posing a threat to liberty
in the way that power did. Americans could therefore promote liberty easily
and directly by making government accountable to the people. As they knew
better than anyone else, self-government was at once the best means for
safeguarding individual rights and also a right in itself. Power had never
seemed more likely to overawe liberty in their lifetimes than when an
unrepresentative Parliament at the same time, often in the same measures,
denied Americans both their individual rights and their right to control their
own destiny. 67 A self-governing people, in short, could only foster liberty
rather than tyranny.'68 As one New Jersey critic put the common
formulation, "a virtuous legislature will not, cannot listen to any proposition,
however popular, that came within the description of being unjust, impolitic
or unnecessary."'69 When it came to liberty, as the title of a New England
pamphlet succinctly stated, it was The People the Best Governors.
170
American republicans also had to reconsider the role of power. They
acknowledged that insuring liberty through representative government, or
accountability, came at the expense of government power, or efficiency.
Unable and unwilling to replicate either the monarchical or aristocratic features
of the English mixed government in any straightforward way, republicans
realized that their own governments would be more modest, limited, and small.
Accordingly, those governments might well deliver many services and preserve
order less effectively. But this was a price that republicans were willing to pay.
Their own experience of energetic government as England had practiced it-
the suspension of the New York legislature, 17' the closing of the port of
Boston, 72 the use of standing armies 73-- made Americans even more leery
of government power than they ordinarily might have been.
These principles became concrete in early state constitutions, most of
which in some way featured legislative supremacy, radical representation, and
167. See generally BAILYN, supra note 152, at 55-93 (discussing power and corruption in Colonies);
EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA 239-62 (1988) (discussing representation in Colonies); EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M.
MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION (3d ed. 1995) (discussing constitutional
controversy surrounding Stamp Act).
168. See LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 84 (1995).
169. "Curtius," ELIZABETHTOWN POL. INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 4, 1786, quoted in ROBERT P.
MCCORMICK, EXPERIMENT IN INDEPENDENCE: NEW JERSEY IN THE CRITICAL PERIOD, 1781-1789, at 72-73
(1950). But see WOOD, supra note 133, at 409-13 (noting perception of legislatures as despotic).
170. The People the Best Governors, in I FREDERICK CHASE, A HISTORY OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
AND THE TOWN OF HANOVER, NEW HAMPSHIRE 654 (John Lord ed., Cambridge, J. Wilson 1891).
171. See REID, 3 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 151, at 276-81.
172. See id. at 26-27, 31-32; ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 1763-1789, at 229-31 (1982).
173. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAW: THE STANDING-ARMY CONTROVERSY, THE
Two CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 228-39 (1981).
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magisterial impotence. 74 Consider first those devices, both abandoned and
embraced, that Whig constitutionalism traditionally viewed as fostering liberty.
American republicans manifested their comparative retreat from balance by
concentrating power in the legislatures. As Gordon Wood states, "The
American legislatures, in particular the lower houses of the assemblies, were
no longer to be merely adjuncts or checks to magisterial power, but were in
fact to be the government-a revolutionary transformation of political
authority . '... 175 Virginia's Constitution of 1776-in many ways typical of
the first-generation state frameworks-provided that all legislation must arise
in the lower house, prohibited the upper house from amending financial
measures, empowered both houses to appoint most judges, and tacitly
permitted the legislature to change the constitution by statute. Pennsylvania's
first constitution, generally seen as the most radically republican ever
produced,176 went further and concentrated these and other powers in the
lower house of the assembly, abolishing the upper house altogether.177 Not
only did these initial constitutions concentrate power in the assemblies, they
prevented the other branches of government, especially the "kingly" governors,
from checking the legislatures. The first constitutions consequently sought to
prohibit the executive from corrupting the legislature through informal
influence, commonly prohibiting any person holding government office or
receiving government patronage from sitting in the assembly. 178 More
dramatically, they also removed formal checks on the legislature that the
magistracy had traditionally wielded both in Parliament and in the colonial
legislatures. In most states the republican governor, unlike his royal
predecessor,179 could neither adjourn nor prorogue the assembly.180 Nor,
more dramatically still, could he veto legislation.' 8'
In lieu of balance, American republicans embraced accountability, which
in practice meant that the democratic part of government, the lower house of
the legislature in particular, should represent the people as closely as
possible.' American republicans therefore employed an array of
174. One important exception to these developments, at least with regard to magisterial importance,
was New York. See infra text accompanying notes 237-54.
175. WOOD, supra note 133, at 163.
176. For discussions of Pennsylvania's extreme republicanism, see WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 178-80; WOOD, supra note 133, at 83-90.
177. See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 2. Georgia and Vermont did likewise. See GA. CONST. of 1777, art.
VII; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § II; see also WOOD, supra note 133, at 163.
178. See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XVII; VA. CONST. of 1776, para. 10.
179. 2D CHARTER OF VA. of 1606, § XV, reprinted in CHARTERS OF THE OLD ENGLISH COLONIES
IN AMERICA 14 (Samuel Lucas ed., London, John W. Parker 1850). See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 66-70 (1968) (comparing powers of royal and republican governors).
180. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 10; PA. CONST. of 1776, § 20; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II,
§ XVIII; VA. CONST. of 1776, para. 9.
181. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 7; PA. CONST. of 1776, § 20; VA. CONST. of 1776, paras.
8-10; see also WOOD, supra note 133, at 141.
182. See BANNING, supra note 168, at 99-100; MORGAN, supra note 167, at 245-54; WOOD, supra
note 133, at 162-73, 209-14. Edmund Morgan provides a vivid characterization of the approach that
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constitutional mechanisms long extolled by their Whig predecessors. Among
these were annual elections,18 3 term limits to guarantee rotation in office,
84
a relatively broad franchise,8 5 even a right of localities to issue nonbinding
instructions to their representatives. 8 6 Predictably, nowhere did the rage for
representation proceed further than in Pennsylvania. In addition to all of the
foregoing devices, that state's first constitution did its best to make the people
part of the legislative process, providing that "[t]he doors of the house in
which the representatives of ... this state shall sit in general assembly, shall
be and remain open for the admission of all persons,"'87 that "[t]he votes and
proceedings of the general assembly shall be printed weekly during their
sitting,"' 18 and that "all bills of public nature shall be printed for the
consideration of the people, before they are read in general assembly the last
time for debate and amendment."' 89
Where the early constitutions traded one libertarian strategy for another,
they sacrificed the traditional devices meant to insure adequate state power.
Nowhere was this more clear than in the treatment accorded the magistracy,
the body that for better and often for worse wielded power most efficiently.
Not only did the early constitutions prevent the governors from checking the
legislature, but time and again they empowered the legislatures to check the
governors. The Virginia Constitution, once more reflecting the national trend,
permitted the legislature to choose the state secretary, the attorney general, 90
the governor's cabinet (styled the "Privy Council"),' 9' and finally, the
governor himself. 9 Virginia republicans further sought to limit magisterial
power by prohibiting the governor "under any pretence, [from] exercis[ing] any
American republicans took:
The colonists had been contending that a representative ought to think, feel, and act like his
constituents. Now [in the early state constitutions] they began to practice what they preached
by electing more ordinary men, men who did not talk in the highfalutin language of lawyers,
merchants, and big landowners, men more like themselves, who knew about the problems of
running a small farm and keeping the tax collector off your back.
MORGAN, supra note 167, at 247-48.
183. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 3; GA. CONST. of 1777, arts. II, III, XVI, XXIII, LIII; MD.
CONST. of 1776, arts. XXV, XXVI, XXVII; PA. CONST. of 1776, §§ 9, 31; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II,
§§ VIII, X; VA. CONST. of 1776, paras. 4, 5, 8.
184. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 15; GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XXIII; MD. CONST. of 1776,
art. XXVII; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. XXIII, XXVI; PA. CONST. of 1776, §§ 8, 11; VT. CONST. of 1777,
ch. II, § X; VA. CONST. of 1776, para. 5.
185. Willi Paul Adams provides useful tables that generally indicate a broadening of voting
qualifications as each colony made the transition to statehood. See ADAMS, supra note 176, at 293-307.
186. See id. at 248; see, e.g., N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 18.
187. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 13.
188. Id. § 14.
189. Id. § 15.
190. VA. CONST. of 1776, para. 14.
191. Id. para. 10.
192. Id. para. 8.
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power or prerogative, by virtue of any law, statute or custom of England,"'193
specifying a three-year gubernatorial term limit,' 94  and subjecting the
governor to impeachment for "mal-administration."' 95 Pennsylvania, again
pushing the limits of republicanism, simply got rid of a unitary governor
altogether. In its place, Pennsylvania's republicans created an unwieldy
"supreme executive council" consisting of twelve persons directly elected by
the people, but headed by a president and vice president chosen by the
unicameral assembly.
19 6
c. Toward Separation of Powers
Americans quickly discovered that their republican solutions did not work
as well as they had hoped. To many observers, the governments that operated
under the first state constitutions had ushered in what John Quincy Adams
called a "'critical period,"",197 and what others simply referred to as a
"crisis. '98 Of the many evils that had arisen, perhaps the most dismaying
was the behavior of the legislatures. In state after state, self-interested and
rapacious factions, it seemed, had managed to seize the assemblies and enact
ill-advised laws that confiscated property, transferred wealth through schemes
of calculated inflation, eliminated existing contractual obligations, and even
limited the right of trial by jury.199 Most observers agreed that these and
193. Id.; see also MD. CONST. of 1776, art. 33 (same); cf. N.H. CONsT. of 1776, paras. 2-3 (criticizing
abuses of Great Britain but hoping for reconciliation); N.Y. CONsT. of 1777, art. 35 (rejecting parts of
common law that concern allegiance, supremacy, sovereignty, government, and prerogatives of Crown).
194. VA. CONST. of 1776, para. 8.
195. Id. para. 16. Impeachment of government officials by the legislature, an important aspect of
removal authority, furnishes an especially rich and complex example of the republican approach. Drawing
on English precedent, all but six states initially adopted impeachment procedures largely as safeguards
against corruption by government officials and appointees. Such procedures, however, violated the
separation of powers doctrine, or at least a rigid version of the doctrine, in at least two ways. First,
impeachment authority obviously encroached on executive authority to control government officials.
Second, it intruded upon judicial authority to the extent that the basis for impeachment shifted from general
political grounds to the more narrow conception of wrongdoing, and impeachment procedures themselves
resembled indictments and trials. From another viewpoint, rendering impeachment procedures more judicial
in nature bucked the contemporary trend by placing limits on the power of the legislature. Where the
British House of Commons had earlier exercised almost unfettered discretion in bringing impeachments,
the republican conception confined the exercise of this power. In this way, the development of
impeachment authority anticipated the disenchantment with legislative abuses that would become evident
during the late 1770s and 1780s. By anticipating this disenchantment, impeachment became a device that
constitutional reformers suspicious of legislative excess retained and defended. For a superb study of
impeachment during the Critical Period and Founding, see PETER C. HOFrER & N.E.H. HULL,
IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 59-109 (1984). For a concise account, see Gerhardt, supra note
62, at 10-18.
196. See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19.
197. ROBER A. EAST, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, THE CRITICAL YEARS, 1785-1794, at 85 (1962)
(quoting Adams).
198. See WOOD, supra note 133, at 393.
199. Id. at 405-09. In response, several state courts began to develop the doctrine of judicial review.
Id. at 454-59; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782) (holding that lower house of
Virginia legislature exceeded its power in granting pardon that upper house did not approve); Rutgers v.
Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. 1784) (construing state statute as comporting with state constitution
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other ills arose because the American people were not so virtuous after all. In
addition, many commentators predictably viewed these developments in
classical republican terms and decried what surely appeared to be an inevitable
popular degeneration into "'anarchy and licentiousness. ' ,'200 Others, however,
diagnosed a novel and far more troubling malady. To these individuals, the
problem was not an excess of liberty, but rather that the people, through the
legislatures, were doing what Whig and republican theory posited as a
solecism: They were tyrannizing themselves. As Forrest McDonald comments,
the reason for the crisis facing the nation "in the eyes of many Americans, was
that governments were now committing unprecedented excesses, even
though-or precisely because-governments now derived their powers from
compacts amongst the people., 20 1 Americans, in short, began to consider that
self-government and rights did not always go hand in hand.
With the republican model exposed as inadequate, a number of prominent
thinkers groped toward new solutions, a search that included rethinking the
hitherto "relatively minor eighteenth-century maxim" of separation of
powers.0 2 Americans had long been familiar with the doctrine through the
writings of English Commonwealth radicals, Locke, and, most of all,
Montesquieu.23 Still, the development of the doctrine in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century Europe, to say nothing of its reception in America, is an
enormous, complex, and often counterintuitive topic that merits a separate
study in its own right. The often-invoked Locke, for example, spoke of
legislative, executive, and "federative" power.2' The idea of a discrete
"judicial power" came relatively late in the doctrine's development.20 5
Perhaps the best that can be said is that by the 1770s, Americans who invoked
the separation of powers doctrine generally agreed that it turned on three now-
familiar types of governmental power: legislative, executive, and judicial.
in order to preserve property rights), reprinted in JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 393, 415 (1964); Trevett v. Weeden (R.I. 1786) (unreported)
(holding state statute unconstitutional on grounds that it violated right to trial by jury), described in 2
WILLIAM CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 965-68
(1953); Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787) (declaring state statute unconstitutional on grounds
that it violated right to trial by jury). For an excellent account rescuing the last case from obscurity, see
William M. Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
491 (1994).
200. WOOD, supra note 133, at 403 (quoting MOSES HEMMENWAY, A SERMON, PREACHED BEFORE
HIS EXCELLENCY JOHN HANCOCK 40 (1784)).
201. MCDONALD, supra note 135, at 154; see id. at 143-83 (discussing lessons learned from
1776-1787); see also WOOD, supra note 133, at 409-13.
202. WOOD, supra note 133, at 449.
203. See VILE, supra note 20, at 120-22; see also id. at 118-75 (describing separation of powers
doctrine in America).
204. See JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government,
in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 265, 364-66 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988). By "federative"
power, Locke meant the conduct of foreign relations. See id. at 365. For a thoughtful discussion of Locke's
contributions to separation of powers thinking, see GWYN, supra note 21, at 66-81.
205. See GWYN, supra note 21, at 53-55, 101-11 (attributing development of concept of judicial
power to Montesquieu).
1764 [Vol. 105: 1725
Most Dangerous Branch
According to Montesquieu, to whom such Americans usually turned, legislative
power comprised the enactment, amendment, or abrogation of permanent or
temporary laws;0 6 executive authority included the power to make peace or
war and to establish public security; 20 7 judicial power entailed punishing
criminals and resolving disputes between individuals. 208 Even here, at the
core of the doctrine, these definitions did not command universal assent. Most
often, discussions of governmental structure assumed rather than explicated
such definitions.2 9 And beyond this imprecise core, the rest remained up for
grabs-including those issues, such as removal authority, that generate modem
controversies. Moreover, despite superficial similarities, separation of powers
was distinct from the idea of mixed government and long subordinate to it. In
separation of powers, institutions were differentiated by function, whereas in
mixed government, government bodies reflected different orders of society.
American constitutionalists nonetheless employed separation of powers
early on, though mainly rhetorically. Four of the early state constitutions even
included separation of powers clauses. Virginia's clause was typical, providing
that "[t]he legislative, executive, and judiciary department, shall be separate
and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the
other."210 Perhaps the most concrete manifestation of the doctrine is one
taken for granted today. In general, the early republican constitutions expressly
prohibited members of the legislature from holding any remunerative position
elsewhere in government. They did this, as the New Jersey Constitution
declared, so that "the legislative department of this government may, as much
as possible, be preserved from all suspicion of corruption," especially
corruption by the executive. 21' Given their commitment to legislative
supremacy, however, the states at best honored their commitment to these
declarations in the breach. As Gordon Wood states:
[W]hat more than anything else makes the use of Montesquieu's
maxim in 1776 perplexing is the great discrepancy between the
affirmations of the need to separate the several governmental
departments and the actual political practice the state governments
followed. It seems, as historians have noted, that Americans in 1776
gave only a verbal recognition to the concept of separation of powers
206. BARON DE MONfESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See WOOD, supra note 133, at 150-61. Wood argues that it is difficult to glean what eighteenth-
century Americans meant by their repeated calls for distinct and separate departments. This is so, he
explains, because the doctrine of separation of powers was vague and ill-defined. Id. at 151-53.
210. VA. CONST. of 1776, para. 3.
211. NJ. CONST. of 1776, art. XX; Wood, supra note 133, at 157-59. This principle was carried
forward by the Incompatibility and Ineligibility Clauses, which provide that no Congressperson may serve
in another office under the authority of the United States. U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 2.
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in their Revolutionary constitutions, since they were apparently not
concerned with a real division of departmental functions.212
Taking separation of powers more seriously suggested ways of explaining
where the states had gone wrong, which in turn sharpened many Americans'
apparently hazy conception of the doctrine. From this process a number of
leading critics realized that they had placed too little faith in balance, had
devoted too much attention to simple accountability, and had given insufficient
concern to efficiency.
The most insistent theme was balance. Time and again, critics of the state
constitutions decried their asymmetry and proposed separation of powers as a
means to restore balance and preserve liberty. Among the first, Benjamin Rush,
a vociferous supporter of the concept of separation of powers, complained that
in the Pennsylvania Constitution "the supreme, absolute, and uncontrolled
power of the State is lodged in the hands of one body of men. 2 3 Jefferson
sounded the theme most forcefully and famously when criticizing his state's
constitution in Notes on the State of Virginia:
All the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary,
result to the legislative body. The concentrating [of] these in the same
hands is precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no
alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands,
and not by a single one. 173 despots would surely be as oppressive
as one .... [Government] should not only be founded on free
principles .... the powers of government should be so divided and
balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could
transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and
restrained by the others.214
Despite occasional rhetorical excesses-arguably Jefferson's final sentence
is such an example-the advocates of separation of powers rarely argued for
keeping the three government departments absolutely distinct. Even when they
did, it is doubtful whether they meant it with much more clarity than did the
men who drafted Virginia's original-and effectively ignored-separation of
powers clause. As Willi Paul Adams notes, "Montesquieu, the authority used
by the critics, had not advocated a separation of powers pure and simple." 215
Likewise, Montesquieu's "much praised model, the British constitution,
permitted several functions to be exercised jointly or in a partially overlapping
212. WOOD, supra note 133, at 153-54.
213. Id. at 441 (quoting Benjamin Rush).
214. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, in WRITINGS 123, 245 (Merrill D. Peterson
ed., 1984); see also BANNING, supra note 168, at 88 (discussing desire of both Jefferson and Madison to
reform Virginia Constitution of 1776).
215. ADAMS, supra note 176, at 275.
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manner by the several branches. '21 6 The more sophisticated commentators
understood that governmental power needed to be separated sufficiently to
ensure that no one branch would ever again become as powerful as the state
legislatures had.217 Separation of powers, in other words, served balance
rather than balance serving a rigid, formalistic view of separation of powers.
As it promised balance, separation of powers also reflected a
reconceptualization of accountability. Simple accountability had proven to be
too dangerous. As the Critical Period progressed, many thinkers could agree
with Aedanus Burke when he observed that "[a] popular assembly," framed to
respond to unmediated popular will and "not governed by fundamental laws,
but under the biass [sic] of anger, malice, or a thirst for revenge, will commit
more excess [sic] than an arbitrary monarch."2 "8 This followed, others
concluded, because simple accountability had also resulted in government that
was paradoxically unaccountable. Recent experience demonstrated -that
radically representative legislatures fell easy prey to demagogues, to localism,
and-perhaps most important-to factions. Each of these evils perverted
consideration of the public good and thus blocked expression of the public
interest. It was for these reasons, in part, that the state legislatures could pass
too many laws too quickly in ways that threatened liberty. As Madison wrote
in a privately circulated memorandum entitled Vices of the Political System of
the United States, "'The short period of independency has filled as many pages
as the century which proceeded it"' with ill-considered, unjust, and
unrepresentative laws.219
Separation of powers helped address these unhappy discoveries not by
abandoning accountability, but by recasting it in such a way as to render it less
dangerous and more truly representative, or at least representative of the
people's better, more deliberative selves. Proponents of the doctrine therefore
tended to worry less about attempting to replicate the populace as nearly as
possible within the halls of the legislature.220 Instead they turned their
concern to according the various departments of government a more
representative basis. Doing this, it was declared, would ensure that "[a]ll power
residing originally in the people and being derived from them, the several
magistrates and officers of government vested with authority, whether
legislature, executive, or judicial, are the substitutes and agents, and are at all
times accountable to them."22' This more complex view of accountability
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302-04 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
218. AEDANUS BURKE, AN ADDRESS TO THE FREEMEN OF THE STATE OF SOUTH-CAROLINA 23
(Philadelphia, Robert Bell 1783).
219. WOOD, supra note 133, at 406. As Wood puts it, "In the eyes of those who favored [new state
constitutions], the old government had lost whatever representativeness of the people it had presumably
possessed." Id. at 447.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 182-89.
221. MASS CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. V.
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meant shifting attention from such republican strategies as annual elections,
local instructions, and requirements such as that "all bills of a public nature,
shall .. be printed for the consideration of the people." '222 In their stead, it
yielded such devices as direct election of the governor and upper houses of the
assemblies.
For all that separation of powers promised as a safeguard of liberty, it also
held out ways for making government power more effective, republican
government's more traditional if less pressing problem. Mostly those ways
pointed toward rehabilitating those offices that executed the laws. Here,
however, the concern was not so much for achieving balance or spreading
representation, but for ensuring that government could promote order. Many
Americans viewed the vices of the Critical Period as the inevitable
degeneration of republics into anarchy. Some events, however, were best seen
as just that, most spectacularly, Shays's Rebellion, during which farmers in
western Massachusetts rioted against state authority in 1786. The famous
revolt, as Wood notes, "was received with excited consternation mingled with
relief by many Americans precisely because it was an anticipated and
understandable abuse of republican liberty. Liberty had been carried into
anarchy and the throwing off of all government-a more comprehensible
phenomenon to most American political thinkers than legislative tyranny."223
Seen this way, as anarchy, the outcome of Shays's Rebellion suggested the
solution. Happily, the state government had been able to restore order to
western Massachusetts thanks in part to that state's reformed and more
vigorous governor. As Charles Thach neatly put it seventy years ago, concern
about authority "meant a corresponding change of emphasis from the
legislature to the executive. 224 At the very least, this change of emphasis
confirmed the wisdom that-contrary to the Pennsylvania approach-"the one-
[person] executive is best."2' It also suggested "the necessity of executive
appointments, civil and military; the futility of legislative military control...
[and the] value of a fixed executive salary which the legislature could not
reduce. 2 26
A new spate of state constitutions put developing separation of powers
principles into practice, most notably, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.
So too, however, did New York's earlier Constitution of 1777, a document that
was ahead of its time, anticipated or even exceeded the approach later taken
in other states, and, with the Massachusetts framework, is often cited as a
222. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II., § XIV
223. WOOD, supra note 133, at 412.
224. CHARLES C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 51-52 (1969).
225. Id. at 53.
226. Id.
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precursor of the Federal Constitution.227 Both state documents, among
others,228 displayed a profound commitment to a functional balance that was
nonetheless short of a rigid, formal division.
The Massachusetts instrument, the work of such notable reformers as John
Adams, stated-or to be accurate, overstated-this new commitment in the
most ostensibly formalist separation of powers clause yet written:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or
either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and
judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the
legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end it may
be a government of laws, and not of men.'9
This prescription meant strengthening the governor and courts at the expense
of the assembly, the lower house in particular. Unlike fellow Chief
Magistrates, the governor of Massachusetts-to be styled "His
Excellency"°--was therefore accorded an array of protections against
despotic legislative power, including express salary protection, the ability to
prorogue and adjourn the legislature," and a provisional veto that could
only be overridden by two thirds of each house.232 Along similar lines, the
New York governor had the authority to convene (on extraordinary occasions)
and prorogue the assembly,233 along with a complex power to "revise" bills
in conjunction with the state chancellor and judges of the supreme court to
prevent laws that are "hastily and unadvisedly passed.,,234 In both states the
judiciary also benefited, at times in tandem with the executive. Massachusetts
vested the power to appoint judges in the governor (with the advice and
consent of the upper house of an executive council)235 and granted judges
life tenure. z 6 New York, though more modest in its protections, also
accorded the governor a qualified power to appoint judges 7 and guaranteed
that judges would serve during good behavior until the age of sixty.238
227. For a discussion of the New York Constitution's place in state and national constitutional
development, see id. at 34-41. In particular the New York Constitution is often taken as a model for the
federal executive. Id. at 53-54; WooD, supra note 133, at 463.
228. For example, the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784. See WOOD, supra note 133, at 463.
229. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XXX.
230. Id. pt. II, ch. II, § 1, art. I.
231. Id. pt. II, ch. II, § i, art. V.
232. Id. pt. II, ch. I, § 1, art. II.
233. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XVII.
234. Id. art. III.
235. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. II, § 1, art. IX.
236. Id. pt. II, ch. III, art. I.
237. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. XXIII, XXIV.
238. Id. art. XXIV.
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Despite these measures, Massachusetts and New York fell short of the
former state's near absolute separation of powers clause in much the same way
that Virginia dramatically fell short of its own earlier, more cryptic version.
New York, while empowering the governor to appoint most "officers" with the
advice and consent of a "council of appointment," 239 placed the appointment
of the state treasurer directly in the hands of the assembly.24 Massachusetts
provided for a "council, for advising the governor in the executive part of the
government," which would further assume the governor's authority.24' It was
chosen by the assembly.242 More striking, the assembly alone could choose
what, on a modem formalist reading, would be a fair portion of the executive
branch, including: "the secretary, treasurer, ... receiver-general ....
commissary-general, notaries public, and naval officers. 243 In its own
"reform" constitution of 1784, which also boasted a separation of powers
clause,244 New Hampshire likewise vested appointment of the state's
secretary, treasurer, and commissary-general in the assembly.24
Beyond balance, separation of powers meant adopting devices that
reflected the more complex conception of accountability. New York and
Massachusetts did this most dramatically by rejecting legislative selection of
the governor in favor of direct election by the people.246 The constitutions
also diffused accountability within the assemblies themselves. Where a number
of earlier constitutions had gone so far as either to empower the lower houses
to elect the upper houses,247 or to get rid of the upper houses completely, 248
New York and Massachusetts confirmed the majority view by specifying that
this body too would be elected directly by the people.249 Conversely, neither
instrument extended the principle to election of judges, a strategy with which
state constitutions generally would not experiment for at least a generation and
that the Federal Constitution would reject outright.
Finally, both the Massachusetts and New York frameworks also reflected
a comparative concern for efficient administration of state affairs. Given the
Pennsylvania option, it is significant that these and other systems chose to
retain a single person as "supreme executive magistrate" or governor. 5° As
noted, Massachusetts in particular greatly circumscribed the governor's
239. Id. art. XXIII.
240. Id. art. XXII.
241. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. II, § 3, art. I.
242. Id. pt. II, ch. II, § 3, art. II.
243. Id. pt. II, ch. H, § 4, art. I. In this, Massachusetts retained a feature evident in earlier state
constitutions. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 16.
244. N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XXXVII.
245. Id. pt. II.
246. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XVII; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. II, § 1, art. III.
247. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. of 1776, para. 4.; S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. II; see also WOOD, supra note
133, at 214 (discussing early state constitutions in which lower house selected upper house).
248. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. R.; PA. CONST. of 1776, § 2; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § I.
249. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. X, XI; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. I, § 2, art. I.
250. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XVII; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. II, § 1, art I.
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executive supremacy, especially with regard to appointments. Nonetheless, the
state's retention of a "unitary" governor reflected a fresh appreciation
throughout the Republic that a single Chief Executive promoted energetic
enforcement of the laws in a way that a plural executive could not.25
Likewise, Massachusetts, as well as New York,z 2 also provided that the
governor would be "the commander in chief of the army and navy.., and
shall have full power ... to train, instruct, exercise, and govern the militia and
navy" to defend the commonwealth. 3 If anything, New York enunciated its
commitment to energy even more plainly in stating that it was the duty of the
governor "to transact all necessary business with the officers of government,
civil and military; to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, to the best
of his ability; and to expedite all such measures as may be resolved upon by
the legislature.'
'54
d. Separation of Powers and the Articles of Confederation
Meanwhile, developments on the national level also pointed toward
separation of powers, pragmatically understood. Compared to the state
constitutions, the Articles of Confederation were not a source to which
contemporaries often turned to draw lessons about governmentY5 That said,
as in the states, experience under the Articles provided little support for a
much more thoroughgoing conception of separation of powers than a general
functional commitment to balance, joint accountability, and comparatively
greater energy.
The Articles of Confederation established something more than a mere
"gathering of ambassadors" but far less than a true national government. 6
Under the Articles, the United States lacked many basic governmental powers.
Of greater relevance, it also lacked anything approaching the governmental
structure that had been developing in the states. Instead, the Articles
concentrated what national authority that existed in the Continental Congress,
a unicameral assembly composed of delegates from each state, each delegation
possessing one vote. As the sole repository of national power, Congress
performed legislative, executive, and judicial functions-imprecise as those
terms remained-as well as duties that were less easily categorized. The
Articles gave Congress what were considered core legislative powers, such as
251. See WOOD, supra note 133, at 435-36, 451-52; ADAMS, supra note 176, at 271-72.
252. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XVIII.
253. MASS. CONST of 1780, pt. II, ch. II, § 1, art VII.
254. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIX.
255. The leading historical accounts of American constitutional thought during the Critical Period,
echoing the sources, pay little attention to the Articles in comparison to the state constitutions. See, e.g.,
WOOD, supra note 133, passim; McDONALD, supra note 135, passim.
256. For an excellent discussion of the nature of the national government under the Articles, see
RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 55-79 (1987).
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regulating financial matters, establishing post offices, and fixing weights and
measures. 2 7 But they also gave Congress the power to make war and appoint
and commission all military officers serving the nation-authority usually
thought to be executive in nature.z 8 In addition, Congress possessed
significant authority for, in the words of the Articles, "managing the general
affairs of the united states." 259 This phrase referred specifically to a
"Committee of the States," that would do the "managing" when Congress was
in recess.260 In effect, the phrase also applied to other ways Congress
attempted to oversee national affairs. Initially Congress tried to perform this
task either through the whole body or through special committees that came
to be comprised of both delegates and nondelegates.26' When this system
proved clumsy, Congress in 1781 established departments under single heads
who were not members of Congress.262 As if this combination of functions
were not enough, Congress also acted as an appellate court for interstate
admiralty disputes.263
Few observers, and fewer participants, championed this framework. Most
came to criticize the Articles for their failure to grant sufficient authority to the
national government.264 Yet many also voiced criticisms of the national
government's structure, and these complaints often echoed developments in the
states. Most obviously, the Articles failed the test of balance. Alexander
Hanson of Maryland, for example, viewed the concentration of power in the
single body of Congress as a grave deficiency.265 Conversely-and in
contrast to the states-others complained that Congress was not accountable
enough. So unresponsive was Congress that, after the Revolution ended, the
257. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. The Committee of the States, which was to be comprised of one delegate from each state, see
id. art. X, met only once and was a near complete failure. MORRIS, supra note 256, at 97-99.
261. These committees included the Naval Committee, the Secret Committee, and the Committee of
Secret Correspondence, among others. MORRIS, supra note 256, at 95.
262. The original appointees included Robert Morris as Superintendent of Finance and Agent of
Marine, Benjamin Lincoln as Secretary at War, and Robert R. Livingston as Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
Id.
Morris, perhaps his generation's leading historian of the Founding, significantly labels the
congressional experience with standing committees and single-head departments as "The Executive and
Administrative Functions of Congress." Id. For a general account, see JENNINGS B. SANDERS, EVOLUTION
OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789 (1935).
263. MORRIS, supra note 256, at 67-71; see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb.
20, 1784), in I THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND
JAMES MADISON, 1776-1826, at 292, 294 (James M. Smith ed., 1995) [hereinafter THE REPUBLIC OF
LETTERS].
264. As early as 1780, Alexander Hamilton proclaimed that "[t]he fundamental defect is a want of
power in Congress." Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 3, 1780), in 2 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, 1779-1781, at 401 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961); see MORRIS, supra note 256, at 245-47
(discussing Hamilton's letter); WOOD, supra note 133, at 463-67.
265. ALEXANDER C. HANSON, REMARKS ON THE PROPOSED PLAN OF A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 217, 225 (Paul L. Ford
ed., B. Franklin 1971) (1888).
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body had great difficulty maintaining a quorum, much to the consternation of
Jefferson, among others.266 (This concern does nothing to belie the growing
fear of simple accountability on the state level since Congress could not claim
a direct electoral mandate, and was unlikely to abuse it even if it had had one.)
Finally, others criticized the national government not just for its lack of
authority, but also for its lack of energy in using the powers it did possess.267
As in the states, these criticisms reflected a growing appreciation of
separation of powers. Yet, as in the states, they not only fail to demonstrate
that a formalist conception of that doctrine was just around the corner, but
instead'point the other way. In particular, the Articles underscore how much
conceptual work would have to be done to give practical definition to
legislative, executive, and judicial (not to mention, "managerial") authority,
much less to assign these powers exclusively to one branch or another, much
less to do all this in the space of a few years. Without doubt the failures of
government, both state and national, illustrated the need for a greater division
of powers to the extent those powers could be clearly defined. They did not,
however, preordain a rigid formalist structure in which all governmental
authority was clearly defined and neatly packaged.
Perhaps the most significant congressional enactment during this period,
the Northwest Ordinance,268 points in the opposite direction, albeit in a
paradoxical fashion. Enacted the same summer that the Philadelphia
Convention drafted the Constitution, this often overlooked legislation merits
consideration as a foundational constitutional document, or at least as a
document that reflected American constitutional thinking at the time.
269
Among other things, it established the basic interim governmental framework
for territory now occupied by six states.270 It also enumerated "fundamental
principles of civil and religious liberty" that would "forever remain
unalterable." 27'
Not surprisingly, the framework set forth evinced yet another take on
separation of powers, one which, like those apparent in the states, was keyed
to recent developments. In this case, these factors pointed to a need for greater
congressional involvement in the territories. Accordingly, the Ordinance greatly
enhanced the authority of the congressionally appointed territorial governor. To
an extent, this resulted in a division of powers that at first glance appeared to
approach a modern formalist conception. The governor, for example, acted as
266. MORRIS, supra note 256, at 92-93.
267. Id. at 194-219, 245-66.
268. Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, 1 Stat. 50 (1789), reprinted in
I U.S.C. at li (1994) [hereinafter Northwest Ordinance].
269. For discussions developing these themes, see John J. Gibbons, Intentionalism, History, and
Legitimacy, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 613, 634-37 (1991); Denis P. Duffey, Note, The Northwest Ordinance as
a Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 929, 940-53 (1995).
270. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 268, §§ 1-14.
271. Id. §§ 13, 14, arts. I-VI.
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Commander in Chief of the militia, appointed all military officers (except
generals, who were appointed by Congress), and even appointed all
"magistrates, and other civil officers."2 72 Yet the Ordinance went further,
according the governor an absolute veto over legislation as well as the "power
to convene, prorogue, and dissolve the general assembly when, in his opinion,
it shall be expedient.' 273 This was arguably "executive" authority; British
monarchs and royal colonial governors possessed these powers into the
eighteenth century. Yet this was not necessarily so, as the Federal Convention
itself would soon demonstrate.
2. The Myth of Fonnalist Separation
The account to this point refutes the formalist view. Calabresi and Prakash,
however, claim that the story can be told with far greater precision. For them,
separation of powers meant more than a central commitment to balance, joint
authority, and a comparative concern for efficiency. Rather, the doctrine
reflected these goals not in the abstract fashion just recounted, but through a
precise and near-absolute division of powers. The foregoing account
undermines this view in a number of ways. First, the sweep of events belies
the assumption that the formalist conception was a constant and renders
improbable the notion that it became the consensus. Second, it directly belies
the notion that the term "separation of powers" primarily, still less necessarily,
referred to the doctrine in its formalist guise.
a. The Pace of Change
Calabresi and Prakash embiace the idea that an "ancient text" should be
construed "in its historical context."274 Toward that end, they briefly examine
the thought of Locke, Blackstone, and Montesquieu to argue that "the founding
generation firmly believed that, like Julius Caesar's Gaul, all of government
came divided into three parts." 275 In doing this they assume that Locke,
Blackstone, and Montesquieu advanced a formalist conception, that this
conception was the eighteenth-century norm, and that the American
constitutionalists, being the learned individuals they were, assimilated and
applied this view.276
272. Id. §§ 6, 7.
273. Id. § 11.
274. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 599 n.219.
275. Id. at 606.
276. See id. at 604-05. For a discussion of the political philosophers who influenced the Founders with
regard to executive power in particular, see FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 38-66 (1994).
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None of this was the case. As noted, even a minimally adequate sense of
context reveals that for much of the eighteenth century, constitutional thought
was dominated by the tripartite but radically different model of mixed
government. This conception, in turn, largely gave way to the republican
commitment to legislative authority at the expense of executive or judicial
power. Only after this approach proved problematic did separation of powers
emerge in anything like its present form. Through all but the latter part of
these developments, separation of powers was at best a peripheral doctrine that
had barely been worked out, even by those American constitutionalists who
gave it rhetorical support. All this would be true even if Locke, Blackstone,
and Montesquieu advanced the type of formalist understanding of government
that Calabresi and Prakash say they did. Yet the foregoing account challenges
this claim as well. As an initial matter, only a careful, considered analysis of
the work of these three thinkers could settle this point adequately. Absent such
a study, the long reign of mixed government theory should at least give one
pause before relying on any of these complex thinkers in any straightforward
way, still less before invoking them to support formalism.
But perhaps the larger formalist contention can still be saved. Calabresi
and Prakash could safely concede that separation of powers thinking may not
have dominated eighteenth-century political thought yet still contend that it
came into its own exactly at the point when the early republican constitutions
demonstrated their inherent flaws.
At the very least, the complex evolution of constitutional thought during
this period makes this reformulated claim appear counterintuitive and highly
improbable. The dizzying theoretical changes that occurred prior to the Federal
Convention cut against the type of global precision that formalists project.
What strikes anyone who examines the era in any depth, especially those
historians who have devoted years to the exercise, is its complexity,
contradictions, and, at times, confusion. To note one well-known example, so
distinguished a constitutionalist as John Adams in part grasped various tenets
underlying the early republican constitutions and the subsequent reaction to
them, yet never fully abandoned many of the central tenets of Whig mixed
government. More to the point, modem formalists such as Calabresi and
Prakash in effect need to argue that despite an initial commitment to mixed
government, despite republican experiments in which the executive was all but
abandoned, and despite the limited functional rather than formal realization of
separation of powers in subsequent state constitutions, American
constitutionalists by 1787 suddenly embraced a thoroughgoing formalist view
that provided crisp, neat answers to intractable separation of powers problems
that plague us still.
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b. Rhetoric Versus Reality
Not only is this unlikely, it is plainly incorrect. Aside from invoking great
eighteenth-century thinkers, Calabresi and Prakash seek to establish context by
demonstrating how frequently American constitutionalists employed the
language of separation. Simply observe, they say, how often key pamphlets,
documents, and speeches speak of three and only three governmental powers:
legislative, executive, and judicial. Note further how these sources time and
again contend that only the legislature can make laws, only the executive can
execute them, and only the judiciary can adjudicate them. What more
compelling proof could there be for the formalist case?
This strategy is not only ahistorical, but tautological as well. When
considering a general term like separation of powers, what matters is not just
that people said it, but what they meant when they said it. In demonstrating
certain general commitments, the account to this point also shows that early
American constitutionalists did not in fact advance a comprehensive conception
of separation of powers when they employed the general language of
separation. Instead, they commonly used that rhetoric even as they established
mechanisms that would violate the formalist conception of the doctrine. As
Massachusetts illustrates, even the most extreme expression of the idea did not
prevent those invoking it from according the power to appoint (and presumably
remove) a substantial portion of the executive branch to the legislature. And
American constitutionalists did not merely employ separation of powers
rhetoric to later, "reform" constitutions such as that of Massachusetts, nor use
it to critique the earlier, first-generation frameworks. As Calabresi and Prakash
themselves note, they also spoke the language of separation in those earlier
frameworks, as witness Virginia's. 2 7 7 Yet these were precisely the
experiments notable for their nearly all-powerful legislatures. In this light, to
assert that the mere utterance of separation of powers terms illustrates a
particular (and improbable) conception of that concept is akin to arguing that
the mere invocation of the words "natural law" reflects a clear commitment to
John Finnis instead of Thomas Aquinas.
As a final matter, even differing accounts of the period just considered
undermine the formalist case no less strongly. In this regard, consider the
classic treatment of separation of powers by M.J.C. Vile, which Calabresi and
Prakash overlook. In partial contrast to Wood, McDonald, and Adams, Vile
argues that the early state constitutions actually embraced a "pure" separation
of powers only to give way to later frameworks that turned to what he terms
"checks and balances. 278 Vile quickly notes, however, that contemporaries
277. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 607.
278. VILE, supra note 20, at 120-21, 133-54.
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employed the language of separation to defend each approach. 279 He further
asserts that what he views as "pure" separation of powers by definition meant
a weak, minuscule executive-since the mere execution of laws was seen as
purely mechanical-and that the appointment and removal powers of executive
officers (including the Chief Executive) were not clearly seen as either
legislative or executive matters-which is why these "pure" versions of the
doctrine could vest the appointment of the executive in the legislature.28°
Two conclusions follow. First, Vile's treatment underscores the notion that
"separation of powers" and related terminology were malleable, since on his
view such terminology stood for both an earlier, formalist version of the
doctrine (his "pure" separation of powers) and for a later, functionalist version
(his "checks and balances"). Second, his version shows that, even at its apex,
the formal version of the doctrine never vested anything like absolute control
of the executive in the head of the executive.28'
B. Convention and Constitution
The constitutional experience of the previous twenty years culminated, at
the Philadelphia Convention, in the Constitution of the United States. With
these landmarks, Americans for the first time employed at the national level
the still newly utilized, roughly defined doctrine of separation of powers as a
means to serve the newly appreciated goals of balance, joint accountability,
and comparative energy. They did not commit to a great deal more. This
Founding commitment to a functional rather than formal separation of powers
first became apparent at the Convention. The summer-long gathering displayed
a general consistency about the goals that the doctrine was to further, yet
revealed confusion, disagreement, and compromise in attempting to define the
doctrine more specifically. More importantly, the commitment to a functional
separation of powers also became apparent in the document that the
Convention framed. At best, the framework offered a sketch of separation of
279. Id. at 146-47.
280. Id. at 138-45.
281. I have in general followed the account advanced by Wood rather than that put forward by Vile,
for several reasons. First, Wood's version reflects the majority view among historians. Second, Vile's
definition of "pure" separation of powers, while logical, nonetheless fails to account for the problem of
executive appointments and removal, which are central to the modem formalist conception. Employing his
definition would therefore cause needless confusion, especially to a legal audience. Finally, Vile's approach
unnecessarily cedes the term "separation of powers," which is the phrase in dispute in current legal
discourse, even though Vile himself relies on thinkers, such as Jefferson, see JEFFERSON, supra note 214,
who spoke in terms of separation of powers when discussing what Vile labels "checks and balances." VILE,
supra note 20, at 149-53.
Nonetheless, I should stress that I believe the two accounts are fundamentally in accord and mostly
differ in the use of terminology. Each version supports my contention that the Massachusetts Constitution,
for example, embodied a functional model, whether it is said to reflect "separation of powers," as does
Wood, or "checks and balances," as does Vile.
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powers, inked in only at the top of each branch, and even there falling well
short of an absolute division of government functions.
By the same token, both the Convention and the Constitution belie the
formalist contention that separation of powers was an end in itself. In
particular, everything mentioned so far-previous constitutional experience, the
Convention, and the Constitution-demonstrates that specific clauses that
leading formalists commonly trot out for support are better understood when
read the opposite way. Against this backdrop, the Vesting Clause should not
be read to grant the executive branch a prepackaged set of powers. The Take
Care Clause should not be taken to commit the President to execute only those
laws that the President thinks are constitutional. The Opinions Clause is not
surplusage. The Necessary and Proper Clause is only implausibly read as
granting Congress the power to do no more than pass laws that further the
authority of each branch within its sphere.
1. Separation of Powers Realized
a. The Convention
Contrary to the usual originalist assumption, the records of the Federal
Convention more often than not reveal how little the Framers settled rather
than how much. Instead, the Convention in many ways replicated, in a single
summer, the confusion, disagreement, yet nascent consensus, that had
characterized American constitutional thinking in the previous two decades.
This point applies with special force to separation of powers. Here, not only
did the fifty-five individuals who came to Philadelphia wildly disagree on
particulars, but many initially questioned the doctrine itself. Numerous
differences were put aside as the summer wore on, but not so many that
anything other than a basic sketch was put forward. Certainly no one put
forward any plan that assumed the rigid, global division of powers advocated
by modem formalists.
A gathering any less contentious would have been surprising. As
previously described, the background of the Convention at most furnished
separation of powers as a mechanism yet to be worked out with precision.
Moreover, a number of other factors cut against even the degree of consensus
that had been achieved in a state like Massachusetts. For one thing, the ideals
of mixed government and radical republicanism still commanded adherents,
several of whom attended or influenced the Convention.82 For another, the
Framers came from different states, which had handled the problem in different
ways and whose experiences offered different lessons. Perhaps most important,
the novel problem of how to apportion power between the national and state
282. See McDONALD, supra note 135, at 240-42.
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governments would profoundly affect how the delegates thought about
apportioning power among the branches of the national government itself.
2 3
These factors exacerbated certain divisive tendencies among the delegates
throughout the Convention. An array of issues split the convention along a
number of axes: small state vs. large state, North vs. South, commercial
interests vs. agrarian interests.28 These splits often eclipsed disagreements
over how best to divide government power. That said, loose groupings did
emerge that bore upon separation of powers. At one extreme were the
delegates "who had come of age politically before 1776,' ,25 who did not
consider the early state constitutions to be fundamentally flawed, who valued
state power, and who believed in legislative dominance (but not hegemony).
This group included Roger Sherman, Edmund Randolph, George Mason,
Benjamin Franklin, and John Dickinson.8 6 While often unsuccessful, these
delegates insured that the Convention would have to take their relatively
backward views into account. At the other end of the spectrum were younger
delegates who had already become harsh critics of the republican state
constitutions, who advocated national power, and who urged a substantial
enhancement of the executive and the judiciary. Leaders here included James
Madison, James Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, and Gouverneur Morris. Even
these delegates, however, frequently disagreed on major points. In between fell
those whom Luther Martin termed "the moderates." Often, though not
uniformly, this group sided with the nationalists rather than the
republicans. 287
The give and take among these groups did not lend itself to ready
consensus except at the most general level. As McDonald notes, "Almost all
the delegates agreed that there must be an executive branch, independent of the
legislative and judicial branches."2 Yet, despite this basic accord, for much
of the summer the Convention left a shocking number of core separation of
powers issues-presidential selection, the veto, legislative involvement in
executive appointments, and assignment of the war power, to name a
few-either up for grabs, or tentatively settled in ways contrary to their
ultimate resolution. When it did settle such matters, the resolution often came
in a last-minute flurry that reflected compromise within the framework of
general shared purposes rather than the culmination of any specific vision.
283. See THACH, supra note 224, at 78-104.
284. BANNING, supra note 168, at I11; MORRIS, supra note 256, at 269-70; THACH, supra note 224,
at 78-79.
285. MCDONALD, supra note 135, at 240.
286. Id.
287. See id. at 185-224, 240-42; THACH, supra note 224, at 78-104; see also Luther Martin, Genuine
Information, reprinted in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 172 (Max Farrand
ed., rev ed. 1937) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION].
288. McDONALD, supra note 135, at 240.
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Rarely do the Convention's deliberations appear less tidy than in the
emergence of the executive at each of the gatherings' well-known mileposts.
The Virginia Plan, through which the nationalists seized the early initiative, set
out an executive that was weak and ill-defined. This first blueprint, essentially
Madison's work, proposed that the chief magistracy be selected by the national
legislature, be responsible for executing national law, serve for a single,
unspecified term, exercise veto power only in conjunction with the judiciary,
and consist of an undetermined number of individuals. 289 This outline
changed only modestly as the Virginia Plan was considered in the Committee
of the Whole during June and July. There, thanks largely to James Wilson, the
delegates voted that the chief magistracy should be vested in a single
individual and armed with a true but qualified veto, yet retained selection of
the Chief Magistrate by the legislature.290 It was not until the Committee of
Detail reported on August 6 that the executive began to assume a more
familiar shape, with early versions of the Vesting Clause, the Take Care
Clause and the Commander in Chief Clause. To this package the Committee
added the bold proposal, earlier advanced by Wilson and rejected, that the
Chief Executive be chosen not by the legislature but directly by the people, an
idea that the Convention nonetheless at first rejected. 29'
As late as August 31, less than three weeks before the Convention
concluded, "the method of election of the chief magistrate, the question of
eligibility to redlection, the degree of participation by Senate and President
respectively in control of foreign affairs and the naming of judges, the method
of impeachment, [and] succession in case of vacancies ... were all yet
unsettled. 292 The Convention referred these and other unresolved or
provisionally settled matters to a Committee of Eleven-really a committee on
unfinished business.293 Completing its work on September 8,294 this
committee at last resolved the matter of presidential selections, proposing the
electoral college yet granting the Senate its advice and consent authority with
regard to treaties, ambassadors, and judges.295 Yet even after this, matters
were not complete. In the Committee on Style, Gouverneur Morris-in a last-
minute move that passed without debate and almost certainly without a great
289. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 21-22 (May 29); McDONALD,
supra note 135, at 207, 226; THACH, supra note 224, at 81-85.
290. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 79-81 (June 2), 96-97 (June
4), 104 (June 4); McDONALD, supra note 135, at 242, 248-52; THACH, supra note 224, at 85-89.
291. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 177-89 (Aug. 6), 402-03
(Aug. 24); MCDONALD, supra note 135, at 244; THACH, supra note 224, at 117, 133. For the text of the
report notes from the Committee of Detail, see 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287,
at 129-75.
292. THACH, supra note 224, at 131.
293. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 471 (Aug. 31); MCDONALD,
supra note 276, at 176-78.
294. 2 RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 544-47 (Sept. 8).
295. 2 id. at 493-95 (Sept. 4).
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deal more general consideration-placed ostensible limits on the clauses
vesting legislative and judicial power but left the executive Vesting Clause
ostensibly open-ended. 296 Finally, in two last-minute changes, the Convention
lowered the percentage of votes necessary to override an executive veto from
three-fourths back to two-thirds2 97 and modified the Appointments Clause to
give Congress the power to vest the selection of inferior officers in the
President, heads of departments, or the courts.298
Other aspects of the Convention show even more directly how the
delegates agreed about the purposes underlying separation of powers but
sharply disagreed over what the doctrine meant.299 Over the course of the
summer, a number of proposals came to the fore, remained under serious
consideration, and, but for chance, compromise, and tangential conflicts, nearly
made it into the final document. These proposals generally shared a concern
for restored balance, joint accountability, and renewed efficiency. They shared
little else, least of all a fully-worked-through formalist conception of what
separation of powers entailed.
Consider, for example, the Council of Revision, a pet project of
Madison's 300 that also received support from Wilson.3"' Originally part of
Madison's Virginia Plan, the Council combined the executive and judiciary for
a provisional veto of national legislation. Madison, who was later joined by
Wilson, kept pressing for the scheme throughout the Convention. Their
reasoning, which convinced a number of state delegations, had to do with
balance: Only the executive and judiciary combined, they asserted, could resist
the excesses of the legislature.30 2 As many delegates noted, the Council
would have violated an absolute division of power among the branches in a
number of ways, first in combining the executive and judiciary, next in
granting the judiciary the power to alter laws prospectively.30 3 Yet this
mixing of powers did not bother either Madison, Wilson, or the delegates who
supported the measure. In the end, it did not necessarily lead to the measure's
defeat either. In the final debate on the subject, Gouverneur Morris objected
to the Council on the grounds that the Supreme Court ought to have no role
296. 2 id. at 590-603 (Sept. 12); TIACH, supra note 224, at 138-39.
297. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 585-87 (Sept. 12).
298. See 2 id. at 497-500 (Sept. 4).
299. See 2 id. at 585-87 (Sept. 12), 627-28 (Sept 15). McDonald notes that the delegates at the
Convention "took with them conceptions of executive power derived from a commonly shared general
corpus ... but they did not by any means view the subject in identical ways." MCDONALD, supra note 276,
at 160; see also id. at 160-81 (discussing delegates' views on executive authority). Thach likewise states
that the basic principle of separation of powers was in many ways the reflection of different experiences
within the states. These experiences did not, however, prevent a commitment to separation of powers as
a "sine qua non of governmental efficiency." THACH, supra note 224, at 74.
300. McDONALD, supra note 276, at 168.
301. See THACH, supra note 224, at 85.
302. See I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 70-97 (June 1-4), 110
(June 4).
303. 2 id at 537-42 (Sept. 7).
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in prospectively declaring laws void because the judiciary was part of the
executive.3°
The Convention also struggled with the problem of how to select the
"Chief Magistrate," a conflict that further undercuts the formalist account while
illustrating the delegates' concern for joint accountability in addition to
balance. The standard formalist position holds that the election of the President
by the people is inherent in any sound conception of executive authority. Yet,
for much of the summer, the Convention repeatedly voted in favor of "electing
the Executive by the national legislature. 30 5 Harkening back to the early
state constitutions, Roger Sherman "was for the appointment by the
Legislature, and for making him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was
the will of that which was to be executed."3' Against this option James
Wilson championed "election by the people," either directly or through an
electoral college, only to see his proposal repeatedly defeated when the
Convention considered it. Wilson, along with Madison and Morris, opposed
legislative election in part for balance, arguing that the executive should be as
independent as possible from the two houses of the legislature.30 7 But
supporters of popular election of the executive also saw it as a way to spread
accountability, with Morris in particular asserting that the mechanism would
help render the executive "the great protector of the Mass of the people.
' 308
Unlike the Council of Revision, this idea succeeded at the eleventh hour, with
little discussion. In context, this victory hardly shows the triumph of a
formalist conception. Rather, it reflects a pragmatic and flexible view of
separation of powers as a means to further more general constitutional values,
including joint accountability.
The Convention's efforts to define executive power ring yet another
change on the same theme. Once again the delegates turned not to any widely
shared formalist answer, but to a solution based on more general values, in this
case efficiency above all. The Convention did not address the nature of
executive authority squarely until early August, in the Committee of
Detail.3 9 It did not have much to go on. As McDonald explains, "[E]xcept
for an occasional hint that 'the executive power' would be limited, no one
made any extensive comments as to just what it would include. Experience
was not an adequate guide .... Hume was silent on the subject, Montesquieu
muddled, Locke too general., 310 Blackstone's Commentaries did provide a
thorough account of royal prerogative power, but this helped only if one
304. 2 id. at 298-99 (Aug. 15).
305. 1 id. at 81 (June 2).
306. 1 id. at 68 (June 1).
307. 1 id. at 69 (June 1).
308. 2 id. at 52 (July 19).
309. Compare I id. at 64-69 (June 1) (general introductory proposal for executive) with 2 id. at
129-75 (Committee of Detail), 185 (Aug. 6) (initial detailed definition of executive powers).
310. MCDONALD, supra note 135, at 247.
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equated the Crown's power with executive power. The Committee did not.
Guided instead by a general desire to insure that the executive possessed
sufficient energy and vigor, the Committee divided what Blackstone would
have viewed as executive authority in a "curious manner." Such authority as
the naturalization power, the power to establish courts, make war, and subdue
rebellions went to Congress. The Senate, as the repository of residual state
sovereignty, was awarded the exclusive power to make treaties, appoint
ambassadors, and appoint judges of the Supreme Court. As McDonald dryly




Within this broad division of powers, the Committee further grappled with
the problem of how much authority to accord the executive expressly. Edmund
Randolph, who was sympathetic to the early, republican state constitutions,
offered a limited list that included the authority to carry into execution the
national laws, enjoy executive authority vested by Congress, and receive salary
protection.312 By contrast, Wilson, relying on the Pinckney plan (which in
turn drew from the New York Constitution) proposed vesting the executive
power in a single person, making the President the Commander in Chief of the
army and navy as well as of the state militias, and granting the President the
power to grant reprieves and pardons, among other powers.313 But it too fell
far short of Blackstone's list, which Wilson expressly rejected as a guide.314
Wilson instead thought about executive power, and the executive in general,
with an eye to what would produce sufficient energy and vigor. 5 With
minor verbal changes, Wilson's enumeration became the enumeration of
executive powers in the Constitution; with somewhat greater changes, so too
did the Committee of Detail's division of prerogative powers.
b. The Text in Context
The themes evident in the Convention, the thrust of the previous two
decades of constitutional trial and error, culminated in the document that the
delegates finally offered to the nation. Their text sustained the trend toward a
more rigorous separation of powers, but at best only sketched what that
doctrine was to mean in practice. In general, the proposed Constitution only
attempted to define the powers and relationships of each branch mainly at their
respective pinnacles. Even there, the document mixed certain core powers that
on most formal theories, then or now, were best kept distinct. Perhaps for this
311. Id. at 249.
312. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 21 (May 29).
313. 2 id. at 171-72. After minor modifications, this undated section of Wilson's draft became part
of the committee report. 2 id. at 185 (Aug. 6); see THACH, supra note 224, at 111.
314. See McDONALD, supra note 135, at 147-49.
315. See THACH, supra note 224, at 85-88.
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reason, the Constitution tellingly lacked the type of separation of powers clause
employed in many of its state antecedents. McDonald even goes so far as to
observe that "[t]he doctrine of the separation of powers," defined in a formalist
manner, "had clearly been abandoned in the framing of the Constitution. '31 6
Instead, the Constitution again demonstrated that both the basic division of
powers, as well as their frequent mixture, merely served the more fundamental
goals of ensuring that the branches of government would remain balanced,
extending accountability throughout government, and making government more
efficient than it had been in recent memory.
Of these values, balance once again remained paramount. The Constitution,
following its New York and Massachusetts predecessors, achieved this goal
first by making the executive and judiciary worthy counterparts of the
legislature. The Constitution accomplished this strategy by assigning to the top
of each branch a range of specific, core powers. One result was a "supreme
magistrate [that] was truly awesome.' 317 The President's specific powers
included the authority to grant reprieves and pardons, to make treaties and
appoint ambassadors and judges of the Supreme Court (with the advice and
consent of the Senate), to fill vacancies during the recess of the Senate, to
recommend measures for congressional consideration, to convene Congress
upon extraordinary occasions, to receive ambassadors, to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed, and to commission officers.3 18 Likewise, the
Constitution provided for the Supreme Court and authorized Congress to create
a federal judiciary where none had existed before.319 It also specified broad
potential jurisdiction for the federal courts. 320 Finally, it assumed judicial
review.3 21
The Constitution pursued balance even more directly when it provided the
top of each branch with specific means of self-defense. Often, this came at the
expense of accomplishing a clean division of powers. Most dramatically, the
President could exercise a qualified veto over legislation.32 While delegates
supported the veto on a number of grounds, James Wilson articulated the
dominant rationale when he stated, "[w]ithout such a Self-defence the
Legislature can at any moment sink [the Executive] into non-existence. 3 3
316. MCDONALD, supra note 135, at 258.
317. WOOD, supra note 133, at 521.
318. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 1-3; id. art. II, § 3.
319. Id. art. III, § 1.
320. Id. art. III, § 2.
321. For an excellent, recent study of late-eighteenth-century attitudes concerning judicial review, see
Treanor, supra note 199, at 557-69; cf. WOOD, supra note 133, at 453-63 (describing rise of judicial
review in states).
322. U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2.
323. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 98 (June 4). When he made this
statement, Wilson did not think a qualified executive veto went nearly far enough. He instead advocated
at least an absolute executive veto, or even better, a combined executive and judicial veto in the form of
a Council of Revision. I id.
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Another defensive mechanism that is now taken for granted, but was not at the
time, is the Constitution's express protection of the President's salary from
congressional diminution or increase "during the Period for which he shall
have been elected," along with the allied prohibition that a sitting President
"shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United
States, or any of them."324 Along similar lines, the Convention settled upon
express salary protection for the judiciary, providing as well that federal judges
"shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour.' '325 The Constitution
specified still further protection for the President and judiciary alike in
providing for impeachment as the only method of removal.
No less important, the Constitution continued the recent constitutional
trend of harnessing separation of powers to joint accountability. As in the
states, this inversion of the republican approach to accountability reflected a
suspicion of simple electoral mandates as demagogic as well as the associated
goal of insuring greater public deliberation.326 With the executive and,
indirectly, the judiciary, able to stake their own representative claims, the
legislature would no longer be able to rush through ill-considered laws on the
strength of a self-serving and distorted reliance on popular will. Gouverneur
Morris summed up this goal in a long address extolling a popularly elected
Chief Magistrate as a check on a tyrannical legislature. "If he is to be the
Guardian of the people," Morris declared, "let him be appointed by the
people.132
7
The Constitution sought to insure joint accountability once more by
concentrating on the apex of each branch, the executive in particular. As in
Massachusetts, the most telling innovation was taking the selection of the
Chief Magistrate from the legislature. By contrast, the Constitution declined
the option of direct popular election in favor of the elaborate electoral
college.328 The Convention opted for this indirect method partly to placate
the advocates of vestigial state sovereignty and partly to insure that only the
most virtuous, disinterested individuals-in Wilson's phrase "Continental
Wilson sounded the theme of self-defense throughout the Convention. During the debate on the
Committee of Detail report he declared:
mhe prejudices agst the Executive resulted from a misapplication of the adage that the
parliament was the palladium of liberty. Where the Executive was really formidable, King and
Tyrant, were naturally associated in the minds of people; not legislature and tyranny. But where
the Executive was not formidable, the two last were most properly associated. After the
destruction of the King in Great Britain, a more pure and unmixed tyranny sprang up in the
parliament than had been exercised by the monarch. [Wilson] insisted that [the delegates] had
not guarded agst. the danger on this side by a sufficient self-defensive power either to the
Executive or Judiciary department ....
2 id. at 300-01 (Aug. 15).
324. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
325. Id. art. III, § 1.
326. See Greene, supra note 77, at 177.
327. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 53 (July 19); see THACH, supra
note 224, at 100-01.
328. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 2-3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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Characters" 329-- would gain the office. 330 As a direct function of the
President's newly enhanced accountability, the delegates also decided to give
the President a hand in several "executive" powers that the Committee of
Detail had originally slated for the Senate alone, including the power to make
treaties and appoint ambassadors and judges of the Supreme Court.33' The
Presidency's popular basis also served to bolster the rationale for the veto.
What George Mason said early in the Convention applied now with even
greater force:
Notwithstanding the precautions taken in the Constitution of the
Legislature, it would so much resemble that of the individual States,
that it must be expected frequently to pass unjust and pernicious laws.
This restraining power was therefore essentially necessary. It [a veto]
would have the effect not only of hindering the final passage of such
laws; but would discourage demagogues from attempting to get them
passed.332
A final goal that the Constitution's brand of separation of powers furthered
was governmental energy. Yet as with the values of balance and accountability,
the nature of this efficiency is comparative and can only be understood against
the previous baseline of republican legislative supremacy. Once again, the
document did not attempt to address this goal by advancing or assuming global
solutions. Rather, it specified answers mainly at the top of the branches, and
even here mixed powers among the branches to a considerable extent. Perhaps
the most important decision in this regard was the establishment of a unitary
presidency. The advocates of unity prevailed over noisy opposition-primarily
with the argument that a single magistrate would give the most "energy, 333
"vigor[],, 334  and "dispatch ' 335  to the executive. 336  For similar
reasons,337 the proposed Constitution went beyond even the Massachusetts
framework in granting the executive further-but by no means
329. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 501 (Sept. 4).
330. McDONALD, supra note 135, at 250-53; see also THACH, supra note 224, at 130-34 (describing
creation of electoral college).
331. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 498-99 (Sept. 4); see MCDONALD,
supra note 135, at 250-51.
332. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 78 (July 21).
333. 1 id. at 65 (James Wilson) (June 1).
334. 1 id. at 64 (Charles Pinkney) (June 1).
335. 1 id. at 65 (James Wilson) (June 1).
336. These were not the only reasons. Wilson also advanced "responsibility," I id. at 65 (June 1), as
well as "tranquility," 1 id. at 96 (June 4).
337. Speaking to both a unitary Chief Executive and control of the military, Elbridge Gerry declared
that he
was at a loss to discover the policy of three members for the Executive [which had earlier been
proposed by Edmund Randolph]. It [would] be extremely inconvenient in many instances,
particularly in military matters, whether relating to the militia, an army, or a navy. It would be
a general with three heads.
1 id. at 97 (June 4).
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complete-control of the military. Toward this end, the document made the
President commander in chief, provided that he "shall Commission all the
Officers of the United States, 338 yet kept an array of powers concerning
military finance and regulation vested in Congress.
33 9
The proposed Constitution did not journey backward to embrace either
Whig mixed government or republican legislative supremacy, but instead
continued to develop a commitment to separation of powers that was both
functional and general. Yet this strategy left open almost as many matters as
it resolved. How were Americans to answer the many unanswered questions
that this constitutional sketch left unanswered? Who would control the removal
of executive officials? Who would make war in an emergency? Who would
control the administration of laws? The document itself, especially when
viewed in the context of the constitutional evolution that preceded it, suggests
one basic conclusion. Specific answers would come mainly through the
enumerated political processes as informed by the fundamental constitutional
values that gave rise to them. That meant that it would ordinarily fall to
Congress, acting under its express or implied powers, to fill in the rest of the
Constitution's blueprint, so long as the President did not block the attempt
through the veto. This model did not preclude judicial review when a measure
appeared to violate the functional values underlying separation of powers. It
did not assume, however, judicial intervention based upon a formalist baseline
that was indeed "just myth. ' 340"
2. The "Contested Clauses" Reclaimed
Yet formalists claim to know better. Of these, Calabresi and Prakash offer
the most extended, important, and in many ways powerful recent argument that
the "Constitution allocates the power of law execution and administration to
the President alone, '34t and that "the historical evidence taken as a whole
demonstrates that the case for a hierarchical executive branch under the control
338. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
339. These include the powers:
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a
longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress ....
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cls. 11-16.
340. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 4.
341. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 549 (emphasis added).
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of the President is overwhelming and fully supports all of our textual
claims. 342 Absent a "separation of powers" clause,343 they seek to make
their case with an especially able version of a classic formalist strategy that
places the interpretive premium upon a number of more cryptic bits of text,
including the Executive Power Clause, the Take Care Clause, the Opinions
Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause.344 To the extent that they
engage in simple textualism, Calabresi and Prakash merely exercise their
prerogative as constitutional theorists. Yet to the extent that they also seek to
bolster their readings with historical claims, their account ignores too much
essential scholarship, offers too little context, and assumes too many of the
conclusions it needs to demonstrate. Against the more comprehensive backdrop
presented so far, each of these contested clauses instead comports with a more
modest, functionalist interpretation.
a. The Executive Power Clause
Curiously, formalists rely on history least with regard to the text that for
them matters most. Like other advocates of a unitary executive, Calabresi and
Prakash place great weight on the introductory clause of Article II, which
states that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America. 3 45 This clause, they say, plainly grants the President
exclusive power to execute all federal laws. In contrast to their treatment of
ostensibly less important clauses, however, Calabresi and Prakash make
relatively few historical claims to support this reading. Instead, they rely
mainly on close textual exegesis and on inferences drawn from structures and
relationships set out elsewhere in the document. These tried and true
interpretive methods may be especially effective when reading the Uniform
Commercial Code, and may even be adequate for a terse document like the
Constitution when a given text is clear, which the Executive Power Clause
clearly is not.346 These techniques alone, however, do not amount to an
originalist argument, which Calabresi, Prakash, and a number of other unitarian
formalists seek.347 If the question is historical reconstruction, reliance on text
342. Id.
343. Which, as noted, would hardly demonstrate the formalist case. See supra text accompanying notes
218-29.
344. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704-06 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying on
Executive Vesting Clause); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 63, at 1171-85 (relying on Vesting Clauses
of Articles I, II, and III); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REv.
1231, 1241-46 (1994) (same). But see Froomkin, supra note 19 (arguing that Constitution's text does not
ordain a formalist result).
345. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. I.
346. Compare, for example, Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 570-81 (arguing that Article II
Vesting Clause is exclusive) with Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 47-48 (arguing that Article II
Vesting Clause is not as general as Calabresi and Prakash argue).
347. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 556-59; see also BORK, supra note 104, at 143-60; Scalia,
supra note 104, at 862-65.
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and structure is perilous. Too often those who make the attempt wind up
resembling a naturalist who declares that a fossilized duckbill belonged to a
platypus, where a little more work would have revealed it had in fact been part
of a duck. Something like this is going on here.
For Calabresi and Prakash, the platypus has two elements: First, they argue
that the Executive Power Clause is a grant of executive power; second, they
contend that this grant of power is exclusive. They come to this conclusion for
a number of reasons. First, they reason that the Vesting Clause of Article II is
similar to its counterpart in Article I, which is a general grant of power, and
thus unlike the Vesting Clause of Article I, which speaks only of legislative
power "herein granted" by subsequent, specific allocations.14 1 Next, they
point to the plain meaning of the verbs "vest" and "extend."349 Finally, they
contend that a comparison of the Constitution's specific lists of powers in
Article I, Section 8; Article II, Section 2; and Article Im, Section 2, clearly
shows that the Article II enumeration is exemplary rather than exhaustive.
350
"To vest" means "'[t]o place in possession of' an individual or entity,"351
while "to extend" means merely "'to stretch [tendere] out [ex]' an already
existing thing or power."352 It follows that the Vesting Clauses of Articles
II and I must be grants of power, while Article III's jurisdictional grant-
which states merely that the judicial Power of the United States shall "extend"
to various cases and controversies-merely allocates power already granted by
the Vesting Clause.
The argument made for exclusivity is conclusory and rests mainly on an
implicit negative inference.353 Here Calabresi and Prakash note that Article
II does not say that the executive power shall be vested in one President "and
in such inferior entities as Congress may from time to time establish and
ordain.,354 By contrast, Article III contains just such language empowering
Congress to vest judicial power in lower federal courts. By a variant of
expressio unis est exclusio alterius, Congress may create inferior entities that
exercise the judicial power without the assent of the Supreme Court, but it may
not create inferior executive entities without the assent of the President. Once
created, however, these entities must be subject to presidential approval and
superintendence.
The history of the era suggests not. Either of the readings that Calabresi
and Prakash advance places more weight on the Executive Power Clause than
it will bear because they place too little on the context in which the Clause
348. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 570-72.
349. Id. at 572-74.
350. Id. at 576-79.
351. Id. at 572 (quoting 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2102
(Libraire du Liban ed. 1978) (4th ed. 1973)).
352. Id. (quoting I JOHNSON, supra note 351, at 696).
353. Id. at 563, 571-74.
354. Id. at 581.
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first appeared. The difficulties begin with the claim that the Clause grants
power. Their version not only assumes that there was a generally understood
bundle of authority known as executive power, but that it necessarily included
such specific prerogatives as the ability to appoint and remove executive
officers as well as to superintend the enforcement of all laws. On this
assumption, they further contend that the rest of Article I simply limits and
clarifies the initial, well-defined grant. If the history of the period indicates
anything, however, it is that no such generally understood bundle existed. To
the contrary, the specific division of power struck by Articles I and II was in
many ways unprecedented. By contrast, such comparative confusion did not
reign when it came to "the judicial power." '355 With the possible exception
of judicial review, the particular powers associated with judicial authority were
generally understood with greater precision than those associated with either
legislative or executive authority.356
Details confirm the general account. The Committee of Detail originally
proposed that "the legislative Power shall be vested in a Congress," then
specified particular legislative powers;357 that "[t]he Executive Power of the
United States shall be vested in a single Person ... [to be styled] 'The
President,"' then specified particular executive powers; and finally, that "[t]he
Judicial Power shall be vested in one Supreme (National) Court" and any
inferior courts Congress would create, then specified the scope of permissible
jurisdiction.35 8 This approach suggests that the authors-primarily the
staunchly proexecutive James Wilson 59-- viewed the terms, both "legislative
power" and "executive power," as too vague to be anything more than
precatory and to require further definition. Conversely, this language also
suggests that the term judicial power referred to a more precisely understood
set of prerogatives.
But walt, formalists urge. What counts is not the draft of the Committee
of Detail, but the text of the Constitution itself. As Calabresi and Prakash
acknowledge,360 the current language came about without debate, in the
waning days of the Convention, when the Committee of Style-primarily the
staunchly proexecutive Gouverneur Morris-changed what is now the Article
I Vesting Clause to read, "All legislative power herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress. 36' Calabresi and Prakash attempt to turn the absence of
355. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 172-73.
356. See MCDONALD, supra note 135, at 253-58.
357. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 163, 167-71.
358. 2 id. at 171-72.
359. See MCDONALD, supra note 135, at 249; THACH, supra note 224, at 85-89.
360. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 576.
361. What is likely, but unprovable, is that Morris made the change to forestall any inference that
Article I's list of powers was exhaustive and perhaps to enable an argument that Article 11's Vesting
Clause could serve as authority for unenumerated executive power. See THACH, supra note 224, at 138-39
(suggesting that Vesting Clause "admit[s] an interpretation of executive power which would give to the
President a field of action much wider than that outlined by the enumerated powers").
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debate on its head, arguing that it goes to show how general the agreement
was for the change. Anyway, they add, it was the Morris language that went
to We the People, and it is We the People's understanding that matters.362
A better-informed reading cuts in just the opposite direction. As with most
of the changes made by the Committee of Style, the absence of debate does
not signal a deliberative consensus so much as the exhaustion and impatience
of delegates trying to wrap up their business. 363 More importantly, Calabresi
and Prakash offer no evidence from the ratification debates to show that
anyone understood the final differences among the three Vesting Clauses to
signal an independent grant of a well and broadly defined set of executive
powers, much less that such an understanding was general. Given the
amorphous nature of executive authority during this era, it is implausible that
the popular understanding of Morris's Executive Power Clause was in any way
different from the Convention's understanding of Wilson's earlier version.
Calabresi and Prakash skate on even thinner historical ice with their claim
that the executive power granted by the Article II Vesting Clause is exclusive.
If the Constitution's origins undercut the notion that executive power possessed
some precise meaning, they also negate any contention that such power was
exclusive. As has been seen, even the later generation of "reform" state
constitutions not only permitted, but actually mandated legislative involvement
in both personnel and superintendence. Nothing in the records of the
Convention demonstrates that exclusivity suddenly became the norm in 1787.
True, Article II itself does not expressly grant Congress the power to create
"inferior executive entities" without presidential approval in the same way that
Article ImI explicitly empowers Congress to create inferior federal courts.3"
But this does not mean Congress lacks this power any more than the absence
of presidential removal power, where the appointment power is set forth,
necessarily means that the President lacks removal authority. More likely, the
lack of parallelism between the two clauses illustrates that the delegates had
a better idea of what a court was than what an "executive entity" was. More
generally, the negative inference that Calabresi and Prakash make presumes a
tightness of composition that the Convention's many compromises and last-
minute changes do not support. Against this backdrop, relying solely on
negative inferences from the text serves more as a debating technique than as
a means to recover contemporary understanding.
So what can be said about the Executive Power Clause? Once set back in
its original context, perhaps all that can be asserted with assurance is that the
provision furthers at least two of the general purposes that underpinned
separation of powers thinking at the time. The Clause clearly furthers the ideal
362. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 630-31.
363. MCDONALD, supra note 135, at 228, 272.
364. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § I with id. art. HI, § 1.
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of balance through an enhanced executive, whether it merely signals the
location of executive powers or grants them. Likewise, the provision advances
the goal of governmental energy by declaring that the apex of the executive
department shall be a single individual. Anything much beyond these general
points quickly becomes guesswork. Consequently, Lessig and Sunstein advance
a plausible claim when they say that neither the text nor contemporary
understandings preclude congressional oversight. 65 Perhaps closer to the
mark, on general grounds of balance, is Henry Monaghan's suggestion that the
Clause at least includes a grant of self-protective power3 66 that augments the
veto. Despite their important differences, either conception comports with the
general picture suggesting that the Constitution was a sketch that left the future
resolution of separation of powers matters mainly to the processes inked in at
the highest levels of the three branches. What that picture does not allow,
however, is an assertion that the cryptic phrase "executive power" refers to a
clear, eighteenth-century baseline that just happens to dovetail with the modem
formalist conception of that same term.
b. The Take Care Clause
With the Take Care Clause, which provides that the President "shall take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, 367 Calabresi and Prakash attempt
to bolster their formalist claims with more overtly historical ones. They make
two basic assertions. As an affirmative matter, they argue that the Take Care
Clause reflects the Founding generation's universal understanding that the
President would be empowered to execute federal law independent of
congressional interference. They trot out numerous official and unofficial
statements from the ratification debates to support their case. Typical in this
regard is their reliance on statements from Edmund Randolph at the Virginia
ratifying convention, who declared: "'All the enlightened part of mankind
agree that the superior dispatch, secrecy, and energy with which one man can
act, renders it more politic to vest the power of executing the laws in one
man.' ' '368 Lest there be any doubt, Randolph pressed on to assert that the
President's powers surely included the authority to "'see the laws executed.
Every Executive in America has that power.' 3
69
365. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 12-84.
366. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 61-70
(1993).
367. U.S. CONST. art. II., § 3.
368. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 617 (quoting Edmund Randolph, Convention Debates
(June 10, 1788), in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Va.)
1097-98 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]).
369. Id. at 617 (quoting Edmund Randolph, in 9 DOCUNiENTARY HISTORY, supra note 368, at 1098)
(emphasis added by Calabresi & Prakash).
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But the Take Care Clause did more than just bolster the Executive Power
Clause. Calabresi and Prakash realize that their first claim makes the Take
Care Clause seem redundant. They are aware, too, that a number of
contemporaries understood the clause to impose some duty or limit on the
President. To address these difficulties, they suggest that the clause may have
reflected "a desire to prevent the President from declaring that his executive
power granted him the ability not only to enforce federal law, but also to
suspend federal law or suspend the execution of it. ' 370 Following Judge
Easterbrook, however, they quickly add that the Founders could not have
meant for this limitation to apply to presidential refusals to suspend the
execution of laws that he felt violated his executive authority.37'
Once again, the two scholars overread text because they oversimplify
history. Their initial claim-that the Take Care Clause reflected a consensus
that the President (and only the President) execute the laws-may be dispensed
with quickly. As with their treatment of the Executive Power Clause, the
assertion assumes that any time an eighteenth-century American uttered the
words "execute the laws," the individual not only had a clear categorical idea
of what "execute" meant, but that this idea necessarily precluded any
legislative involvement absent some express indication to the contrary. But this
is precisely what any but the most superficial account of the period refutes. On
this point, recall the purportedly conclusive statements of Edmund Randolph.
By themselves, Randolph's assertions that the execution of the laws falls to the
President say nothing about what he conceived that power to be or whether it
was to be exercised exclusively.372 Moreover-and this is a critical
point-Randolph's elaboration that "Every Executive in America has the power
to execute the laws" directly undercuts a formalist understanding. As anyone
with a more general knowledge of the period would realize, few if any of the
state constitutions at the time prevented legislative involvement in the
execution of laws in the way formalists contend.373 No amount of repetition
can enable this kind of evidence to do any greater conceptual work.374
The second Take Care Clause argument fares no better. Apart from a lone
quotation from the proexecutive Wilson,375 Calabresi and Prakash offer no
370. Id. at 620.
371. Id. at 621-22. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 905, 921 (1989-90) (quoting Madison and Wilson's views that President could suspend laws he
believed unconstitutional).
372. As an initial matter, Calabresi and Prakash misconstrue Randolph's argument about a unitary
presidency to be an argument about a unitary executive branch. By their logic, the phrase "to execute the
laws" would mean that the President alone could do it. Cf. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 617.
373. See supra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
374. For a useful discussion of the Take Care Clause's background, see Greene, supra note 77, at 145
n.75.
375. Wilson's statement appears in PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITrUTION 1787-1788, at
304-05 (John B. McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., Lancaster, Historical Soc'y of Pa. 1888). This is
not to say, of course, that no similar statements were made.
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direct evidence that anyone understood the Take Care Clause to include an
implicit exception allowing the President to refuse to execute laws that
encroached upon executive authority.3 76 They merely assert that it would
make little sense to frame a Constitution with a President as Chief Executive
and then for that Chief Executive to give up powers in the face of
unconstitutional statutes. Why it would make any more sense to frame a
Constitution with a Congress to make laws and a Supreme Court to review
them, and then to make the President effectively the sole judge of which laws
to enforce when he believed them to encroach upon his authority is left
unclear. Similarly unclear is why the President's express veto power does not
accord the office sufficient protection. This last point appears doubly puzzling
considering that when the Founders pointed to the President's powers of self-
defense, they cited the veto almost always,377 and mentioned an implied
power to suspend the execution of laws rarely.
Returned to its original context, the Take Care Clause better accords with
a functional reading. Consider first the text's affirmative reference to the
President's authority to execute the laws. Viewed in light of preceding
constitutional evolution, this aspect of the Clause logically advances the
Founders' goals of balance and energy by further demarcating a critical general
power that the Chief Magistrate would exercise. To say that the Founders
understood the provision to do anything more-to say specifically that they
viewed it as an absolute ban on any legislative involvement in a particular,
broad conception of executing laws-reads into the measure a precision that
the historical sources belie.
A similar point applies to the aspect of the Take Care Clause that limits
the President.378 In context, this facet of the provision addresses the
Founding concern for efficiency by enjoining the Chief Executive to execute
the laws with care and further advances the Founding goal of balance in
mandating that the executive remain faithful to something other than his
whim-presumably federal laws and the Constitution. As before, to say
anything more than this-particularly that the provision assumes that the
President possesses a power to suspend the execution of laws that violate some
clear conception of executive power-projects into the text what its general
background simply does not support.
376. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 621-22.
377. Calabresi and Prakash themselves concede that one original purpose of the veto was presidential
self-defense. Id. at 622 n.352.
378. Calabresi and Prakash also include a problematic argument to bolster their Executive Power
Clause contention. This argument reasons that the Committee of Detail, which drafted the Take Care
Clause, at the same time drafted the Executive Power Clause, and thus realized the need for limits. As
historical support, they note that the Committee of Detail added the requirements that the President "take
care" that the laws be "faithfully" executed to the Committee of the Whole's formulation that the Chief
Magistrate "carry into execution the national laws." Since, they reason, the Committee of Detail at the same
time drafted the Executive Power Clause, which gave all executive authority to the President, it not only
must have added a duty, but also a duty to disobey. Id. at 620-21.
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c. The Opinions Clause
Calabresi and Prakash also invoke history to narrow certain clauses
seemingly uncongenial to their cause. Among these is the Opinions Clause,
which states that the President "may require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject
relating to the Duties of their respective Offices. 3 79 This language, they
suggest, merely makes explicit what was already implicit in the creation of a
Chief Executive.380 They also suggest that the Clause limits presidential
authority by implicitly forbidding the President from demanding opinions on
subjects unrelated to the statutory duties of the executive officer.38' In taking
this position, Calabresi and Prakash reject two functional readings considered
by Lessig and Sunstein. The first, more radical, interpretation holds that the
Clause clearly permits the President to demand opinions from officers in
"executive Departments," but does not extend that authority to cover "Heads
of [nonexecutive or administrative] Departments" of the type referred to in the
Appointments Clause. 82 The second, more limited position, suggests that
without the Opinions Clause, Congress could have prevented department heads
from providing opinions to the President.3 83 In supplanting these readings
with their own, Calabresi and Prakash contend that the Opinions Clause, as
originally understood, is just one more indication that the Founders sought to
create a unitary executive.
At least as a historical matter, this proposition would be difficult to
sustain. To support their reading, Calabresi and Prakash assume that the
Founders thought that department heads would be constitutionally subordinate
to the President by virtue of operating within the executive branch. They even
offer several quotations, all from the most proexecutive of the delegates, to
demonstrate the Founding view.3 4 Notwithstanding these particular
utterances, the larger picture indicates that Calabresi and Prakash again push
their assumptions too far. As the account to this point should have made clear,
precisely what was not settled in this era was the exact relationship of
executive underlings to the Chief Executive. Even less clear was the extent to
which a Chief Executive would oversee underlings free from legislative
interference. 35 Against this backdrop, an articulation of presidential authority
to require advice from subordinates is hardly redundant, but instead settles one
aspect of executive authority that was by no means clear. Paradoxically, the
379. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
380. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 633-34.
381. Id. at 634.
382. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 34-35.
383. Id. at 33-34.
384. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 632 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris,
and Charles Pinckney).
385. See supra Section HLI.A, Subsection III.B.I.
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chief interpretation that Calabresi and Prakash advance acknowledges as much.
To argue that the delegates retained the Opinions Clause either out of caution;
to prevent distortion, or to forestall assertions that the President lacked this
authority suggests at a minimum that there existed a nontrivial body of opinion
that was prepared to argue that, without this clause, the Chief Magistrate did
lack such authority.
That said, the same background suggests that this argument would go too
far in the other direction. If the constitutional history of the time refutes the
notion of a formalist consensus regarding executive power, it would for the
same reasons make unlikely the existence of any sharp distinction between
department heads and heads of departments. As Calabresi and Prakash ably
point out, contemporary usage indicates that no such distinction existed.386
Likewise, the general background of the period suggests that it would go too
far to argue that, absent the Opinions Clause, the President would have no
more authority to demand opinions from heads of departments than he would
from the Chief Justice, the Speaker of the House, or the President of the
Senate-all options that the Convention considered but abandoned.387 But
that is far different from arguing that, without the Clause, Congress could
prevent or regulate the channel of information from department heads to the
President. Nothing about the general background prevents this reading.
Once again, the specific background of the Clause accords with the general
background of the period. The Opinions Clause is the lone surviving part of
a plan put forward by Gouverneur Morris and Charles Pinckney on August 20
to create a Council of the State. The original proposal called for the Council
to consist of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and Secretaries for
Domestic Affairs, Commerce and Finance, Foreign Affairs, War, Marine, and
State. Each of the Secretaries was to be appointed by the President alone and
to hold his office "during pleasure." The plan further provided that the
President "may require the written opinions of any one or more of the
members: But he shall in all cases exercise his own judgment." 388
Two days later the Committee of Detail returned the proposal with several
changes. First, it expanded the roster of what it now called the President's
"Privy Council" to include the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House. In addition, it dropped the provisions specifying the President's
appointment and removal authority of the Secretaries and instead provided that
the Council would simply consist of "the principal Officer in the respective
departments of foreign affairs, domestic affairs, War, Marine, and Finance, as
such departments of office shall from time to time be established .. .. "389
Finally, the new version retained a slightly modified provision regarding
386. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 628-31.
387. See supra Subsection III.A.I.
388. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 342-43 (Aug. 20).
389. 2 id. at 367 (Aug. 22).
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opinions, stating that it would be the members' duty "to advise [the President]
in matters respecting the execution of his Office, which he shall think proper
to lay before them: But their advice shall not conclude him, nor affect his
responsibility for the measures which he shall adopt."'3 90 Despite this
promising start, the Privy Council did not survive the Committee of Eleven,
which scrapped the idea for the sole stated (but not necessarily only) reason
that "it was judged that the Presidt. by persuading his Council-to concur in
his wrong measures, would acquire their protection for them."391 All that
remained was the Opinions Clause.
392
The rise and fall of the presidential council yields complex lessons, none
of which demonstrates a unitary executive. Thanks to their formalist
assumptions, however, Calabresi and Prakash see only those implications that
point in a unitary direction. In truth the story has elements that cut various
ways. On one hand, councils of this type had earlier been seen as checks on
executive power. Those who framed the early, republican state constitutions
employed such councils as separate sources of power and expertise, the better
to control the whims of the Chief Magistrate.393 On the other hand, this
model began to give way in later constitutions, such as the Massachusetts
framework, which made the councils more purely advisory.394 Morris and
Pinckney appear to have viewed their proposal as continuing down this
proexecutive path, first, by making clear that executive officers would have to
report to the President, and even more dramatically, by expressly granting the
President exclusive appointment and removal power.395 Yet for others at the
Convention, the older conception of councils as sources of advice to check
executive caprice (even when it was up to the Chief Magistrate to ask for the
advice) did not disappear. Benjamin Franklin captured the two facets of a
council neatly when he stated that "a Council would not only be a check on
a bad President but be a relief to a good one." 3
96
The ultimate fate of the Council suggests that the Convention was not
prepared to move as far as Morris and Pinckney. Even before the Convention
referred the idea to the Committee of Eleven, the delegates eliminated the most
"unitarian" aspect of the proposal in dropping the President's exclusive
authority to appoint and remove the five executive "Secretaries." The
Committee of Eleven further curtailed the President's potential power insofar
as it eliminated his authority to demand written opinions from the Chief
Justice, the House Speaker, and the Senate President. At the same time, the
390. 2 id.
391. 2 id. at 542 (Sept. 7).
392. 2 id. at 542-43 (Sept. 7).
393. See WOOD, supra note 133, at 138-39.
394. Id. at 435.
395. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 342-44 (Aug. 20); see THACH,
supra note 224, at 118-25.
396. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 542 (Sept. 7).
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removal of these offices as expected sources of advice also reduced the plan's
vestigial checking function. The combined changes, in short, got rid of both
the President's substantial appointment and removal powers as well as the
proexecutive aspects of the advising mechanism, while merely dispensing with
that mechanism's more old-fashioned checking aspect.
The Opinions Clause, as a remnant of the original advising mechanism,
also cut both ways within its reduced sphere. As a vestigial check, it echoed
the expectation that the Chief Executive would consult expert advisors. More
forcefully, it made clear that those in charge of various ministries could not
defy the Chief Magistrate, as had occurred in the early state constitutions, as
well as in Britain, but would have to report to him. What it did not do was
simply express what was already implied in a unitary conception of executive
authority that the history of the Clause undercuts, first through the elimination
of the appointment and removal powers and next through the ambiguous nature
of the advisory function. Nor, conversely, did the Clause reflect a considered
distinction between executive and nonexecutive departments. Between these
extremes, however, nothing indicates that the delegates understood it to
preclude Congress from requiring that executive officers also furnish reports
to it, or from regulating the executive branch generally.
In this way, the Opinions Clause comports with each of the main
functional values that separation of powers was meant to serve. But it does no
more than that. It most clearly promotes efficiency by making principal
officers responsible to the President. It also furthers presidential accountability
to the extent that it reflects an understanding that the opinions offered would
not be binding and that the President should not be able to "acquire the
protection" of that advice for wrong measures. Finally, it advances balance
insofar as it marks the checking function of a specified source of counsel. To
posit any more precise understanding is to mistake the blueprint for the
building.
d. The Necessary and Proper Clause
Calabresi and Prakash also make a number of historical claims to narrow
the ostensible meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. First, they declare
that the Founders considered the Clause to address the means of effectuating
federal law, rather than who may do so. Second, they contend that the Clause
precludes legislative direction in the execution of laws because the Founding
generation viewed such involvement as improper. Next, they argue that
legislation limiting the President's authority to superintend the laws under the
Necessary and Proper Clause was just the type of improper enactment that
made contemporaries uneasy about the provision. Finally, they assert that
reading the Clause to permit congressional limits on the President's ability to
execute the laws would be to return the national government to the Articles of
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Confederation.397 Neither the history of the period, nor the particular sources
that Calabresi and Prakash cite, sustain any of these assertions.
When Calabresi and Prakash say that 'the Necessary and Proper Clause
spoke to the means-the "how"--of effectuating federal powers rather than
which branch-the "who"-of doing so, they first of all mean that the
provision gave Congress no power to enact statutes that excluded the President
entirely from the execution of any federal laws. To support this contention,
they note several instances in which Founders discussed what means the
Clause would permit Congress to effect, while assuming that the power to
oversee those means would remain with the President.398 None of these
examples, however, shows anyone limiting the scope of the Clause to means,
nor are there enough of them to infer such a limit from the failure of speakers
to go beyond a discussion of means. Calabresi and Prakash simply fail to make
the historical case that a background understanding of the Clause prevented
Congress even from taking certain law enforcement matters out of the
President's hands completely. If history does suggest that such a law would be
problematic, it is because the act would arguably violate some Founding
commitment that is demonstrable-such as the maintenance of balance among
the branches-rather than a more specific and questionable understanding.399
Calabresi and Prakash use the same evidence to support another facet of
their argument with even less success. In contending that the Necessary and
Proper Clause spoke only to means, they suggest that no one could have
mistaken the Clause to permit Congress to limit the President's authority to
enforce the laws, for example, by restricting presidential discretion to remove
executive officers.4°° To so restrict the President, they contend, would be in
effect to remove him from the execution of laws. On this point the historical
case is not only weak but untenable. Once more, the passages Calabresi and
Prakash employ do not limit the Clause to means and provide only marginal
support for such an inference. More importantly, the history of the period yet
again undercuts any contention that the Founders generally understood the
assignment of executive authority to the President to preclude congressional
limitations on that authority of the type just mentioned. As previously
discussed, that history demonstrates that any widely held notion of what the
power to execute the laws required was far thinner than modem formalists
assume. In the most telling example, recall that the Massachusetts Constitution,
despite a separation of powers clause that could scarcely be more exclusive,
not only permitted but required the legislature to select a host of executive
397. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 622-26.
398. Id. at 623. For example, they quote John McClurg asking whether the President is to have his
own military force or command of the militia as a means of carrying the law into effect. See id. For more
on McClurg, see CLINTON RoSSITER, 1787 THE GRAND CONVENTION 123-24 (1966).
399. See supra Subsection III.A.2.
400. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 589-90.
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officers. Even assuming some (unproven) bright-line distinction between how
laws are executed and who executes them, the Massachusetts framework-and
the general functional understanding it reflects-in effect treated measures that
Calabresi and Prakash assume relate to "who" as instead going to
"how."740 1
Beyond this, the most basic Necessary and Proper Clause claim that
Calabresi and Prakash advance-asserting that a broad reading of the Clause
disregards the central lessons of the Articles period-itself disregards lessons
of the period that are even more central. As previously recounted, a more
complete account of the era reveals that American constitutional thinking
clearly responded to the Articles' lack of a separate executive, which Calabresi
and Prakash note, and to a far greater extent responded to the legislative
excesses of the early, republican state constitutions, which they do not. The
latter factor in particular generated a desire to enhance both the executive and
judicial branches as the 1770s ended and the 1780s progressed. There is,
however, a wide gap between this general desire and a wish "to get Congress
out of the business of executive details."40 2 The historical evidence simply
does not indicate that American constitutional thought had settled on anything
beyond the general desire at the time the Constitution was framed.
In this more complete light, the Necessary and Proper Clause appears to
mean just what it says. By granting Congress the power "to make all laws for
carrying into execution" the enumerated powers assigned to any of the
branches, the text on its own terms contemplates that Congress will determine
how these powers are best exercised. The Clause does not say that Congress
can regulate the execution of federal power only so long as the President
undertakes the execution. Still less does it say that Congress can merely
401. Related claims suffer from this same flaw of assuming a historical baseline that did not exist. The
Necessary and Proper Clause could not, they contend, authorize legislative restrictions of the President's
authority to execute the laws because Congress lacks any predicate power to do so and because any
congressional attempt to alter the separation of powers would be improper. Id. at 586-93, 622-26. Congress
might well need such independent authority on the assumption that this power is clearly defined and in all
relevant senses exclusive. Restrictions on presidential authority that in fact altered separation of powers
would indeed be improper. But it is exactly these assumptions that anyone familiar with the period would
doubt. As Calabresi and Prakash suggest, few Founders would have objected to Congress authorizing the
President to call forth the posse comitatus to help him execute federal law. Id. at 623. What they would
have a daunting time showing is that many more would have objected to the same law telling the President
when the posse could be called out, how it could be deployed, what types of individuals it could comprise,
when its members could be discharged, or any number of other restrictions.
The same problems plague the contention that "[lI]egislation stripping the President of his authority
to superintend execution of law, enacted under the guise of the Necessary and Proper Clause, is exactly
the type of usurpation that worried Madison," and so the Founders generally. Id. at 624. Yet this is exactly
the type of measure over which neither Madison, nor anyone else whom Calabresi and Prakash cite,
expresses concern when analyzing the Clause. Nor is there much reason to assume that they would have.
Once more, the constitutional history of the era indicates that the Founding generation simply had not
settled on a conception of executive power that precluded legislative regulation. Worries about how the
Necessary and Proper Clause would be abused have little bearing on measures that were not at the time
seen as abuses. See supra Section IILA, Subsection III.B.I.
402. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 86, at 625.
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facilitate the President's own determinations of how best to execute the
government's authority.
Read in this straightforward fashion, the Necessary and Proper Clause is
fully consistent with the nation's evolution toward separation of powers,
functionally conceived. In granting Congress regulatory authority over the
implementation of federal power, the provision does nothing more than permit
what even the most separationist state constitutions compelled. It certainly does
not violate any preexisting consensus about the exclusivity of presidential
authority, because there was none. Nor does it render separation of powers
chimerical. Unlike the governors of Virginia or Pennsylvania, the President can
fight off perceived encroachments with the substantial procedural safeguard of
the veto. Moreover, at some point a congressional action might become so
intrusive that it would plainly violate the clear values that the doctrine was
meant to serve. To pick an outrageous hypothetical, a statute declaring that
only the Comptroller General could oversee the execution of Commerce Clause
enactments would in one fell swoop upset the balance among the branches,
frustrate even a joint conception of accountability, possibly undermine
governmental efficiency-and so violate separation of powers as the Founding
generation understood it. It would not, however, violate the doctrine on the
unfounded assumption that the individuals who struggled with the Constitution
generally believed that only the President could determine most if not all
aspects of executing the laws.
C. The Ratification Debates
Final confirmation for a functional understanding comes from the national
debate over whether to ratify the Constitution, arguably the most important
source of all. That debate, which includes the official proceedings of the state
conventions, pamphlets, and private correspondence, has obvious historical
importance. Its importance to modem theorists, however, is if anything greater.
Nowhere is the significance of ratification greater than among those theorists
who assume that the intent of the lawgiver is dispositive. On this assumption,
what should count is not "framer intent" but "ratifier intent. '403 As Chief
Justice Marshall explained long ago, the work of the Convention "was a mere
proposal [which] ... the people were at perfect liberty to accept or
reject .... ." "From [the ratifying] Conventions the constitution derives its
whole authority."4 4  But "ratifiers' intent"-or at least "ratifiers'
understanding"-also matters for those who simply seek to gain a better
understanding of the Constitution's often delphic prose. It stands to reason that
403. Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY
77, 77 (1988).
404. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-04 (1819).
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the great public discussion over the document, which involved hundreds of
writers for more than a year, can clarify meanings that the private drafting of
the instrument, which involved fifty-five speakers during a single summer,
cannot.
405
Despite all of this theoretical appreciation, actual reliance on the
ratification debates itself remains theoretical. With the exception of the totemic
The Federalist, neither judges, lawyers, nor academics turn to them with
anything like the frequency with which they consult the handy Records of the
Federal Convention. Use of The Federalist, moreover, tends to be notoriously
acontextual.4 °6 Chronic neglect and misuse of certain sources do not mean
that they cannot be consulted. Rather, those transgressions simply make it that
much more important that they be consulted properly.
1. The Federalist "Case" for Functionalism407
More than any other argument, the Federalists defended the Constitution's
at times quirky division of powers as the surest way to achieve the elusive
goal of balance. In doing this, they assumed an object that by now nearly
every American valued, however much they disagreed about the scope of the
powers being divided or the extent of the division. Federalists and Anti-
Federalists, both famous and obscure, proclaimed over and over that separation
of powers would prevent the concentration of too much authority in any one
branch of government and thus prevent tyranny. Hamilton put the point
concisely at the New York Convention, declaring: "The true principle of
government is this-make the system complete in its structure, give a perfect
proportion and balance to its parts, and the powers you give it will never affect
your security."4 ° "Brutus," an Anti-Federalist, concurred:
The judgment of the learned Montesquieu will be found analogous to
these [separation of powers clauses] of Virginia and Massachusetts.
This able writer says, "whenever the legislative and executive powers
are united in the same person or in the same body of magistracy,
405. Then again, maybe not. As James H. Hutson has shown, the records of many of the ratifying
conventions are extremely unreliable. To take the most notorious example, Thomas Lloyd, who served as
the official reporter for the Pennsylvania and Maryland ratifying conventions, was often too drunk to take
anything down, much less take anything down accurately. James H. Hutson, The Creation of the
Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1986). Moreover, the
records of the Federal Convention are problematic in their own way. Hutson estimates that Madison, whose
notes make up most of what we know about the proceedings, managed to take down only about 10% of
what was said. Id. at 34. The point here is not that these sources should not be consulted, but that any
claims based upon them should be modest and qualified.
406. See Bemstein, supra note 134, at 1588; Flaherty, supra note 16, at 553 n.137.
407. I use quotation marks to make clear that my claim is not that the Federalists consciously argued
in favor of what is a twentieth-century construct. Rather, my point is that Federalist arguments for the
Constitution better comport with modem functionalism than formalism.
408. Alexander Hamilton, in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITrLTION 350 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1941) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
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there can be then no liberty; because apprehensions may arise that the
same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them
in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty if the power of
judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers. 40 9
"A gentleman in New-York," another- Anti-Federalist, put the matter more
tersely, stating, "To vest judicial, legislative, and executive powers in the same
body, is admitted by all constitutional writers as parental of aristocratic
tyranny, or single despotism. '410 James Wilson did not disagree, declaring
in almost identical terms that, "[tlo have placed in the [Confederation
Congress], the legislative, the executive, and judicial authority, all of which are
essential to the general government, would indubitably have produced the
severest despotism." 4'
Where the Federalists and Anti-Federalists parted company was on the
question of whether the Constitution's approach to the doctrine struck the
proper balance. The Federalists had no doubt, at least in public. Much of the
time they preached to their own choir, praising the Constitution's enhancement
of the executive and judiciary as a response to the legislative excesses that had
prompted the Federal Convention in the first place. Madison sounded this
theme in classic fashion in The Federalist. Noting that "[t]he legislative
department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all
power into its impetuous vortex, 412  he lamented the comparative
disadvantages of both the executive and judiciary.413 The remedy for this was
not absolute separation of governmental power. Instead, it was "to divide the
legislature into different branches; .... [a]s the weight of the legislative
authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive
may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified," in particular, by the
President's qualified veto.414 To this prescription, Hamilton would add his
famous defense of the Constitution's enhancement of judicial power in The
Federalist No. 78.4' 5
409. "Brutus," VA. INDEPENDENT CHRON., May 14, 1788, in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
368, at 799 (citation omitted).
410. Extract of a letter from a gentleman in New-York to his friend on the present Assembly [Virginia
Ratifying Convention], dated October 26, 1787, VA. INDEPENDENT CHRON. (Nov. 14, 1787), in
8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 368, at 157.
411. James Wilson, Convention Debates (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Pa.), supra
note 368, at 556.
412. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
413. Id. at 309-10.
414. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322-23 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). James
Bowdoin emphasized the continuity between the Constitution's fortification of the executive and previous
efforts at reform, noting that, "[t]he legislative [i.e., veto] powers of the President are precisely those of
the governors of this state [Massachusetts] and those of New York." 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES (Mass.), supra
note 408, at 128.
415. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464-72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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At the same time, the Federalists also argued that the Constitution's
remedies did not make the legislature too weak. Many Anti-Federalists,
unconvinced that the state legislatures had gotten out of hand to begin with,
raised fears that the proposed framework tipped the balance toward the newly
fortified branches, especially the executive. Against this charge, Federalists
typically contrasted the President's limited powers with those of their former
monarch. Tench Coxe, for example, argued that "[t]he king of England has
legislative power, while our President can only use it when the other servants
of the people are divided," and later concluded that "[f]rom such a servant
with powers so limited and transitory, there can be no danger, especially when
we consider the solid foundations on which our national liberties are
immovably fixed by other provisions of this excellent Constitution., 41 6 Here,
as before, the Federalist defense did not assume that a complete division of
powers, precisely delineated, was an end in itself. Rather, the Federalist
argument turned on whether the division actually made advanced the functional
goal of balance.
Balance was just the beginning. Federalists contended that their new
Constitution also promoted accountability-not the simple, legislative
accountability of the first state constitutions but the more complex, joint
accountability advocated by the reformers who sought to change those early
frameworks. In part for this reason, Federalists like Tench Coxe wasted no
time in pointing out that under their approach to separation of powers, "[t]he
people will remain ... the fountain of power and public honour.' 417 "The
president, the Senate, and the House of Representatives," Coxe continued, "will
be the channels through which the stream will flow-but it will flow from the
people, and from them only."418 Moreover, Wilson noted,
The executive, and judicial power are now drawn from the same
source, are now animated by the same principles, and are now
directed to the same ends, with the legislative authority: they who
execute, and they who administer the laws, are so much the servants,
and therefore as much the friends of the people, as those who make
them.419
As Wood observes, the consequences of this system not only contributed to
balance but to a new type of shared, interbranch, governmental responsiveness:
"Because the Federalists regarded the people as 'the only legitimate fountain
416. TENCH COXE, AN AMERICAN CITIZEN I (Sept. 26, 1787), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(Pa.), supra note 368, at 141, 142.
417. TENCH COXE, AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 131, 147 (Paul L. Ford ed., Da
Capo Press 1968) (1888).
418. Id.
419. WOOD, supra note 133, at 598 (quoting James Wilson).
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of power,' . . . no department was theoretically more popular and hence more
authoritative than any other."420 More specifically, no longer could any
department claim an exclusive popular mandate to justify ill-considered or
oppressive measures, as legislative departments had done in the preceding
decade.
Other aspects of the plan provided still further guards against the excesses
associated with simple accountability. One part made presidential selection
"mediate." The electoral college, in what became a common Federalist theme,
would ensure "that the immediate election [of the President] ... be made by
men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station and acting
under circumstances favorable to deliberation .... [as well as] afford as little
opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder., 421 Just as the electoral
process would forestall demagoguery, so too would the nature of the election.
"[B]eing elected by different parts of the United States," argued James Wilson,
the President "will consider himself as not particularly interested for any one
of them, but will watch over the whole with paternal care and affection. 422
In similar fashion, the Federalists also praised the judicial selection process as
a way to produce judges who were neither independent of the people nor
slaves to demagogic whim. Even congressional elections, Federalists pointed
out, should not be thought of as "immediate" on the model of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. The Senators, for example, would be accountable to the people
only indirectly, through the state legislatures. In all these ways, the diffusion
of accountability represented by the Federalist separation of powers meant that
only a sustained and widespread popular desire could serve as the legitimate
basis for government action.
But the Federalists sought more than gridlock. For all that it promoted
balance and expanded accountability, separation of powers was also intended
to ensure that government had enough energy to do what it had to do once it
did decide to act. As Hamilton told the New York Convention, "[T]o secure
ourselves from despotism .... certainly was a valuable [object]." He
continued, "but, sir, there is another object, equally important... : I mean a
principle of strength and stability in the organization of our government, and
vigor in its operations.,, 423 Though Hamilton was perhaps the best exponent
of vigorous government, Federalists generally agreed with his diagnosis. 424
420. Id. at 550 (citation omitted).
421. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
422. Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 1, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 368, at 452.
423. Alexander Hamilton, in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES (N.Y.), supra note 408, at 301. Madison sounded
the same theme. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 226 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
424. Just after the Convention, Madison wrote Jefferson that one great object of the Convention was
"to unite a proper energy in the Executive and a proper stability in the Legislative departments, with the
essential characters of Republican Government." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24,
1787), in I THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERs, supra note 263, at 495, 496; see WOOD, supra note 133, at 350-52.
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Separation of powers, at least the Constitution's version, advanced
governmental efficiency mainly though the executive. Toward this end, Wood
notes, "[n]ot only was the president to be made independent of the legislature,
but he was to be granted an extraordinary amount of power.' 425 It did not
follow, however, that the Federalists believed that the only way to insure
sufficient governmental energy was to render all executive functionaries
subordinate to the President alone. Instead, when Federalists did seek to
demonstrate the Constitution's functional commitment to energy, they typically
pointed to the more modest device of a unitary Chief Executive. Edmund
Randolph sounded a view shared even by many Anti-Federalists when he told
the Virginia Convention that "[a]ll the enlightened part of mankind agree that
the superior dispatch, secrecy, and energy with which one man can act, renders
it more politic to vest the power of executing the laws in one man, than in any
number of men." 426 "The placing [of] the executive power in the hands of
one person," agreed James Monroe, "appears to be perfectly right.
427
Perhaps the most thorough expression of the Federalist position came from
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 70: "The ingredients which constitute energy
in the executive are unity; duration; an adequate provision for its support; and
competent powers" (as opposed to some fixed notion of "executive
power"). 428 Echoing Randolph, Hamilton praised the Constitution for creating
a single President, because "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will
generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent
degree than the proceedings of any greater number. 429 He also praised the
document for dispensing with an executive council. 430 Nowhere, however,
did he argue that the need for energy requires absolute unity below the unitary
Chief Executive. In fact, later in The Federalist he assumed that the approval
of the Senate is required before the President can remove executive appointees,
even though the document is silent on the matter.43' In the end, the
constitutional goal was not complete unity but sufficient energy. Against the
failures of the state governments and the Articles, a unitary President with
425. WOOD, supra note 133, at 551.
426. Edmund Randolph, 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Va.), supra note 368, at 1097-98.
427. James Monroe, Some Observations on the Constitution, (ca. May 25, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY (Va.), supra note 368, at 870.
428. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
429. Id.
430. Hamilton criticizes the ideal of an executive council not only on the ground that it would
undercut the value of a unitary Chief Magistrate, but also because it would "destroy" presidential
responsibility (a point he says also applies to a plural Chief Executive). Id. at 427-31. In other words,
Hamilton argues that a council would diffuse accountability too much.
431. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also
MCDONALD, supra note 135, at 259.
1806 [Vol. 105: 1725
Most Dangerous Branch
enhanced powers sufficed. Too many people retained too many Whiggish fears
for widespread agreement on anything more.432
2. The Federalist "Case" Against Formalism433
Little in the ratification debates supports the view that either the
Federalists or the Anti-Federalists presupposed that the Constitution reflected
a more thoroughgoing, formalist approach to separation of powers. Much
refutes it. As with the Convention, the records yield nothing approaching a
consensus either as to what separation of powers entailed or what the powers
themselves included beyond the basic values the doctrine was to serve. Perhaps
more than the Convention, the evidence suggests that the goal of dividing
powers no longer commanded the support it once did, even assuming that it
was possible to define those powers with precision. Challenged by their
opponents, many leading Federalists not only acknowledged but celebrated the
ways in which the Constitution mixed powers, the better to serve such more
fundamental ends as balance, accountability, and energy.
Especially striking is the lack of direct evidence for the formalist position.
As had been true for over a decade, the Americans who debated the
Constitution freely tossed about such terms as "legislative power," "executive
power," "judicial power," "executive unity," and "separation" or "division" of
powers. As had also been true, rarely did anyone define what these terms
meant with any precision. Still less frequently did they address issues that
today are at the center of separation of powers disputes. It could be, of course,
that silence on these matters simply means that there existed such a deep-
seated consensus on these terms that no one thought elaboration was necessary.
Or it could be that these general terms signalled only the most basic agreement
while masking profound disputes and uncertainties. Given the historical
context, the formalist possibility is untenable.
But the point hardly needs to rest on negative inference. Madison, for one,
recognized precisely the true state of affairs when he remarked to Jefferson
that, "[e]ven the boundaries between the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary
powers, though in general so strongly marked in themselves, consist in many
instances of mere shades of difference. ''434 Time and time again, Federalists
and Anti-Federalists alike pointed to the numerous ways that the Constitution
violated a strict separation of powers even on the assumption that the powers
to be divided could be clearly defined. As both Vile and McDonald argue, if
432. Hamilton alluded to these fears when he stated that, "[tihere is an idea, which is not without its
advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government." THE
FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
433. See supra note 407.
434. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in I THE REPUBLIC OF
LET'ERS, supra note 263, at 495, 500.
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one defines the doctrine as a fairly complete division of well-defined types of
authority, then "separation of powers had clearly been abandoned in the
framing of the Constitution., 435 The Anti-Federalists keenly understood this
and cried foul.43 6 Typical were the remarks of an "Officer of the Late
Continental Army," who criticized the Constitution on the ground that "the
LEGISLATIVE and EXECUTIVE powers are not kept separate as every one
of the American constitutions declares they ought to be; but they are mixed in
a manner entirely novel and unknown, even to the constitution of Great
Britain." 437
Acknowledging the mixture, the Federalists responded defensively, then
defiantly. Writing early in the debates, Tench Coxe took what would become
the common tack of pointing out that the Constitution's blending of powers
was still not as extensive as that in Britain. "The king of England," he wrote,
"has legislative power, while our president can only use it when the other
servants of the people are divided."4 38 But soon the Federalists extolled
mixture as a means that at points better served the purposes attributed to
separation of powers. "Is there any one branch," Hamilton asked the New
York Convention, "in which the whole legislative and executive powers are
lodged?" The answer:
No. The legislative authority is lodged in three distinct branches,
properly balanced; the executive is divided between two branches;
and the judicial is still reserved for an independent body, who hold
their office during good behavior. This organization is so complex, so
435. McDONALD, supra note 135, at 258; see VILE, supra note 20, at 160-75.
436. See HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 60-63 (1981). Storing, who
remains perhaps the leading authority on the Anti-Federalists, brilliantly demonstrates that while the
Federalists moved beyond viewing separation of powers in terms of a formal separation of government
powers, their opponents continued to doubt "the theoretical soundness, the practical feasibility, and even
the good intentions of this new kind of balanced government." Id. at 62.
437. To the Citizens of Philadelphia, INDEPENDENT GAZETER (Phila.), Nov. 6, 1787, reprinted in
3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 91, 93 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). A minority of the Pennsylvania
Convention developed the point at greater length:
The president general is dangerously connected with the senate; his coincidence with the views
of the ruling junto in that body is made essential to his weight and importance in the
government, which will destroy all independency and purity in the executive department, and
having the power of pardoning without the concurrence of a council, he may screen from
punishment the most treasonable attempts that may be made on the liberties of the people, when
instigated by his coadjutors in the senate. Instead of this dangerous and improper mixture of
the executive with the legislative and judicial, the supreme executive powers ought to have been
placed in the president, with a small independent council made personally responsible for every
appointment to office or other act, by having their opinions recorded; and that without the
concurrence of the majority of the quorum of this council, the president should not be capable
of taking any step.
The Dissent of the Minority of the Convention (Dec. 18, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Pa.), supra
note 368, at 617, 635 (emphasis added).
438. [Tench Coxe], An American Citizen I, INDEPENDENT GAZEITEnR (Phila.), Sept. 26, 1787,
reprinted in I THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 20, 23 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
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skilfully contrived, that it is next to impossible that an impolitic or
wicked measure should pass the scrutiny with success.439
Not all Federalists viewed the blend in the exact way that Hamilton did.
"Americanus," for example, observed that "[i]n the organization of the senate,
we may observe three distinctions of characters, into which it is divided, the
one legislative, the other executive, the third judicial."440 But Hamilton,
Americanus, and numerous other Federalists did agree that the Constitution's
mixture of power helped insure balanced, accountable, and energetic
government.
It would fall to "Publius," in this case Madison, to develop the point most
powerfully. A rigid formalist separation of powers, he explained, misconstrued
Montesquieu, the British Constitution on which he drew, and the early state
constitutions:
[Montesquieu's] meaning, as his own words import, and still more
conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to
no more than this, that where the whole power of one department is
exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of
another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution
are subverted....
If we look into the constitutions of the several States we find that,
notwithstanding the emphatical and, in some instances, the unqualified
terms in which this axiom has been laid down, there is not a single
instance in which the several departments of power have been kept
absolutely separate and distinct.
The trick of government was not to assign three clearly conceived types of
governmental authority to three discrete branches, but to seek the most sensible
degree of division and linkage. As Madison put it, "[U]nless these departments
be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over
the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to
a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained." 442 But it was
impossible to achieve the proper blend through setting it out extensively in
advance (and still less, it follows, by presuming it implicitly). The Critical
Period showed that "a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional
limits of the several departments is not a sufficient guard against those
encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of
439. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 408, at 348 (Alexander Hamilton).
440. "Americanus II," VA. INDEPENDENT CHRON., Dec. 19, 1787, reprinted in 8 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY (Va.), supra note 368, at 244, 246.
441. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302-04 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
442. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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government in the same hands."" 3 Ultimately, the solution lay not in any
particular division, express or presumed, but sounded mainly in process. "[T]he
defect must be supplied," Madison concluded, "by so contriving the interior
structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their
mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper
places." 4  In this way separation of powers would ensure that the
government "will be controlled by itself."" 5 So long as the system did this,
it was doing its job."6
IV. FOUNDING VALUES TWO HUNDRED YEARS LATER
The Founders developed separation of powers as a means to further certain
purposes, including balance, accountability, and energy. They sketched a basic
tripartite division of governmental authority, specified certain relationships
mainly at the top of the three branches, and trusted that the processes the
framework established would advance the purposes it was designed to
achieve.' 7 They did not presuppose, and in fact rejected, the idea that
separation of powers "is a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and
clear distinctions." 448 But then again, so what? Assuming still that it should
443. Id. at 313.
444. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
445. Id. at 323.
446. Adhering to a standard of temporal breadth, see supra text accompanying note 129, would
ordinarily counsel taking the story past the Constitution's ratification to early practice under it and, perhaps,
beyond. This Article will not do so for a number of reasons. One set is theoretical. Many, though by no
means most, interpretive theories that look to the past place greater emphasis on the legislative history
leading up to a text than on a subsequent practice under it. See supra text accompanying notes 102-05.
Another set of reasons is practical. Early practice, a sufficiently complex topic in its own right, would take
at least as much space as the present treatment covering the period leading to ratification. Moreover, in
contrast to the background of the doctrine, considerable work in the legal literature addresses early
separation of powers practice. See, e.g., Casper, supra note 99, at 224-60; Corwin, Tenure of Office, supra
note 54, at 360-87; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 438-83.
Furthermore, much of the scholarship with regard to early practice is consistent with the account
presented here in any case. Consider, for example, the "decision of 1789." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52, 142 (1926). During its first session, the House of Representatives specifically considered whether to
vest the President with the authority to remove heads of certain executive departments. Corwin's classic,
and ably researched, article demonstrated that "a mere fraction of a fraction, a minority of a minority, of
the House, can be shown to have attributed the removal power to the President on the grounds of executive
prerogative." Corwin, Tenure of Office, supra note 54, at 362, 362-69. Recent work confirms the point.
Lance Banning, for example, notes that Madison proposed that the heads of three executive departments
be removable by the President, arguing that the Constitution left Congress no choice but to grant removal
authority to the President. See BANNING, supra note 168, at 276-77. But Banning also notes that Madison
entered the congressional debates on this point asserting that Congress did have the power to decide
whether to grant or withhold such authority. See id. at 277. Madison, himself, in other words, had no
consistent conception of formal boundaries between the branches even in his own mind. His initial position,
moreover, indicates that Madison came to the issue, after having led the ratification struggle, believing that
the authority rested with Congress.
447. For modem articulations of this Founding insight, see Todd D. Rakoff, The Shape of Law in the
American Administrative State, 11 TEL Aviv U. STUD. L. 9, 21-25, 39 (1992); Strauss, supra note 62, at
596-603; Gerhardt, supra note 62, at 44-45.
448. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1463 (1995).
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matter, does the Founding yield any lessons for modem separation of powers
controversies? This part sketches an answer, arguing that the changed
circumstances since the Founding make even more compelling the type of
functional view of separation of powers evident at its inception. A fuller
version of this argument must appear elsewhere. But at least the general
contours seem plain.
The argument has three parts. First, it holds that the most appropriate way
to maintain fidelity to the Founding is not through literal "originalism," such
as that advanced by Justice Scalia and Judge Bork, but through models that
serve the Founders' more general purposes in light of changed circumstances,
as suggested by Lawrence Lessig and Bruce Ackerman. While these purposive
approaches are sensible in general, nowhere do they make more sense than
where the Founders themselves failed to agree on much more than general
purposes-the case with separation of powers. Next, and here contrary to
Lessig and Sunstein, the argument maintains that those circumstances that have
changed since the Founding reveal that the modem formalist approach
undercuts the principal functional values that the Founders hoped their
approach to separation of powers would promote. Finally, the argument
concludes that functional solutions should govem. Accordingly, the Court
should mainly leave separation of powers controversies to the processes that
the Founders specified, unless those particular processes or the general values
that they were designed to promote are clearly under attack. This means that
older devices such as the legislative veto and administrative oversight by
"congressional agents" should have been left in place. Yet it also means that
newer mechanisms such as the current version of the "line item veto" should
not be.449
A. Fidelity over ime
Given that some degree of faithfulness to the Founding is a good thing, the
question remains how best to be faithful two centuries later. So many bytes
have been processed justifying the need for fidelity to begin with that
comparatively little attention has been devoted to methods for achieving it. At
least three candidates have nonetheless emerged as contenders: "narrow
449. Nor need the applications end here. While this Article concentrates on conflicts between Congress
and the President, Larry Kramer has suggested that a similar type of analysis applies to disputes between
Congress and the judiciary. Specifically, Kramer argues that nothing in the history of separation of powers
prevents federal courts from making federal common law, notwithstanding the formalist objection that
unaccountable judges should not be involved in lawmaking. To the contrary, he contends, "common
lawmaking arguably furthers some purposes of separation of powers." Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking
Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REv. 263, 286 (1992); see also Larry Kramer, The Constitution
as Architecture: A Charette, 65 IND. LJ. 283, 28548 (1980) (arguing that Founders' understanding of
separation of powers may have been to allow sufficient flexibility in governmental framework to allow
institutional responses based on future events).
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originalism, '' 450  as set forth by Justice Scalia and Judge Bork;451
"translation," as is currently being developed by Lawrence Lessig;452 and
"synthesis" of different constitutional moments, as advanced by Bruce
Ackerman.453 However they relate to other aspects of the Founding, their
relation to separation of powers is clear. The models of translation and
synthesis advance the project of fidelity. Originalism, narrowly understood,
undercuts it.
If ever a term muddied as much as it clarified, "originalism" is it. It has
most commonly referred to the contention that judges should apply the
meaning of a rule "understood at the time of the law's enactment.' 45 4 On this
view, original understanding is not merely probative but dispositive. Often, this
brand of originalism does not merely dictate the extent to which history should
apply, but how to apply it. One might, after all, derive a rule at a sufficient
level of generality that it could be readily applied to new circumstances
without enacting a new law. Or one might view the original understanding of
some text as sufficiently precise that only a new text can accommodate a
change in context. Judge Bork advanced the ostensible originalist answer,
contending that "a judge should state the principle at the level of generality
that the text and historical evidence warrant.' 455 Judge Bork and other
avowed originalists nearly always find that the historical evidence equates the
intended meaning of a rule with either precise understandings or
contemporaneous applications.456 Under this narrow originalist approach, the
Eighth Amendment cannot prohibit disproportionate sentences,457 nor the
Fourteenth Amendment prevent the criminalization of (homosexual)
sodomy,458 nor the Commerce Clause permit regulation of manufacturing or
agriculture459-- all because the (purported) original understanding of each
provision is too narrow to account for changed circumstances.
This type of narrow originalist approach is ill-suited for separation of
powers analysis. One set of problems pertains to narrow originalism generally.
450. See Fleming, supra note 83.
451. See infra text accompanying notes 454-59.
452. See infra text accompanying notes 465-67.
453. See infra text accompanying notes 468-72.
454. BORK, supra note 104, at 144.
455. Id. at 149.
456. For example, Judge Bork argues that the Supreme Court in The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1872), properly gave a narrow reading to the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause on the ground that its original meaning "remains largely unknown." BORK, supra note
104, at 36-39. Along similar lines, Judge Bork asserts that the Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), violates the original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause by
ignoring the contemporaneous practice of segregation in public education. BORK, supra note 104, at 75-80.
My argument at this point is not that the judge is correct or incorrect in his history, but that his history
usually points him toward a narrow level of generality, at least when considering constitutional provisions
protecting rights.
457. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961-85 (1991) (Scalia, J.).
458. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986).
459. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1642-51 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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In the first place, the historical evidence indicates that the Founders
consistently aimed for a fairly high degree of generality. As William Michael
Treanor observes, the Founders "were not traditional originalists. They created
a terse, open-ended constitution whose meaning would change in response to
changed circumstances. 460 Much in our legal culture confirms this view, not
least of which is Chief Justice Marshall's famous dictum in McCulloch v.
Maryland: "[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding. 46' Common sense supports this view as well. It seems absurd
to maintain that someone who speaks with an expectation that her words will
apply in unforeseen circumstances would not also intend that her meaning
carry over. 462 None of this is to say that we may blithely ignore the textual
requirement that the President "have attained to the Age of thirty five
Years" 463 just because we may now believe that only those over forty are as
worthy. It is to say that for the Constitution's "majestic generalities, ' 464 to
say nothing of its nontextual doctrines, narrow originalism fails the test of
fidelity on its own terms.
The second problem facing narrow originalism is more serious still. Even
if the Founders did not usually aim for a high level of generality, they did
when it came to separation of powers. As this Article has taken pains to show,
the Founders generally agreed on the basic purposes that the doctrine was
meant to achieve. Beyond this, agreement quickly broke down. The Founders
never reached a consensus about the specifics of the three powers they were
separating outside their respective cores. Still less did they agree about the
specifics that generate modem controversies. Furthermore, the Federalists
themselves defended the blending of powers, as they variously understood
them, where necessary to achieve the ends previously associated with dividing
them. There was no specific, which is to say, formalist, baseline. And since the
Founders' own blend and division of powers was unprecedented, there was no
uniform set of applications to yield specific answers either. In this situation,
even the most narrow originalist has no choice but to apply general Founding
values or to give up the attempt to maintain fidelity to the Founding.
That leaves translation and synthesis. Each of these methods is also
"originalist" in the sense that it aims to preserve privileged meanings from
earlier eras of constitutional lawmaking. But unlike narrow originalist method,
both translation and synthesis presuppose that an intended meaning or purpose
is sufficiently general to carry over into changed circumstances. So profound
460. Treanor, supra note I11, at 857.
461. 17 U.S. (4 wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
462. Cf. Greene, supra note 77, at 129-30 (arguing that preservation of Framers' principles requires
changed readings of Constitution in response to changed contexts); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding
Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REv. 395, 396-401 (1995) (arguing that changes in
nature of law as well as economic and social context justify changed readings).
463. U.S. CONST. art. II, § i, cl. 5.
464. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
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is the disagreement on this point that the advocates of these approaches avoid
the "originalist" label altogether.
Translation applies when there are changes in context. In such cases,
"particular applications of a constitutional text [or norm] may change over time
as the context of application changes-all consistent with the command of
fidelity." '465 Consider, for example, the New Deal. Lessig, a leading
proponent of this approach, argues that the radical changes ushered in by the
New Deal, though radical, remain faithful to the Founders' original design. On
this view, the original "Constitution embraced competing goals: one to
empower the federal government over a range [but not a limitless range] of
national economic activity; the other to reserve ... to the states a domain over
some kinds of economic activity." '466 By the time of the Great Depression,
the context for applying these purposes had fundamentally changed. It had
become clear that the national economy was more extensive, integrated, and
constructed than anything the Founders could have imagined. In addition, it
had also become clear that laissez-faire economic assumptions no longer
tracked economic reality, which in turn suggested that previously uncontested
views about the courts' power to check economic regulation enacted by the
legislature were as much political as legal. In light of these changed contexts,
the Supreme Court could curtail substantive economic due process, and
legitimately permit the expansion of federal commerce power while remaining
faithful to the Founding design. In similar fashion, Lessig notes, the Court
translates old norms to new contexts all the time.4 67
By contrast, synthesis applies when there are changes in constitutional
norms. Bruce Ackerman poses the challenge this way: "At Time One, the
Founding generation announced X as higher law; at Time Two, [a later
generation announced] Y-where Y is partly, but not entirely, inconsistent with
X. How then to put X and Y together into a meaningful whole?" '468 The
answer, he suggests, is "[b]y self-consciously confronting the tensions between
[the] Founding and [later amendments], and elaborating doctrinal principles
which harmonize the conflict in a way that does justice to the deepest
aspirations of each." 469 For Ackerman, the New Deal cannot simply be
explained by changes in context. Rather, he posits that "We the People"
affirmatively repudiated economic liberty under the Takings, Due Process, and
Commerce Clauses and approved vastly increased federal powers, through
what amounted to Article V amendments ratified during the 1930s. 470 These
changes did not eclipse all prior constitutional norms. Griswold v.
465. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 87.
466. Lessig, supra note 462, at 465-66.
467. See id. at 438-39.
468. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 105, at 90.
469. 1 id. at 94.
470. 1 id. at 105-08.
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Connecticut,47' for example, represents the Court's attempt to synthesize the
New Deal's expansion of power with the Founding's surviving commitment
to noneconomic rights.472
Each of these models assumes that certain norms can be held constant and
applied in new circumstances. Yet some question this assumption. Mark
Tushnet, for example, notes that a critical difficulty in applying old norms to
changed circumstances is the need to identify functional equivalents of earlier
practices, beliefs, or institutions in novel settings.473 However difficult this
task may be in other constitutional settings, it is not a significant obstacle in
separation of powers. Today, Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court
still function, thereby suggesting plausible functional equivalents for
yesterday's Congress, President, and Supreme Court. These institutions may
have grown more powerful in absolute terms; their relative authority may have
shifted; they may have been joined by an additional branch of government.
None of this, however, forecloses attempting to apply a norm that, for
example, counsels against concentrating too much power in a single governing
institution.474 This conclusion may have been different had the Republic
adopted the type of system that the young Woodrow Wilson might have
applauded and adopted a parliamentary system that in effect collapsed existing
divisions of authority into a unicameral national legislature.475 But it did not.
The same point applies when considering the nature of the norm rather
than the character of the circumstances. Common sense suggests that the more
general the norm, the more likely it will be to discover functional equivalents
of the original applications. A rule mandating a jury trial in civil suits "where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty [1791] dollars," 476 for example,
will find fewer equivalent applications than a more general standard
prescribing fairness in dispute resolution. As has been argued, the Founding
did not yield a dominant approach to separation of powers that, at least below
the apex of government structure, went beyond general goals. Norms such as
that are sufficiently broad to be applied in all but the most radical of changed
circumstances even at the expense of previous readings or applications of those
norms.
For the purposes of this Article, moreover, there is no reason to choose
between either the translation or synthesis approach. No one doubts that the
federal government of the 1990s is a vastly different entity from its counterpart
471. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
472. See I ACKERMAN, supra note 105, at 150-58.
473. See TUSHNET, supra note 115, at 41-44.
474. Tushnet does not "deny that we can ever understand the past, because the world of the past is
not the world within which we have developed ways of understanding how others act." Id. at 44. To the
contrary, he asserts that the interpretative task should be "to think through the implications of our continued
dedication to the large abstractions when the particulars of the world have changed so drastically." Id.
475. See WVILSON, supra note 7.
476. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
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of the 1790s. As will be seen, the balance of power among the branches has
shifted; the nature of electoral accountability has changed; and novel means of
insuring governmental energy have multiplied. Like the New Deal, it may be
that these changed circumstances arose from changes in social and economic
contexts. But also like the New Deal, it may also be that they are better seen
as stemming from intervening amendments. Either way, the task of fidelity
demands figuring out what current applications best serve the Founding's
surviving purposes in this new world.
Doing that, however, requires a better understanding of what these new
circumstances are.
B. Changed Circumstances
As a general matter, developments in American government over the past
two centuries undercut the modern formalist case still further. For starters,
"more than 200 years of practice under the Constitution suggest that the
inherent fluidity and the system of checks and balances render a strict
separation impossible," 477 a point that scholars as diverse as McDonald,
Corwin, Lessig and Sunstein, and Susan Low Bloch have suggested. 78 That
phenomenon would be dispositive assuming that evolving custom should count
as a source for constitutional norms. 47 9 For present purposes, however, more
important are the ways "more than 200 years of practice" affect the application
of norms derived from the Founding itself. Those two centuries of change have
profoundly reshaped the context in which each of the principal Founding
values so far considered are to be implemented today if they are to be
implemented at all.
1. Balance in an Executive Vortex
a. General Powers
By far the greatest changes concern the goal of balance, the Founding's
most important separation of powers value. As Forrest McDonald recently
observed, "[i]t is a commonplace among students of the presidency that the
two-plus centuries of American experience under the Constitution have been
characterized by a general if irregular drift of authority and responsibility
477. MCDONALD, supra note 276, at 180 n.35.
478. See CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 54, at 76-84; MCDONALD, supra note 135, at 180 n.35;
Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning
There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 618-51; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 14-22.
479. For a classic discussion and application of this approach, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593-614 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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toward the executive branch. '480 This is not to say that Congress cannot, on
occasion, still seize the initiative when, as now, it benefits from an effective
leadership and a rudderless Chief Executive. But from a larger perspective the
overall drift has been inexorable and shows few signs of any long-term
shift.48' It often surprises students to discover Madison's statement,
previously noted, that "[t]he legislative department is ... drawing all power
into its impetuous vortex. 482 Were Madison to consider the same problem
in light of subsequent developments, he would have little choice but to
conclude that if there were any one branch against which "the people ought to
indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions, 4 3 it would be
the executive.
This evolution has occurred across the board, starting with activities that
formalists consider to be at the core of executive authority. Consider law
enforcement, which Justice Scalia has called "a quintessentially executive
function. ' 4  In fact, presidential dominance in this area was slow in coming.
As Lessig and Sunstein, among others, have noted, in the beginning Congress
relied mainly on state and local officials to enforce federal legislation, while
federal district attorneys, who acted under instructions of an auditor in the
Treasury Department, remained all but completely independent up to the Civil
War.485 Key changes occurred in 1855, when the Attorney General was made
a full-time job;4 86 in 1861, when federal district attorneys were placed under
the Attorney General's direction;487 in 1870, with the establishment of the
Justice Department;48 and in 1909, with the creation of the Justice
Department's first "Bureau of Investigation., '489 The President likewise
expanded enforcement powers through increasing use of executive orders,
480. MCDONALD, supra note 276, at 277. While noting this orthodoxy, McDonald himself in part
challenges it, contending that "[i]n truth, the preponderance of power has flowed in long-term trends from
one branch to another, and now and again a balance has been reached." Id. McDonald nonetheless
concludes that the twentieth-century trend has been largely toward executive power, notwithstanding
congressional reassertions in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate. Id. He further contends that with regard
to popular expectations, the "inflation of the presidency has been virtually uninterrupted." Id. at 277-78.
481. Perhaps tellingly, many of the major challengers to the current incumbent seek to exchange
powerful positions in Congress for the presidency, including Senate majority leader. For a recent assessment
of the major challengers as they entered this year, see Steven V. Roberts et al., Looking for Mr Un-Dole,
U.S. NEvs & WORLD REP., Jan. 15, 1996, at 30. It remains to be seen to what extent the present initiative
will remain with Congress should a Republican capture the White House in the next election.
482. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see BANNING,
supra note 168, at 400.
483. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
484. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Governmental investigation and
prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function.").
485. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 16-17; HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND,
FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 146-47, 164
(1937).
486. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 485, at 152-55.
487. Id. at 218-19.
488. Id. at 225.
489. Id. at 366-83; LEwIS L. GOULD, THE PRESIDENCY OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 293 (1991); MAx
LOWENTHAL, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 83-92 (1950).
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which according to some estimates now number 50,000 since 1907.490 At
times, especially in this century, Presidents have engaged in direct action as
if to preserve the "king's peace," 491 without specific legal authorization.
Nowhere has this been more evident than in labor disputes, where in the first
half of this century Presidents intervened in no fewer than twenty-five major
industrial disputes.492 Meanwhile, Presidents from Jefferson and Jackson
onward had discovered liberal use of patronage as a way to gain further control
over executive personnel, a means of control only partly undermined by the
emergence of a civil service system in the late nineteenth century.
Presidents have further garnered the lion's share of expanded federal
authority in areas that are harder even for formalists to characterize. In foreign
affairs, presidents as early as Jefferson pushed beyond original expectations by
deploying American forces abroad without congressional approval. Over time
the practice became more frequent and involved higher stakes as the United
States assumed its place as a world power.493 In similar fashion, Presidents
have also proven themselves to be naturals at commanding progressively more
powerful media attention to the relative exclusion of the multivoiced Congress
and secretive Supreme Court.494 As a function of these and other
developments, the public long ago focused its expectations on the executive
branch, both state and national, to address the nation's needs-a focus that
serves further to confirm the shift.495
The shift toward presidential government has also taken place in areas that
formalists would consider "quintessentially legislative"-or at least those
legislative activities that the Constitution arguably confers upon the President.
Take, for example, initiating the legislative process. Under Article II, Section
3, the President has the duty not just to report to Congress on the State of the
Union, but to "recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall
judge necessary and expedient. ' 496 With the exception of Lincoln, nineteenth-
century presidents used this authority sparingly, and then generally in abstract,
almost ritualistic ways. It was not until Theodore Roosevelt that a President
indicated a desire to seize the legislative initiative, an initiative actually
grasped by Woodrow Wilson. Wilson's proactive approach, if not always a
490. MCDONALD, supra note 276, at 297.
491. Id. at 294-95.
492. See CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 54, at 126-36 (describing Roosevelt's "stewardship
theory" of President's emerging powers); MCDONALD, supra note 135, at 295; BENNETT M. RICH, THE
PRESIDENTS AND CIVIL DISORDER 72-107 (1941).
493. For one of the most recent and penetrating assessments, see ELY, supra note 11 (considering
constitutionality of wars in Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and of later covert wars, and suggesting
reforms of combat authorization).
494. MCDONALD, supra note 276, at 425-58 (providing history of shaping presidential images from
John Quincy Adams to Bill Clinton).
495. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see THEODORE J. Lowi, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER
INVESTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED (1985) (describing shift from congressional government to new regime
of presidential government).
496. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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success, has since become the norm, so much so that the President has aptly
been termed the "legislator-in-chief."'4 97 One committee chairperson gave a
flavor of the twentieth-century norm when he told an administration witness,
"[D]on't expect us to start from scratch on what you people want. That's not
the way we do things here-you draft the bills and we work them over.,
498
As Bruce Ackerman emphasizes, Franklin Roosevelt's tenure accelerated
the expansion of federal power, and with it the rise of the presidency, by a
quantum leap.499 F.D.R. set new standards with regard to law enforcement,
broadly defined, first in his efforts to micromanage the economy under the
National Recovery Act and then through such initiatives as his unprecedented
campaign of antitrust prosecutions .5 00 F.D.R.'s success in pushing through
major legislation likewise established new boundaries for presidential
leadership in that area."' So too did his mastery in foreign affairs, with radio
and the press generally, and in forging popular expectations of what an active
President could accomplish. 2 For present purposes, it does not matter
whether Ackerman is correct that these changes in degree amounted to a
change in constitutional kind,03 or whether Lessig is closer to the mark in
arguing that the New Deal represented the translation of extant constitutional
norms to a new context.50 What matters here is that each of these changes
compounded a historic shift from the congressional government anticipated by
the Founders to the presidential government familiar to us.
b. Delegation and the Administrative State
For all these developments, the most clearcut shift toward presidential
power has yet to be mentioned. This is, of course, the grand-scale emergence
of executive and independent agencies, the "fourth branch of government" also
known as the "administrative state." As the nation's problems grew,
Progressives and New Dealers believed that so too should the federal response.
Congress therefore "not only passed more laws, requiring more execution; it
also passed more laws requiring broad-scale policy making before
execution. 50 5 Once more the net beneficiary would be the President, the
nominal head of the agencies that would both execute and make policy. But
497. MCDONALD, supra note 276, at 348, 359-64.
498. Quoted in Richard E. Neustadt, Presidency and Legislation: Planning the President's Program,
49 AM. POL. Sd. REv. 980, 1015 (1955).
499. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 105, at 105-08; Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA
Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 801, 845-96 (1995) (describing New Deal transformation of
presidency).
500. See McDONALD, supra note 135, at 289-91.
501. See id. at 365-66.
502. See id. at 405-07, 441-47.
503. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 105, at 105-08.
504. Lessig, supra note 462, at 461-72.
505. Greene, supra note 77, at 154.
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unlike many of the transfers considered so far, this one crossed bright doctrinal
lines. Previously, a formalist-minded Supreme Court had held that, while
Congress could enact laws that required execution, it could not franchise away
its legislative power by passing laws that required broad-scale policymaking.
Twice the Court invoked this "nondelegation doctrine" to strike down
congressional giveaways.5 s These were, however, the last times the Court
tried to keep the floodgates shut.
Here, then, was a threat to separation of powers that functionalists and
even formalists could (or should) agree on, though for different reasons. For
formalists, the rise of the administrative state could not count as a simple
expansion of laws to be executed. Nor was it like the President's expanded
role in proposing legislation, since at least that had some basis in constitutional
text. Still less was it analogous to the increased focus on the President by the
media and the public, developments not directly implicating constitutional
concerns. Instead, for formalists the problem with the death of the
nondelegation doctrine lay precisely in the Court's refusal to police previously
established boundaries. For functionalists, by contrast, this aspect of the
Court's turnabout was a virtue. As the Court elsewhere indicated, its new
stance acknowledged that the administrative state typically wielded "quasi"
executive, legislative, and judicial power that could not be easily shoved into
any of the three traditional categories.507 The Federal Trade Commission, for
example, was not only "to carry into effect" certain policies, but was "to
perform other specified duties as a legislative or as a judicial aid. '50 ' Broad
delegation of authority to what, on the formalist view, is the executive was not
therefore necessarily troubling, least of all because it crossed borders that had
formally been policed, so long as Congress did not delegate in such a way that
threatened such foundational values as balance.
Yet this is just what Congress continued to do. With the New Deal, and
the attendant death of the nondelegation doctrine, the giveaway of what had
been seen as legislative authority (or something close) became massive.
Between "1934 and 1936 alone, Congress established the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Bituminous
Coal Commission, and the United States Maritime Commission, to name a
few. 509 This trend, moreover, has generally accelerated during the five
decades since F.D.R.'s death. At least as important as the scope of modem
delegation, however, is to whom the power has been delegated. If there has
506. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935).
507. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628-29. Later, in Morrison v. Olson, the Court
would go further, repudiating the "quasi" subcategories and (at least in that case) adopting an out-and-out
functionalist analysis that turned on whether restrictions on the removal of the officials at issue impedes
the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty. 487 U.S. 654, 690-91 (1988).
508. Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 628.
509. See MCDONALD, supra note 276, at 327.
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been any net beneficiary of Congress's abdication of authority, it has been the
President. In formal terms, Presidents ultimately exercise the appointments and
removal powers over the heads of both executive and independent agencies (a
distinction that is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain). Informally,
Presidents influence agencies through ex parte and secret contacts and through
executive agencies established to coordinate agency activities. This is not to
say that Congress lacks methods of influencing agency conduct. It is to say,
however, that a substantial measure of power that under the nondelegation
doctrine would by definition have resided in Congress has since fallen to the
President.
c. Fidelity and Balance
Any approach that ignores changes bearing upon ongoing constitutional
commitments overlooks them not so much at its own peril, but at the peril of
the commitments it purports to further. Where the commitment is balance, even
the most glancing survey indicates that the executive branch long ago
supplanted its legislative counterpart as the most powerful-and therefore most
dangerous-in the sense that the Founders meant. This shift toward presidential
government suggests that at a minimum we need an approach that would
permit Congress to maintain some control over the authority the Court now
permits it to delegate away to the administrative state. More broadly, this shift
implies that invoking separation of powers to invalidate congressional attempts
to keep pace with the presidency is not only wrong headed but, more important
still, fundamentally unfaithful to our founding values.
Then again, any approach that hopes to maintain fidelity to those values
must also be open to the possibility of further change. It may be that the
current activist Congress signals the beginning of a long shift back toward the
legislative department or, more dramatically, the first act of a "constitutional
moment."510 So far, either conclusion seems premature. Yet should either
situation occur, securing balance would compel the Supreme Court to be as
accommodating of presidential efforts to keep pace as it has only occasionally
been of congressional efforts to do the same in the current context. Put another
way, the concern with balance was neither inherently proexecutive, nor
prolegislative, nor projudicial, but can only be given meaning by taking it for
an end in itself.
2. Accountability and the Populist Presidency
'Tvo hundred years of practice have also affected the Founding
commitment to accountability, properly recaptured. On this view,
510. I ACKERMAN, supra note 105, at 267.
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accountability should no longer be the province of one branch of government
but instead should rest with both houses of the legislature, the executive, and,
less directly, even the judiciary. In this way, separation of powers tamed
accountability by ensuring that government, or any part of it, could threaten
liberty in the name of last year's election results. It also refined accountability
by ensuring that government action could not proceed legitimately only if it
rested on sustained, widespread, and deliberative support as reflected in the
agreement of several components of the government, in turn reflecting several
soundings of popular will through staggered congressional and presidential
elections.5"
a. From Merit to Mandate
If any branch at first seemed the most likely to claim electoral mandates
for tyrannical or precipitous actions, it was the legislature. By contrast, the
Founders generally conceived of the presidency not first and foremost as a
representative post, but as a relatively apolitical award for men who had
demonstrated extraordinary virtue and character through selfless public service.
No longer. As unitarians are quick to point out, at present no elected official
plausibly claims to be more representative or accountable than the President.
He, or one day she, can do this on the strength of elections that, far from
filtered affairs envisioned by the electoral college process, long ago evolved
into tournaments that are in part plebiscite, in larger part popularity contests.
The best way to appreciate the distance travelled is to go back to the
starting point. Ralph Ketcham captures the conventional wisdom among both
Federalists and historians, stating that "elevation to the presidency" was
initially seen as recognition for "seniority and previous service to the nation,
a service [that] could continue ... only if [the president] could insulate his
office from partisanship... [and] scorn electioneering. '512 No Chief
Executive embodied this "idea of a patriot king" more thoroughly than
Washington, who sought to rule based upon his incomparable reputation rather
than any mere victory at the polls. One means to insure that the Republic
would have a fighting chance of selecting successors in Washington's image
was the electoral college. As Hamilton noted, this last-minute contraption
would screen the people's choice for President through men of "discernment"
who would be "capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station and
acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious
combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern
their choice., 5  Accordingly, the main claimant of direct accountability to
511. See supra text accompanying notes 316-32; see also supra text accompanying notes 219-21.
512. RALPH KETCHAM, PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTY: THE FIRST AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 1789-1829,
at 3 (1984).
513. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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the people would remain the legislature, the only branch that would in large
part be elected directly.
514
This early conception began to break down almost from the outset. Even
so, "the passage from a traditional, notable-oriented and deferential politics on
the one hand to a party, electorate-oriented and egalitarian style of politics on
the other, did not come about abruptly."515 The Jeffersonians took an
important step along this path when they successfully transformed the election
of 1800 into a plebiscite of sorts, pitting their policies against those of the
Federalists. Jefferson, while himself continuing to "scorn electioneering," not
surprisingly ran the first administration to take a consistent lead in proposing
legislation rather than simply waiting for Congress to act. The Jacksonians
took even greater strides. Not only did they embrace the idea of presidential
elections as popular referenda, and do it with gusto, they pioneered the modern
political party as the best way to mobilize grassroots support for their
candidate. Despite inevitable detours, others continued in the same direction.
So tireless was Theodore Roosevelt in bringing his message to the people, for
example, that Congress voted him a fund for railroad travel in 1906, thus
"putting his [bully] pulpit on wheels."5 16
Once again, however, it was the other Roosevelt who increased executive
pretensions by another order of magnitude. Symbolically, F.D.R. once and for
all ended the fiction that individuals did not seek the White House by bucking
precedent and accepting the Democratic nomination in person in 1932. In more
substantive terms, F.D.R. identified his subsequent electoral victories with the
popular will to such an extent that he treated the decision in Humphrey's
Executor as almost a personal affront, which in turn prompted him to overplay
his hand with his ill-fated "court packing" scheme. As Rexford Tugwell
recalled:
If Franklin, who not only had a vivid sense of presidential
prerogatives but who by election and reelection was the chosen leader
of the American people, felt that the obstructions of the Court
constituted an impertinent denial of his right to act as leader, there
was certainly justification. It has been suggested that the Humprhies
[sic] case constituted an affront to the presidency. It very well may
have been that case, even more than the other decisions of 1935,
514. Among other things, this early conception of the presidency undermines the notion that the
Founders viewed responsiveness as the special province of a unitary executive branch. But of more
immediate concern, it also suggests that the Founders did not view the presidency as the type of institution
that could abuse claims to "speak in the name of the people" in the same way that the early state
legislatures had. None of this is to ignore how recent an innovation that the popular election of a Chief
Magistrate was, filters or no. However avant-garde he may have been on the point, James Wilson could
state that in some sense the President truly would be a "MAN OF THE PEOPLE." James Wilson,
Convention Debates (Dec. 1, 1787), in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Pa.), supra note 368, at 452.
515. Ronald P. Formisano, Deferential-Participant Politics: The Early Republic's Political Culture,
1789-1840, 68 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 473, 473 (1974).
516. MCDoNALD, supra note 276, at 436.
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which provided the motive for the post-election attempt to humiliate
the Court in turn .... ,51 7
And so it has gone until today's near all-consuming carnival. Any but the
most general assessment about modern presidential politics would be
problematic. It appears safe to say, however, that the "electorate-oriented and
egalitarian style" has rarely been so strongly pronounced nor further from its
original, "notable-oriented" precursor. What is more, parties, which served as
the critical device for popularizing the presidency, no longer act as a check.
Instead, presidential candidates now largely bypass party machinery and go
even more directly to the public through advertising, press manipulation, and
the media generally. Some of these candidates advance salient agendas, thus
emphasizing the plebiscitarian component of the process. Others are simply
more interested in projecting a winning image, content to defer the problem of
what actually to do once in office until that bridge needs to be crossed. Either
way, successful presidential candidates not only exercise awesome power, but
power greatly enhanced by their success in convincing the electorate to
sanction their general policy orientation or, perhaps more dangerously, to issue
them a blank check based on the strength of how well they project an
appealing image." 8 For good or ill, the presidency in the late twentieth
century asserts the most plausible entitlement to "speak for the people" in
much the same way that the Pennsylvania legislature did in the late eighteenth
century. At a minimum, the presidency's current purchase on that title has
grown far more plausible than it was when the office was initially conceived.
b. Fidelity and Accountability
In this light, accountability appears as nearly the opposite of the trump
card that proponents, and even many opponents, of the unitary executive take
it to be. As with balance, the changes in government practice since the
Founding cut against, not for, executive power. In each case the trick is to
avoid confusing original applications of a constitutional norm with the norm
itself, properly reconstructed. Contrary to the usual assumption, here was not
the rudimentary accountability that modern unitarians extol. Instead, the
Founders reconceptualized the idea to render it more safe and more reflective
of considered popular choice. Initially, Congress put the greatest pressure on
this more sophisticated commitment by virtue of its superior representativeness.
As unitarians are the first to argue, this is exactly the area in which the
President now advances a comparable, if not more compelling, claim. Any
517. REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE DEmocRATIC ROOSEVELT 392 (1957). For a historian's account
agreeing with Tugwell's assessment, see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTrITTONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 78-81 (1995).
518. See, e.g., LOWI, supra note 495, at 7-21, 97-133 (discussing "plebiscitary presidency").
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response faithful to the Founding, therefore, should greet this development not
as a cause for celebration but concern.
A simplified example should make this concern more plain. Assume that
President Clinton manages to win reelection in 1996 on a traditional "liberal"
Democratic platform. Assume further that the Republicans retain majority
control less than two-thirds of the Senate and House. Inevitably taking his
victory as a mandate, the President directs the Secretary of the Interior to stop
all private development of public lands in its tracks. Accordingly, the Secretary
issues several phonebooks-worth of regulations that would have been the envy
of the New Deal, Square Deal, New Frontier, and Great Society. Unitarians
would argue that all this is appropriate. The people spoke in the last
presidential election, and a responsive Chief Executive is merely carrying out
their will.
But is he? Recall that a deregulation-minded G.O.P. retained comfortable
majorities in each house. Permitting the President absolute control in this
instance does violence to the Founding conception of accountability in at least
two regards. First, it would not appear to reflect a considered national
determination to go back to the heyday of regulation (which a Democratic
sweep in both houses might have indicated). Second, it accords the President
immense power (the stakes would be irrevocably higher by inverting the
example to assume a presidential directive to sell off the national forests). Nor
is it enough to say that Congress could always change the laws under which
the Secretary acts, since they would not necessarily survive a veto on these
facts. Exclusive reliance on the override solution precludes several less drastic
means of enabling the considerable portion of the country opposed to the
executive's actions, perhaps even the majority, as reflected in dozens of
congressional elections. Current doctrine aside, one such device would be the
legislative veto. Another, assuming recalcitrant underlings, would be limitations
on the President's removal power.
Lately, some scholars have explored the deeper implications of
accountability from a modem perspective. In particular, Peter Shane has
suggested, "[o]nce we plumb the complexities of both defining and
operationalizing accountability, a strong case appears that tight unitary control
of the executive is a problematic model. 51 9 Yet even Shane, among others,
remains tentative on the extent to which "original intent" supports the
application of a more complex notion of the concept to the modem presidency.
They need not.
519. Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of
Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REv. 161, 212 (1995).
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3. Energy and Governmental Activity
Modem government at its most lethargic is energetic beyond the Founders'
most reckless speculations. To take one not entirely symbolic measure, from
1789 to 1861 Congress on average enacted 60 public bills and 6.4 public joint
resolutions per year-and each of these averaged less than a single page. 20
By 1992 the number had climbed to 609 bills52' and 50 resolutions, with one
act alone running over 1000 pages. 22 As Richard Epstein aptly notes, the
specter of modem government is so great that it suggests at least a prima facie
"conflict between the original constitutional design and the expansion of state
power."523 It is, moreover, a conflict dominated by the federal government.
Just as it is a truism that modem government engages in pervasive regulation,
it is likewise a clich6 that the bulk of this power has flowed to the White
House, Congress, and the Supreme Court. 24 Contrary to Professor Epstein,
these changes need not be considered illegitimate simply because they are epic.
Any number of approaches-a broad reading of the Reconstruction
Amendments, treating the New Deal as higher lawmaking, translating
Founding norms into evolving social and economic context, even custom and
stare decisis-insure that we are unlikely to return to a Colonial Williamsburg
version of Washington, D.C. anytime soon.5 25 Nonetheless, the Founding
commitment to energy cannot be discussed in a relative vacuum, apart from
these changes.
Nonetheless, many observers discount these changes on other grounds,
arguing that activity does not necessarily mean action. Washington, they say,
will spin its wheels in hearings and studies rather than take needed action, and
even when it does act, the measures that result are often at cross purposes.
Consider federal regulation of tobacco. During July 1995 the Food and Drug
Administration proposed the fairly self-evident measure of treating nicotine as
a drug; three months later the measure is still pending. 26 Then again,
successive Surgeons General have actively discouraged tobacco consumption,
520. McDONALD, supra note 276, at 347 n.2.
521. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, tbl. 433 at 279
(1994).
522. For example, the House bill that became the "Housing and Community Development Act of
1992" came in at 539 pages. H.R. 5334, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (enacted).
523. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN at
x (1985). Elsewhere I have criticized Professor Epstein's historical methods and conclusions. See Flaherty,
supra note 16, at 556-67. On this point, however, I believe that the sources support this assessment. See
id. at 575-79.
524. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 67, at 56.
525. On Reconstruction and the Reconstruction Amendments, see FONER, supra note 127; NELSON,
supra note 127; Kaczorowksi, supra note 127. On the New Deal as higher lawmaking, see 1 ACKERMAN,
supra note 105, at 34-57; Ackerman, supra note 117, at 508, 510-15. On stare decisis, see Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 748 (1988).
526. Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Held to Be Drug That Must Be Regulated, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1995,
at A18.
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as has Congress through its ban of broadcast cigarette advertising. Conversely,
Congress has also perennially subsidized tobacco growers, while the
Commerce Department has done its best to open overseas markets.527 All of
this is arguably but one example of "gridlock., 528 Considering all the actions
that the government does take regarding tobacco, such gridlock hardly
demonstrates insufficient energy. Rather, the phenomenon at least in part
reflects the price of the Founding strategy of joint accountability. A majority
of the American people may well desire a smoke-free nation. But given
tobacco farmers, employees, smokers, and libertarians, not enough of the
nation appears to desire a consistent policy against smoking to sustain one.
Until enough of the nation does, different branches of the government, and
different components of those branches, will-and should-continue to reflect
patchwork national attitudes with patchwork national policies.529 The point
is that there are a plethora of policies, however contradictory, to begin with.
An incalculable number of these policies could not exist without one
segment of government yet to be directly considered in this regard-the
administrative state. Here the not-entirely-symbolic measure is the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR). In its first year of publication, significantly 1939,
the CFR consisted of sixteen volumes; last year it had expanded to 200
volumes, exceeding 60,000 pages combined.530 As these numbers suggest,
delegation may have come about because the world became too complicated
for Congress to handle alone, but it also enabled Congress to address more
than it ever otherwise would have on its own. In this regard, the Progressives
and New Dealers who advocated agencies for their expertise, efficiency, and,
in turn, energy were right all along. This is not to ignore that in several other
regards they were not. An enormous literature chronicles the ways in which
agencies have not lived up to their original billing. They can be "captured" by
the industries they purport to regulate. They are subject to "triangulation," by
which the agency, Congress, and the President produce stalemate. They are,
more simply, often overstaffed, wasteful, and inert.531 All of this may well
be accurate, but it begs the relevant question. If the issue is fidelity to
Founding concerns about energy, agencies-warts and all-provide one more
527. Peter Schmeisser, Pushing Cigarettes Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1988, § 6 (Magazine), at
16.
528. See Symposium, The Constitutional Structure of National Government in the United States: Is
It in a State of Crisis?, 9 ADMIN. L.J. 1 (1995); see also Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Separation of Powers
and Administrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U. L. REV.
1064, 1090-91 (1981) (speaking of governmental "deadlock").
529. Cf. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 71 (using game theoretic model to analyze Framers'
understanding of balance).
530. See J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN Er AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH, 272 (6th ed. 1994);
see also Note, The Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations-A Reappraisal, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 439 (1966) (describing history and purpose of Federal Register Act).
531. On the inefficiencies of the administrative state, see Calabresi, supra note 69, at 50-55, 58-67,
78-81, 83-86; Shane, supra note 519, at 202-06.
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reason for constitutional scholars to look elsewhere for problems to lose sleep
over.
C. Separation of Powers Doctrine Restored
Only at this point can our experience with separation of powers be brought
to bear on doctrine intelligently. As Part ImI demonstrated, the Founders did not
assume a global tripartite division of government but struggled to a rough
consensus on certain more abstract values. As this part has suggested, evolving
circumstances since the Founding have yielded threats to these more abstract
purposes from quarters that the Founders themselves would have thought
surprising and counterintuitive. Assuming, as this part also does, that this
legacy should matter, how should the judiciary respond? The answer is
twofold. First, in light of the abstract Founding principles, courts should greet
separation of powers challenges with skepticism, and dust off in spirit, if not
in specifics, Alexander Bickel's concept of "passive virtues. ' 532 Yet second,
also in light of the Founding's general principles, the judiciary should
nonetheless intervene in certain instances. Those instances, however, should be
confined either to violations of clear textual provisions relating to the apex of
the three branches or to clear breaches of underlying separation of powers
principles themselves. In light of changed circumstances, it should be clear that
nearly every time that at least the Supreme Court has stepped in, those
interventions not only have ignored the passive virtues, they have frustrated the
values underlying the doctrine they purport to apply.
1. Separation of Powers and the Passive Virtues
The passive virtues, at least in the separation of powers context, are briefly
stated. The Supreme Court should rarely intervene in separation of powers
conflicts. When it does, it should do so principally when faced with a
compelling violation of one of the basic values of balance, joint accountability,
or sufficient energy. Otherwise, it should abide by the solutions worked out
through the political processes by the other branches. This approach follows
first because the formalist baseline is unhelpful for the types of conflicts that
commonly arise. It also follows because the functionalist baseline is inherently
difficult-though not necessarily impossible-for the judiciary to police.
Ironically, perhaps the closest formulation of this prescription to appear in
recent case law comes from Chief Justice Rehnquist, usually a formalist fellow
532. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 11 (1962). Here I use the term only in the abstract, to refer to a general stance of judicial
deference, rather than to the specific doctrinal devices Bickel had in mind. Such devices mainly comprised
a strict and vigorous application of doctrines related to standing, ripeness, and political questions, among
others. See id. at 111-98.
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traveller of Justice Scalia. Despite upholding the independent counsel, the
Chief Justice attempted to remain true to the formalist spirit as best he could
for most of the opinion. He relied on the text of the Appointments Clause to
defend the manner in which the independent counsel was selected. Likewise,
he drew upon Article Ill to uphold the judiciary's minimal oversight of the
post. In each instance, the text plausibly carved out certain exceptions to
presidential control of prosecutors.533 No such tack was available, however,
to deal with the limitations Congress imposed on the President's authority to
remove the independent counsel. At this point the Chief Justice simply
abandoned formalist categories altogether- 34  and embraced a rough
functionalist formulation keyed to balance. As he put it, the question ultimately
became
whether the Act, taken as a whole, violates the principle of separation
of powers by unduly interfering with the role of the Executive
Branch....
[That is, does] the Act "impermissibly undermine[ ]" the powers of
the Executive Branch, or "disrupt[ ] the proper balance between the
coordinate branches [by] prevent[ing] the Executive Branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions[?]" 535
The vagueness of this test has not been well received. Not surprisingly,
Justice Scalia could not believe that the Court could abandon the crisp tripartite
division of government power for the Chief Justice's inquiry. "The Court," he
declared, "replaced the clear constitutional prescription that the executive
power belongs to the President with a 'balancing test.' What are the standards
to determine how the balance is to be struck, that is, how much removal of
Presidential power is too much? ' 536 Commentators unsympathetic to
formalist categories have sounded a similar theme. Abner Greene, for example,
argues that "the Court's language is based on no theory of checks and
balances, but merely on an ad hoc judgment that the deprivation of presidential
power here is not too great."
537
533. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677-85 (1988).
534. Not only did he abandon the familiar three categories of legislative, executive, and judicial, but
he also abandoned the subcategories of "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" on which the Court relied
in Humphrey's Executor. He had to take this extra step since he, like Justice Scalia, assumed that a
prosecutor exercised core executive power. Id. at 687-88.
535. Id. at 693, 695 (fifth and sixth alterations in original) (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 433 (1977)).
536. Id. at 711 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
537. Greene, supra note 77, at 175. In place of formalist categories, Greene suggests that the Court
should invalidate legislative measures primarily when Congress is engaged in the aggrandizement of its
power, that is, when it retains power to oversee the implementation of the law through the legislative veto,
as in Chadhia, or through its removal powers, as in Bowsher. See id. at 158-77, 184-96.
While a provocative idea, Professor Greene's proposal does not ultimately provide a solution that
comports with fidelity. The aggrandizement model does provide a way for imposing a degree of coherence
1996] 1829
The Yale Law Journal
Yet the ad hoc nature of the Morrison approach is precisely what renders
it faithful to the Founding conception. Adhering to an abstract, purposive,
inquiry merely acknowledges that the Founders themselves were no more
precise. They can be fairly said to have reached broad agreement on certain
general purposes; they cannot be fairly said to have achieved a consensus on
any precise baseline capable of determining who can remove government
officials. The main exception to this, a profound one, comes at the top of the
government's structure, where constitutional text addresses the relationship
among the Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court in comparative
detail. Consequently, the Court rightfully should step in if Congress were to
appoint its own Commander in Chief of the armed forces, or eliminate the
Supreme Court, or direct the enforcement of a bill notwithstanding a successful
presidential veto. However epic, these scenarios are ultimately trivial to the
extent that they are far-fetched.
All of this suggests an approach along the following lines. First, the
absence of precise guidelines means that the Court will, and should, generally
leave to the political processes the question of how to divide government
authority. On this version of the passive virtues, the judiciary should defer to
mechanisms worked out by Congress and the President unless one or the other
side can establish a palpable violation. The lack of an exact baseline, in short,
should mean a high threshold for judicial intervention.
This approach follows, moreover, not just because the Founding offers no
precise baseline. It is also faithful to the general nature of those separation of
powers values of which we can be relatively certain. As Justice Scalia and
Professor Greene point out, rendering a judgment on the comparative power
of the various branches is at best controversial and at worst difficult. The same
insight applies with perhaps even greater force to the goals of joint
accountability and adequate energy. To acknowledge this, however, is merely
to recognize an additional reason for the Court generally to leave the resolution
of separation of powers disputes to the other branches and respect the
compromises that they hammer out. In this regard, the Court should adopt a
on the Court's otherwise irreconcilable case law. The aggrandizement inquiry nonetheless fails the test of
fidelity for at least two reasons. First, it does not fully liberate itself from formalism. In a broad sense,
Congress assumes-or aggrandizes-power every day, whether by statute, restrictions it places on
presidential removal power, or (formerly) legislative vetoes. For this reason, one needs some baseline to
figure out when impermissible aggrandizement takes place. Yet such a foreordained baseline is just another
type of formalism. Perhaps for this reason, Greene himself tends to slip into formalist jargon when defining
aggrandizement. See, e.g., id. at 161 ("[Under] the 'no congressional aggrandizement' theory: Congress may
not give itself a role in the removal of officers exercising executive power.").
Second, and more important, aggrandizement, in Professor Greene's sense, is not necessarily a bad
thing from the Founding perspective. To the contrary, preventing it can yield results that violate Founding
separation of powers values as surely as does formalism of the more orthodox variety. To invalidate the
legislative veto on the grounds of aggrandizement, for example, ignores the role that this device played in
maintaining a balance between Congress, which has been permitted to delegate its policymaking authority,
and the executive, which has been the main beneficiary of that delegation. See supra text accompanying
notes 354-78.
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stance not unlike its current (albeit shaky) approach to federalism in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.5 3 Given that the President
and even a post-New Deal Congress are more evenly matched than the federal
government and the states,539 the argument for such a generally passive
approach is more compelling here.
Second, "generally" does not mean "always." Fidelity in no way requires
either treating separation of powers disputes as nonjusticiable or as justiciable
but requiring judicial deference in every instance. Contrary to Justice Scalia's
position, an approach such as the Court employed in Morrison need hardly be
"standardless. ' '540 One set of standards comprises those certain clear textual
commands directed to the respective summits of the three branches. However
unlikely, should Congress attempt to appoint Cabinet members or other
"Officers of the United States, 54' the Court would have a clear textual basis
for intervention. The other set of standards consists of the general purposes
that the Founders sought to implement through their rough sketch. Apart from
specific textual commands, the values the Founders sought to implement
through their rough sketch do provide a substantive basis for judicial
intervention. Take, as did the Chief Justice, the preeminent goal of balance.
The presidency's current ascendancy notwithstanding, an act transferring all
authority to remove federal officials currently exercised by the President to
Congress would, at a stroke, so weaken the executive that the Court's
deference would be hard to justify. Conversely, balance-to say nothing of
joint accountability-may provide a nonformalist basis for reinvigorating
nondelegation on the grounds that Congress routinely gives away so much of
its policymaking authority as to result in the presidency's current ascendancy.
In these ways, the approach offered here parts company with Garcia, or at
least with Jesse Choper's proposal that conflicts over the division of power
between the federal government and the states should be treated as
nonjusticiable,542 a suggestion on which the Garcia Court drew.5 43 For the
same reason, this approach even more directly parts company with Professor
Choper's related proposal-which the Court has never adopted-that separation
538. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
539. For an incisive critique of Garcia's assumptions regarding the states' abilities to defend
themselves using constitutional mechanisms, see Kramer, supra note 143.
540. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 712 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
541. U.S. CONSr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
542. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-84 (1980).
543. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 n.1 1. At least one eminent commentator, perhaps in light of the Court's
explicit reliance on Choper's work, read the opinion to hold exactly this. See William w. Van Alstyne, The
Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1709, 1720-25 (1985). What Garcia actually says on this
point is another issue. As an initial matter, the Court's opinion does not purport to say that federalism
disputes are not justiciable but instead that, on the merits, they should usually be left to the political
process. Moreover, the Court's reasoning keeps open at least two possibilities for intervention. One would
be a breakdown in the political processes. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556. Another, substantive one would
be federal intrusion on matters central to state self-government. Id.
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of powers disputes "should be held to be nonjusticiable." 5" Unlike these
strategies, here there are substantive bases for intervention. While they may be
imprecise, and so only rarely enforceable, they better address the concerns of
the Founding generation than standards that, however definite, cannot make
this same claim.
2. Applications
From this perspective-the Founding emphasis on purpose and
process-the Court's historically novel forays into separation of powers have
been bad enough. From the perspective of changed circumstances--outlined
earlier-the outcome of those sallies has been even worse. Now should it be
clear how much worse. Too often the Court has managed to get matters
exactly wrong, going out of its way to exacerbate the very evils that separation
of powers was designed to curb. Most often these missteps have come about
when the Court has invalidated mechanisms that the political branches had
developed as responses to presidential government, including the legislative
veto as well as limits on executive removal and appointment authority. The
added irony is that in each of these instances, the Court has generally justified
its wrong turns by relying on history. That said, in none of these areas are the
precedents so well settled as to preclude a reevaluation, particularly given the
inconsistent rationales that support them and the Court's less-than-ironclad
stance on stare decisis 45 Such a reevaluation should in turn prevent further
missteps as the Court likely faces new separation of powers controversies such
as the line item veto. Regardless, should the Court continue down the path of
formalist activism, it should at least do so forthrightly, without fleeing to
questionable historical assumptions even more questionably applied.
a. The Legislative Veto
Many who defended the legislative veto suggested that the mechanism
comported with "original intent," but few if any among them realized how
strong their case was-strong enough, in fact, to merit the device's
resurrection. As Justice White made clear in Chadha, the legislative veto was
a classic response to the administrative state.546 In scores of instances,
544. CHOPER, supra note 542, at 263. See generally id. at 260-415 (elaborating proposal that
separation of powers be treated as nonjusticiable).
545. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 788, 854-55 (1992) (joint opinion); Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) (arguing that while stare decisis is "preferred course," it is not
an "inexorable command"); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47 (rejecting rule that turns on judicial appraisal of
whether government function is "integral" or "traditional"). For a careful consideration of the Court's recent
encounters with stare decisis, see Monaghan, supra note 525.
546. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-74 (,Vhite, J., dissenting) (tracing historical use of legislative
veto to resolve major constitutional and policy differences).
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Congress realistically had to, and constitutionally could, relinquish substantial
policymaking authority that could variously be termed legislative, executive,
adjudicative, administrative, or "quasi" variants of all of the above. Yet fearful
of ceding too much power, particularly to the executive branch, Congress
reserved vestigial authority to reverse policy determinations made by whatever
entity now exercised the power delegated away. In practical terms, this type
of reservation meant that Congress-or more problematically, either House-
no longer needed a two-thirds vote to rescind certain decisions but could
instead do so with a mere majority. The question remains: Is what was once
a classic response a constitutional one from the viewpoint of fidelity?
There is no reason why it should not be, least of all a formalist one. Then
again, this dispute, unlike others, does implicate fairly precise requirements.
Article I, Section 7 provides that "Every Bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States." 547 The strictures of
bicameralism and presentment, however, do not apply just because they exist.
To the contrary, fidelity points the other way on at least two counts-one
contingent, the other, unconditional. As many have argued before and after
Chadha, it is difficult to find an analytic difference between the power
Congress may permissibly give away in general and the portion of that same
power it opts to reserve in certain instances. 48 Absent some other
reason,549 either power should qualify as "legislative," and thus trigger
bicameralism and presentment, or neither should. Since the Supreme Court
long ago gave up subjecting delegated policymaking to Article I, Section 7, so
too should it abandon doing the same to reservations of this same authority.
In addition, and perhaps overlooked, the Bicameralism and Presentment
Clauses cut against application here precisely because they are express. Recall
that the developments leading to the Constitution's text indicate that its drafters
at most offered a sketch of separation of powers, inked in only at the top of
each branch, and even then not fully filled in.550 This context in turn
suggests that the two clauses at issue are best read as speaking not to every
governmental action that changes the legal relations between parties, which
even in the eighteenth century would have been incalculable. Rather, it
suggests that the clauses address departures in policy-including a system of
joint oversight for the implementation of those departures-which by virtue of
their novelty would be important enough to require the attention of both
547. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
548. See, e.g., Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 71, at 540-43; Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Separation
of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75
Nw. U. L. REv. 1064, 1078-92 (1981) (arguing against legislative veto despite its constitutional validity).
549. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV.
101, 112-16 (1984) (arguing that framework of checks and balances should be viewed as dynamic system
affecting all three branches of government).
550. See supra Part III.
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political branches. Put another way, neither the text nor its history specifies the
exact relationship among the branches apart from certain requirements at the
framework's apex. It follows that those requirements should not be extended
below that apex to such matters as implementation, which the document in
most other areas leaves to the political branches to work out among
themselves.
Conversely, there is every functionalist reason to look favorably upon the
legislative veto, at least with regard to those functions championed at the
Founding. First, consider balance, the centerpiece of the system. Given that
balance was a primary purpose for dividing government authority, and given
further that the executive has supplanted the legislature as the branch posing
the greatest threat to this balance, it follows that any jurist faithful to the past
should applaud, not deride, legislative attempts to maintain that balance,
especially when those attempts appear in part of a package delegating still
more power to the executive. t
Now turn to accountability, ostensibly the unitarian strong suit. Yet here,
contrary to unitarians left and right, the given from history is not unmediated
responsiveness to a single electorate by a single branch, but coordinate
responsibility to the people as reflected in several elections. On this score, the
last thing on a judge's mind should be preventing Congress from exercising
some vestigial control over policymaking decisions rendered by executive and
administrative officials who are otherwise answerable to the President, the
officer who today makes the most plausible yet problematic claim to an
electoral mandate. To recall the environmental hypothetical, a legislative veto
of a determination to sell off the national forests makes good sense both
because it checks the most powerful branch and because the existence of a
congressional majority, though not "veto proof," demonstrates a lack of
popular commitment to the policy at issue.
Nor, finally, does a concern for energy preclude the device. For all of their
worries about "democratic despotism," the Constitution's supporters to be sure
prized a government that would possess sufficient vigor to act. As an initial
matter, it is far from clear that a legislative veto necessarily frustrates this goal.
It may just as easily block executive attempts to suspend an action as impede
decision to take them, as Chadha itself demonstrates. But suppose that the
legislative veto did spell gridlock. In light of the governmental activity made
possible by the administrative state, the inefficiency wrought by the legislative
veto would have to be crippling before it raised a concern of constitutional
proportion. Fifty years of practice under the device suggests that this was
hardly the case.
551. Cf. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 980-84 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that Framers did not contemplate
broad restraint on congressional authority).
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b. Removal
The analysis is much the same when applied to removal authority, only
stronger. Congress early on considered placing statutory limitations on the
executive's presumed authority to dismiss government officials,5 52 at first
balking, but then reversing itself with the Tenure of Office Act of 1820.
Only in this century have limitations on presidential removal authority, mainly
restricting the exercise of that authority "for cause," become a staple of the
Court's separation of powers jurisprudence. These have included restrictions
upon the discharge of "executive" officials in Myers, of officials in
"independent agencies" in Humphrey's Executor, of Congress's own officials
who ostensibly executed the law in Bowsher, and, coming full circle, of
"executive" officials in Morrison. Each of these variations raises its own
particular considerations, especially Bowsher Nonetheless, they all share the
common thread of remaining faithful to the Founding conception as applied to
contemporary practice.
The removal issue, in fact, exposes formalist analysis at its least grounded.
Unlike the legislative veto, arguably no specific text serves as a candidate to
determine matters. Absent a "Removals Clause," or something reasonably
close, opponents of legislative involvement must retreat to an originalist
baseline that assumes that the removal of government officials is categorically
an executive task. In this way, unitarians can claim that the removal authority
is inherently executive, bootstrap the power to the all-purpose Executive
Vesting Clause, or both. Yet such an originalist baseline is precisely what the
original understanding does not support. While some of the Founders may have
believed that removal was necessarily an executive act, many, including the
proexecutive Hamilton, did not-too many to assume sufficient agreement on
the matter. Rather, the Constitution's silence left the issue, as it did so many
others, to the political processes that it explicitly set forth.
By contrast, limitations on executive removal authority comport with those
values that did initially command widespread support-or at least they comport
with modem values. Start again by considering balance. As the Humphrey's
Court recognized, preventing Congress from imposing neutral restrictions on
the dismissal of "independent" agency officials would accord the President a
powerful weapon for controlling administrative policymaking, even as
Congress was ceding even more policymaking control to such officials. 554 As
Brandeis earlier recognized 555 -and as the Court came to appreciate in
Morrison-a similar threat to balance may arise from unrestricted presidential
552. See Corwin, Tenure of Office, supra note 54, at 355-57 (discussing legislative efforts to limit
power of removal).
553. Tenure of Office Act of 1820, ch. 102, 3 Stat. 582 (1820).
554. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
555. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 291-95 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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control over "purely executive" officials as well.556 In the abstract,
policymaking by officials subject to congressional approval may well present
a closer case. In the real world of presidential dominance, however, such
arrangements should not necessarily trigger constitutional concern. They may
even functiol to maintain interbranch balance, especially when Congress limits
its own removal authority to neutral, "for cause" reasons.
As with the legislative veto, a proper reconstruction of accountability turns
this value against its usual champions. When the goal is diffusing
accountability rather than concentrating it, and when the presidency lays the
most plausible claim to the concentrated version, congressional involvement
in the critical area of removal should meet with approval instead of
invalidation. Moreover, the case is even more compelling than that of the
legislative veto. Here, Congress would have no other way of checking officials
who, to follow the example, promulgated massive environmental legislation at
the President's behest, in a manner consistent with a general statutory
delegation but not reflective of an electorate that has yet to back the
President's approach fully by returning a compliant House and Senate.
Admittedly, the value of joint accountability provides less support for
arrangements in which, as in Bowsher, Congress itself wields removal
authority absent presidential involvement. In this situation, even a "for cause"
limitation on removals would not expand the input of the elected branches.
That said, the restriction to neutral criteria would at least lessen concern about
the concentration of unlimited authority.
As a final matter, efficiency concerns again may not support the device in
question, but they do not undermine it either. Once more, it is not clear that
removal limitations will always work to produce less government rather than
more. Insulated officials may just as easily resist presidential attempts to
reduce governmental activity as expand it, a discovery made by President
Reagan much to his chagrin. But even if they did produce stasis, removal
limitations would not rise to the level of constitutional concern. As with the
legislative veto, post-New Deal experience suggests that the mechanism has
not exactly impeded the government's ability to act with sufficient energy.
Short of that, the extent to which it hampers the President's efficient "chain of
command" is simply the price of balance and joint accountability.
c. The Line Item Veto
The general approach outlined here need not be backward looking. Take,
for example, the "line item veto," an idea whose time may have arrived, but
556. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693-97 (1988).
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which itself has yet to arrive in the Supreme Court. 57 Several variations of
this idea are currently under consideration, but probably the strongest medicine
proposes that Congress grant the President power to "punch out" certain
discrete items in an omnibus bill that would otherwise survive." On this
model, if a bill promoting both guns and butter came to the White House, a
veto could send the provision dealing with butter back to Capitol Hill for a
potential override, yet allow the guns provision to become law. Should the
Court interfere with such a mechanism? If so, how?
To answer the first question, this medicine would be strong enough to
rebut the ordinary presumption against judicial intervention. For starters, a
direct delegation to a coequal branch-in contrast to the legislative veto and
removal authority--does not involve an area ordinarily left to the political
processes. Instead, it directly implicates those processes, those parts of the
separation of powers framework most extensively "inked in at the top." In this
instance, Article I, Section 7 sets out in extended detail the procedures by
which "Every Bill" not approved by the President shall be returned,
reconsidered, and restored (or not). 59 Put another way, the text speaks to the
relationship between coordinate branches themselves, rather than to how any
of the branches deals with "third party" subordinates. In this fashion, the
subject matter implies a more compelling case for judicial intervention. Yet
even if it did not, there would be a separate and sufficient reason for the Court
to act. In its strong form, the line item veto fundamentally undermines the
purposes underlying separation of powers given current government practice.
Not coincidentally, this failing goes a long way toward answering the second
question of how the Court should act.
The same cannot be said of formalist analysis. Though the text generally
sets out the relationship between the branches themselves, in this instance it
provides no clear answer. The type of "bill" to be presented to the President
is arguably indivisible, but also arguable is the position that a measure
pertaining to dozens of disparate topics is not a "bill" within the meaning of
the term. Unfortunately, formalism, which ordinarily promises precise answers
in the absence of text altogether, provides no clear answers either. On one
hand, determining the scope of a bill would seem to be "quintessentially
557. For recent considerations of the line item veto, see Calabresi, supra note 69, at 78-81; Colloquy,
Presidential Lawmaking Powers: Vetoes, Line Item Vetoes, Signing Statements, Executive Orders, and
Delegations of Rulemaking Authority, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 533 (1990); Daniel S. Strouse, The Structure of
Appropriations Legislation and the Governor's Item Veto Power: The Arizona Experience, 36 ARIz. L.
REV. 113 (1994).
558. The House of Representatives has already approved a bill embodying this version. See H.R. 2,
104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995). By contrast, the Senate passed a version in which budget items in an
appropriations bill would be enrolled separately, prior to the President's signing. See S. 4, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995).
559. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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legislative," as deciding whether to prosecute is "quintessentially
executive."56 Congress, therefore, should not be able to cede this
responsibility through the line item veto. On the other hand, the concept of a
bill or law arguably presupposes a measure in which the elements are
sufficiently germane to meaningful discussion and deliberation. 6'
Accordingly, Congress should be able to allow the President to reject certain
provisions and accept others so long as they are unrelated.
By contrast, attention to the Founding values that gave rise to separation
of powers clearly cuts against the strong form of the line item veto. The device
dramatically fails the test of balance and might even have done so back when
Congress was viewed as the most threatening branch. Suffice it to say that in
present circumstances, balance is ill served by a device through which
Congress not only gives away significant power, but gives it away directly to
the President rather than to subordinate departments or agencies.
Likewise, the line item veto impedes joint accountability. Here the problem
is that the mechanism-again in its strong form-permits the enactment of
laws without the approval of the different branches, which themselves
represent different manifestations of the people. Suppose the President uses a
line item veto to reject the butter portion of a legislative package but allows
the gun provision to become a statute. There are two problems inherent in such
a course of action. The first difficulty occurs because of the effect of such a
veto on the issue of whether guns and butter should be joined at all. However
appropriate it may be for the President to disagree with Congress on this score,
the President's action denies Congress the opportunity to override this
determination and relink the measures by a two-thirds majority. Instead, the
two items are severed by virtue of one becoming law, even though the popular
will, as reflected through congressional elections, strongly favors the linkage.
The more dramatic problem is that the gun measure will become a binding
norm even though it might never have commanded a majority standing alone,
absent legislative bargaining.
Finally, while the line item veto would probably not violate the goal of
sufficient government energy, it does not draw strength from this value either.
To the contrary, the device would most likely reduce the level of government
regulation and expenditure, or so both its advocates and opponents assume.
This expected reduction would have to be epic to be of constitutional concern
given the enormous degree of governmental activity that prompts calls for the
560. A formalist so inclined might, moreover, point to prima facie historical support in I WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *176-77, to say nothing of the Constitution's text, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5,
cl. 2 & § 7, cl. 2.
561. To what extent such a relatively strong conception of germaneness constituted eighteenth-century
practice is another matter. See Michael B. Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87 NW.
U. L. REV. 735, 762-66 (1993) (rejecting assumption that restricted sense of bill was one historical
meaning of term).
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line item veto. The Republic may well be entering an era in which it is
rethinking the outer limits of appropriate governmental action. Until it does,
or at least until it does so on the constitutional plane, there will be at least a
latent tension between the line item veto as a way to reduce government and
the Founding goal of a government blessed with sufficient vigor.
V. CONCLUSION
The specific recommendations advanced in this Article must for the
present remain provisional, but the general approach from which they come
should be conclusive. It should be conclusive, at any rate, so long as our
constitutional past has a place in present constitutional discourse. Further
consideration will no doubt lead to further refinement of particular
applications, especially prospective controversies such as the line item veto.
But at least it should now be clear that there is a powerful case for an
approach that considers separation of powers questions in light of the purposes
generally agreed upon to justify the doctrine when one novel variant of it was
adopted in the Constitution. And at the very least, it should be plain that the
history of this development does not support the formalist assumptions too
often taken for granted in present case law and commentary. There may well
be compelling reasons for the unitary executive in particular, and formalist
analysis in general. History is not one of them.
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